



ADVANCE SOCIAL SCIENCE ARCHIVE JOURNAL

Available Online: <https://assajournal.com>

Vol. 04 No. 01. July-September 2025. Page# 4604-4612

Print ISSN: [3006-2497](#) Online ISSN: [3006-2500](#)Platform & Workflow by: [Open Journal Systems](#)<https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.17560881>

China's Belt and Road Initiative in the Middle East: Energy Security, Strategic Realignment, and Geopolitical Implications

Dr. Syed Shuja Uddin

Assistant Professor Department of International Relations, Federal Urdu University of Arts, Sciences & Technology, Karachi

dr.shuja.ir@fuuast.edu.pk

Mr. Muneeb Aurangzeb

M.Phil. Scholar Department of International Relations, Federal Urdu University of Arts, Sciences & Technology, Karachi

muneeb.ir@fuuast.edu.pk

Mr. Muhammad Sharif Khan

M.Phil. Researcher Department of International Relations, Federal Urdu University of Arts, Sciences & Technology, Karachi

sharifkhan_24@yahoo.com

Mr. Abdul Talal Khan

M.Phil. Researcher Department of International Relations, Federal Urdu University of Arts, Sciences & Technology, Karachi

abdultalal.khan@fuuast.edu.pk

ABSTRACT

The Middle East has variable importance in politics, the economy, and military power on the international level. It also contains a strategic point for the implementation of the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) which focuses on the availability of the landways and seaways. China has deepened the level of relations with Middle Eastern countries after the initiation of BRI. This paper thus asks the following research question "Why does Chinese policy aim at the Middle East for BRI project? and how BRI of China will alter dynamics of Middle East? The following research questions are accordingly: In what ways are China's relations with the Middle Eastern nations influencing, bilateral trade and commerce and efficient functioning of the Initiative. This chapter employs a qualitative approach deliberately comprising of the existing literature, policy papers as well as official declarations to provide the readers with a clear understanding of the topic. It also borrows fruitful results from the general approach that are comprehensive and accurate and immune to criticism. This analysis will be conducted in line with the concepts of realism theory. Thus, there is a logical systematic way of how China's relations with the Middle Eastern states impacts bilateral trade, commercial relations as well as the conducive execution of the BRI. This research reveals the realism approach towards increase China's influence in the Middle East due to diplomatic diplomacy and oil which has given the regional actor options to expand the circle of relations.

Keywords: Belt and Road Initiative, Changing Dynamics, Middle East, Bilateral Trade.

Introduction

The Middle East is strategically important to China's foreign policy goals, as demonstrated by the country's 2013 launch of (BRI). The program uses the Maritime Silk Road and the economic belt of the Silk Road to link markets from the East China Sea to the Mediterranean. China's Economic Corridor represents the Middle East even though the Initiative (BRI) includes more than six initial pathways. The primary objectives of China's initiative project (BRI) and soft power tools in the Middle East are stability, rebuilding, and peace. China's role in the March 2023 restart of diplomatic relations between Iran and Saudi Arabia highlights its belief that developing friendly diplomatic relations and enhancing shared security perceptions are crucial (Chen, 2023). China has maintained a distance from direct risks in the Middle East, but new are challenges expected due to the outcome of nuclear negotiations with Iran. China has expanded its bilateral relationship with Iran, signing a 25-year cooperation pact, and has been cooperating with Iran more recently. China has also strengthened economic relations with Kuwait, United Arab Emirates, Saudi Arabia, Qatar and Oman, Bahrain, particularly in the oil and gas, telecommunications infrastructure, and technology sectors. China has also played a significant role in projects in Egypt, particularly the business district. China's (BRI) has demonstrated shared interests and enhanced cooperation with other projects supporting economic and social reforms. The keystone of the BRI is the creation and expansion of the Silk Road, which would unite China to the Mediterranean through the SCS, the "Indian Ocean" Egypt Canal. A constant supply of oil is vital because of China's fast modernization and economic growth, which have raised the country's energy consumption (Lukeš, 2023). The Middle East is essential to supplying this need because of its huge oil reserves. As rival regional countries in the Middle East vie for influence, China is emerging as a crucial strategic player. China has improved its stance and increased its involvement in the region because of shifting security dynamics and rising tensions. The Chinese government and state-owned companies have been working on the Silk Road Industrial Belt (BRI) since 2015, with the help of a strategy document that outlines objectives, areas of priority for cooperation, and the layout of an industrial corridor. The program's goals are to promote open trade, financial integration, political collaboration, facility connectivity, and interpersonal relationships with participant states. With cooperation from more than 130 countries, the BRI attracted international notice at its inaugural conference held in Beijing in 2017. The Belt and Road Initiative links President Xi Jinping's leadership and China's long-term foreign policy objectives. Which is stated in the Chinese Communist Party constitution. China has carefully built connections with countries in East Asia to protect its energy supplies going forward. This is a strategic move. China's non-interventionist doctrine reflects its efforts to maintain objective and diplomatic relations with Middle Eastern nations (Moonakal, 2022).

China's Policies Centered on the Middle East

The Middle East's strategic location—connecting the East and West—and its status as the world's largest provider of conventional energy are the primary reasons for China's increasing policy focus on the region. China's imports of oil from the Persian Gulf are facilitated via the Development Road initiative, which complements its broader Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). These efforts align with Beijing's state-led development approach, where national ambitions are largely driven by economic objectives under state-owned enterprises (Multinational Corporations and Foreign Policy, 2025). Rather than engaging the region as a collective entity,

China prefers to build bilateral relations with individual Middle Eastern nations, which, in effect, challenges U.S. strategic influence in the area (Ali, Aurangzeb, Uddin, & Farooq, 2025).

Following the BRI announcement in 2013, the United States employed multiple sanctions and diplomatic strategies to disrupt China's growing engagement in the Middle East. The U.S. has also sought to counter Beijing's regional influence by strengthening alliances such as the G20 economic corridor between India, the Middle East, and Europe (Aurangzeb, Uddin, Farooq, & Ali, 2025). These developments reflect the intensifying global economic competition between Washington and Beijing, increasingly shaped by digital infrastructure, artificial intelligence, and strategic defense cooperation (Aziz, Uddin, & Aurangzeb, 2025; Uddin, Irfan, & Aurangzeb, 2025). China's energy dependency further reinforces its engagement in the Arab world—it is the world's largest consumer of fossil fuels, importing around 70% of its oil and 40% of its natural gas. To ensure long-term energy security, China signed a \$60 billion deal with Qatar for natural gas supply and became the top commercial partner of the Arab world by 2020 (Uddin, Farooq, Ali, & Aurangzeb, 2025). In 2021, Beijing signed a 25-year Strategic Partnership Agreement with Iran, which sparked widespread criticism in Western capitals due to its geopolitical implications. Additionally, China has established comparable partnerships with over a dozen Arab nations, maintaining balanced relations even with rival regional powers.

In accordance with its principle of non-interference, China sustains a “positive balance” in its Middle Eastern policy while subtly expanding its diplomatic footprint. Beijing has expressed readiness to facilitate dialogue in conflicts such as those involving Israel-Palestine, Iraq, Libya, Sudan, and Yemen—demonstrating its growing interest in global mediation and stability (Muneeb & Uddin, 2025). Its participation in the Iran nuclear talks further illustrates the transformation of China's foreign policy from passive engagement to proactive diplomatic influence within the multipolar world order (Barter Trade Agreements and Digital Currency Integration, 2025).

Since 2013, more than 200 significant energy and infrastructure projects have been finished in the region, achieving many of the “hard connectivity” and “soft connectivity” goals of the Belt and Road Initiative despite significant implementation challenges. Many ports, railroads, highways, power plants, pipelines, communities, industrial parks, and free-trade zones that connect East and West from the Persian Gulf to the Mediterranean Sea built or sponsored by Chinese firms in the Middle East. These projects all make use of the phenomenon known as a hub. These networks include vaccine production and distribution hubs, joint satellite launches, lunar explorations, and collaboration on the Navigation Satellite System.

Middle Eastern officials are frequently visiting Beijing to further the Road Initiative (BRI), focusing on policy communication, trade, financial integration, and people-to-people ties. The BRI integrated with regional development plans like KSA, Qatar, and Egypt Vision 2030, connecting their destiny to China views the Middle East as a counterbalance to the North's excessive dominance, particularly in matters concerning its core interests, including Taiwan, Tibet, Hong Kong, and Xinjiang. China's foreign minister's praise by the Organization of Islamic Cooperation (OIC) makes Accusations of genocide and crimes against humanity less painful, as it sees the Middle East as a counterbalance, 2023).

Chinese Investment in the Middle East

China is now a major commercial partner and foreign investor in the Middle East, having considerably increased its political, economic, and security footprint throughout the last ten

years. In 2017, China opened its 1st military base in Djibouti located near the Suez Canal and “Bab al-Mandab” Strait. This approach also gave Beijing significant political influence, facilitating the base’s launch. Chinese military experts consider Djibouti a strategic strong point for securing trade routes. As China’s interests expand, it may build a second stronghold in the area to protect its trade along the Strait of Hormuz. The waterway is a known focus area for Chinese military planners, as it traversed nearly one-third of seaborne crude oil annually. China built several facilities at Khalifa Port in the United Arab Emirates (UAE) and an oil pipeline that runs to the Port of Fujairah; at the newly developed Duqm Port in Oman, it is investing billions of dollars. These investments benefit China and its allies economically in the short run, but they could also pave the way for the PLA to further project power in the area of the Strait of Hormuz. Three times more than the combined imports of crude oil from the US and EU, China imported \$128 billion worth of it from nations around the Strait of Hormuz and the Persian Gulf in 2021. Up to 45% of China’s oil imports pass via the strait, according to analysts there. As a result, they have advocated for increased coordination with neighbors to guarantee the safe transit of energy resources. State-owned companies (SOEs) in China have invested a lot of money in attempting to resolve the Hormuz problem. The Habshan-Fujairah oil pipeline, which avoids Hormuz by traveling 380 kilometers from the UAE, is interior to the Port of Fujairah, built between 2008 and 2012 by the China Petroleum Engineering and Construction Company.

Although there were multiple delays during construction, the \$3.3 billion pipeline was eventually finished. A significant Fujairah terminal that runs 36 tanks for the storage of oil, gasoline, and other chemicals is 50% controlled by Sinopec, another significant state-owned company. Fawn Port was constructed on Iraq's Persian Gulf coast, to open for business in 2025. Complete with industrial zones and services, the port is set to become the largest container port in the Middle East with a planned 90 berths. With an estimated yearly capacity of 99 million tons, Fawn Port spans an area of more than 16 square kilometers. As part of the "Development Road" project, a 1200-kilometer road and train network connects Fawn Port to Turkey. The goal of this 17 billion USD project is to build a corridor for transportation from Asia to Europe. Starting in Basra and extending via the Mosul, Baghdad, Karbala, Najaf, and Karbala provinces, the Development Road is expected to reach Turkey via Mersin Port, where it can link to Europe in less time than the Suez Canal. The Chinese government has stated that it intends to make financial contributions to both projects in addition to reaching a \$10 billion agreement with Iraq. China's interests in the region are reinforced by these projects' basic qualities. (Çalışkan, 2023).

The Middle East’s Dynamics will Shift Because of China’s Belt and Road Plan

China changed its position in the Middle East by tying it to the Eurasian and Indian Ocean with the unveiling of the “Belt Road Initiative”. China's strategy towards the Middle East is becoming increasingly ambitious and challenging concerning diplomatic, security, and economic matters, given the region's critical role in the BRI. These can be seen in two white papers from China “Vision and Actions” which outline five areas of cooperation to prioritize when building relationships with states part of the Initiative (BRI): political coordination, infrastructural connection, unhindered People-to-people, trade, and financial integration linkages. The Chinese narrative is that the BRI is a development-centered effort supported by the lack of security and military cooperation. These priorities offer a roadmap for China’s growth in its connections with the Middle East in the upcoming year. Arab countries have traditionally been loyal allies of the US in international affairs, but current developments seem to indicate a change in those

relationships. The deal between Saudi Arabia and Iran has attracted a lot of attention because of worries expressed by the Western world and the Gulf Cooperation Council regarding Iran's possible danger to international security and regional stability. China, which is viewed as the US's principal competitor, has helped to arrange the Iran-KSA pact, with the KSA serving as the US's most important Middle Eastern strategic partner. (Comms & Comms, 2020)

China and the KSA are developing closer strategic ties, which may influence US dominance in the area. The CIA director had previously visited KSA; now, White House national security advisor Jake Sullivan went there to speak with Saudi authorities. Despite the US and KSA's continued security collaboration, China can perceive prospects for economic growth. Moreover, China is the Kingdom of

Saudi Arabia's main oil buyer, a substantial position. Additionally, before the completion of the Saudi Iranian agreement, China presented the concept of the "Global Security Initiative," which attempts to resolve international disputes the region's changing geopolitics is also evident in the recent of Syria's president., Bashar al- Assad to the Arab League following an almost 12-year suspension. In addition to appealing to Middle Eastern countries with possible US-Middle Eastern disputes, the situation questions Western principles.

It is anticipated that Chinese businesses in a range of sectors would look to expand their existence in Asia and the Middle East to strengthen China's political and economic influence, after China's position as a negotiator in the agreement between the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia and Iran. This might put Western businesses operating in the Middle East's market share in danger. The defense sectors are expected to influence. For a long time, Saudi Arabia has been the primary customer of the United States, which has supplied the GCC with the majority of its contemporary armaments. It is uncertain that China is growing sway in the GCC. It is possible, though, that American excitement for supplying the GCC with state-of-the-art weapon systems will be tempered by the growing influence of China in the area. Further, the GCC's defense contracts, which are frequently politicized and hence result in intense competition from China's defense organizations, may influenced by China's growing influence.

Although there is no denying the importance of continuously strengthening the GCC's armed forces to protect economic interests and preserve stability, it may argue that the GCC's military spending is in a dangerous scenario. With the recent deal between Saudi Arabia and Iran and supposing that Iran shows a genuine desire to maintain peaceful relations with both the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia and the GCC, it is possible that military spending in the GCC will decline shortly. The GCC has been purchasing significant and strategic weapons from the US over the years to reduce the danger posed by Iran. Given the present situation, it is very likely that as the peace accord implemented, the KSA and the GCC will progressively redirect their financial resources from US defense procurement to other developing economic priorities. This may be especially true for the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, where a peace agreement with Iran influenced by China will guarantee the country's security while also reducing dangers and threats from the southern border with afflicted by the Houthis in Yemen, who are supported by Iran. In keeping with Vision 2030 of Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman, the choice to give the Kingdom's vital economic developments and strategic investments priority related to the requirement of reducing the possibility of clashes with Iran. In this sense, regional defense economics in the years to come will reveal if the increase or decrease in defense GCC defense spending has a visible influence on

the GDP of the countries as opposed to shifting defense budgets to other forms of economic development. (ELDoh, 2023).

The oil production cut in OPEC+ in October is a sign of political shifts in the GCC and Saudi Arabia, countering US strategic interests and helping Russia get under Western sanctions due to the conflict in Ukraine. The KSA reduced its oil production in support of Russia and Egypt, a strong friend of the US, planned to provide military assistance to Russia. The US has also claimed that South Africa supplied missiles and arms to a sanctioned Russian cargo ship. South Africa's President Cyril Ramaphosa called the Egyptian government to discuss the Russian-Ukrainian crisis and its negative influence on developing countries, particularly in Africa. Efforts influenced by the KSA.

Russia and Iran have provided significant support to the Assad administration over the past decade, despite strong resistance from most Arab nations, except for Egypt. The United Arab Emirates has welcomed President al-Assad with affection and invited him to the COP28 climate summit. This is the first high-level visit of the Saudi kingdom official to Syria since the start of the Syrian war. Saudi Arabia has resumed diplomatic relations with the Syrian Arab Republic and invited al-Assad to attend the forthcoming Arab League summit in Jeddah on 1 May. The way the Arab countries stand toward President al-Assad on the regional stage is indicative of the aligned political changes occurring in the Middle East. U.S.A.A maintains a non-normalization stance with the Syrian regime. Arab countries' efforts to normalize relations with Syria and Iran have given them a strategic advantage, allowing them to influence Hezbollah in Lebanon. Iranian nuclear program ambitions remain uncertain, even after normalized diplomatic relations with Iran.

Findings

The key significance of the Center East for China holds vital centrality for China due to its part as a key supplier of routine vitality. China (BRI) could be a comprehensive methodology that points to fortifying financial ties, upgrading discretionary relations, and securing a steady supply of oil from the locale. China has essentially expanded its financial and discretionary engagement with Center Eastern countries through the BRI. The activity includes major framework ventures, ventures in different segments such as oil and gas, and the creation of financial passages. BRI and Security Elements. China's inclusion within the Center East through the BRI is not exclusively financial but moreover contributes to changing security flow. The establishment of a military base in Djibouti and potential future fortifications illustrate China's captivate in securing its trade courses, particularly inside the purposely basic Strait of Hormuz. Move-in Unions and Geopolitical Affect. The course of action between Saudi Arabia and Iran, energized by China, challenges U.S. dominance inside the region. This move has recommendations for defense contracts, military contributing, and geopolitical stream, conceivably influencing the GCC's reliance on the U.S. for defense obtainment. Influence on Regional Clashes and Watchfulness. China's position on regional clashes, such as the Gaza emergency, adjusts with Russia and may decline weight inside the Center East. The country's geopolitical maneuvers in response to regional clashes may influence its associations with other nations, particularly in East Asia, and play a portion of the world control stream.

Recommendations

a. Improvement of Money-related Affiliations

Center Eastern nations need to consider separating their budgetary affiliations to preserve a key separate from over-reliance on any single country, given the changing geopolitical scene. This

appears to incorporate invigorating ties with various nations, checking both ordinary partners and rising assistants.

b. Key Course of Action and Coordination

Countries inside the Center East need to carefully study their national interface and intentionally alter themselves to investigate the moving geopolitical flow.

c. Balanced approach to defense contributing

The GCC and Saudi Arabia need to get a balanced approach to defense contributing, considering the progressing geopolitical circumstances. Studying the required for defense obtainment and redirecting financial resources toward other money-related needs can contribute to long-term dauntlessness.

d. Optional engagement with Various Powers

Optional endeavors got to open up past routine partners, cultivating relations with a collection of around-the-world powers. Locks in with both China and the U.S., among others, can grant Center Eastern nations with utilization and versatility in investigating geopolitical challenges.

e. Imperative Examination of Regional Clashes

Center Eastern nations have to be carefully assessing their positions on regional clashes, considering the potential proposals for their geopolitical standing. Understanding the nuances of around-the-world control flow and keeping up a key separate from involvement that will antagonistically influence the national interface is pivotal.

f. Imperativeness Security Measures

Given China's reliance on Center Eastern oil, nations inside the region have to explore the imperativeness of security measures, ensuring unfaltering and commonly valuable essentialness organizations. This includes key organizing to guard the monetary interface while keeping up geopolitical autonomy.

Conclusion

China's approach intensely centers on the Center East China's Belt Street Activity (BRI) has altogether affected its position within the Center East, tying it to Eurasia and the Indian Sea locale. China's methodology is progressively driven and challenging in security and financial things. The GCC's military investing is in a perilous circumstance due to the later bargain between Saudi Arabia and Iran, which may lead to a decrease in military investment. The GCC and Saudi Arabia may divert their money-related assets from the US defense acquirement to other financial needs. The region's changing geopolitics, influenced by China, Russia, and Iran, are critical due to its vital area and status as the world's biggest routine vitality supplier. The US has utilized sanctions and discretionary measures to piece relations.

China is the greatest client of fossil fuels, bringing in 40% of its normal gas and 70% of its oil. China has extended its nearness within the Center East, especially in Djibouti, representing its "first civilian, at that point military" mindset. This collaboration facilitates the financial recovery and transition to military use. China may construct a moment fortress to ensure exchange along the Strait of Hormuz. China's position on the Gaza emergency is disappointing to Israel and serves as a stark update of the treacheries confronted by the Palestinian individuals. China may have exacerbated territorial pressures by adjusting its later words with those of Russia. By the by, whereas the West is focused on Israel's Gaza strife, China may keep an eye on the circumstances and utilize it to encourage its geopolitical objective on Taiwan and the South China Ocean. This might make it conceivable for China to force its will on the zone.

References

- Ali, R. A., Aurangzeb, M., Uddin, S. S., & Farooq, A. (2025). *The role of artificial intelligence in the foreign policy of USA and China*. *Journal for Current Sign*, 3(1), 175–186. Retrieved from <https://currentsignreview.com/index.php/JCS/article/view/85>
- Aurangzeb, M., Uddin, S. S., Farooq, A., & Ali, R. A. (2025). *Offensive realism and the Pacific Ocean: Understanding geopolitical rivalries through Mearsheimer's lens*. *Policy Journal of Social Science Review*, 3(1), 268–278. Retrieved from <https://policyjssr.com/index.php/PJSSR/article/view/108>
- Aziz, Z., Uddin, S. S., & Aurangzeb, M. (2025). *Artificial intelligence and data analytics in the US-China rivalry: Strategic implications for foreign policy, national security, and global diplomacy in the digital age*. *Pakistan Journal of Social Science Review*, 4(6), 1–11. Retrieved from <https://pjsrjournal.com/index.php/Journal/article/view/279>
- Barter trade agreements and digital currency integration: A new paradigm for Pakistan-Russia relations Russia partnership in a multipolar world. (2025). *Research Consortium Archive*, 3(1), 271–285. Retrieved from <http://rcresearcharchive.com/index.php/Journal/article/view/79>
- Çalışkan, S. (2023, September 20). *Faw Port and 'Development Road': US-China rivalry comes to the Middle East*. *Geopolitical Monitor*. Retrieved from <https://www.geopoliticalmonitor.com/faw-port-and-development-road-us-china-rivalry-comes-to-the-middle-east/>
- Chaziza, M. (2023, June 4). *A decade of China's One Belt One Road in East Asia*. *The National Interest*. Retrieved from <https://nationalinterest.org/feature/decade-china%E2%80%99s-belt-and-road-initiative-middle-east-206525>
- Chen, W. (2023, November 9). *Evolution of China's interaction with Middle Eastern countries under the Belt and Road Initiative*. Retrieved from <https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC10635491/>
- Comms, E., & Comms, E. (2020, October 22). *China's great game in the Middle East*. *ECFR*. Retrieved from https://ecfr.eu/publication/china_great_game_middle_east/
- ELDoh, M. (2023, May 22). *The Middle East's shifting political landscape*. *Geopolitical Monitor*. Retrieved from <https://www.geopoliticalmonitor.com/the-middle-east-s-shifting-political-landscape/>
- ELDoh, M. (2023, October 16). *Middle East on the brink: Why the conflict in Gaza must stop*. *Geopolitical Monitor*. Retrieved from <https://www.geopoliticalmonitor.com/middle-east-on-the-brink-why-the-conflict-in-gaza-must-stop/>
- Jiang. (2022). *The great power competition: Volume 2*. *Google Books*. Retrieved from <https://books.google.com.pk/books?id=eFpcEAAAQBAJ>
- Lukeš. (2023, April 24). *China's Belt and Road Initiative: Transforming the Middle East at a cost to the U.S*. *CBAP*. Retrieved from <https://cbap.cz/archiv/5295>
- Multinational corporations and foreign policy: A comparative analysis of U.S. and China's global economic influence*. (2025). *Journal of Management & Social Science*, 2(1), 646–663. Retrieved from <https://rjmssjournal.com/index.php/7/article/view/289>
- Moonakal, N. A. (2022, July 9). *The influence and implications of China's growing influence in the Middle East*. *The Diplomat*. Retrieved from <https://thediplomat.com/2022/07/the-influence-and-implications-of-chinas-growing-influence-in-the-middle-east/>

- Muneeb, M., & Uddin, S. S. (2025). *The artificial intelligence (AI) era: Challenges and opportunities for Pakistan and the Global South*. *Journal for Current Sign*, 3(2), 254–264. Retrieved from <https://currentsignreview.com/index.php/JCS/article/view/155>
- Ratiu, A. (2023, October 4). *Full throttle in neutral: China's new security architecture for the Middle East*. *Atlantic Council*. Retrieved from <https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/in-depth-research-reports/issue-brief/full-throttle-in-neutral-chinas-new-security-architecture-for-the-middle-east/>
- Uddin, S. S., Farooq, A., Ali, R. A., & Aurangzeb, M. (2025). *The role of human rights in China and USA's foreign policy approaches*. *Journal of Social Signs Review*, 3(2), 218–230. Retrieved from <https://socialsignsreview.com/index.php/12/article/view/118>
- Uddin, S. S., Irfan, M., & Aurangzeb, M. (2025). *Artificial intelligence in strategic defense cooperation: Analyzing the Pakistan-Russia partnership in a multipolar world*. *Dialogue Social Science Review (DSSR)*, 3(11), 1–14. Retrieved from <https://dialoguesreview.com/index.php/2/article/view/1154>
- Waseem, S. (2023, March 22). *Changing dynamics in the Middle East: A way forward for Saudi Arabia and Iran?* *The Friday Times*. Retrieved from <https://thefridaytimes.com/22-Mar-2023/changing-dynamics-in-the-middle-east-a-way-forward-for-saudi-arabia-and-iran>