The Arab Spring and Israel's Security Environment: Threats, Opportunities, and Adjustments

Dr. Ramzan Shahid
Assistant Professor, Department of Political Science and International Relations, University of Gujrat, Pakistan
Dr. Muhammad Naveed Ul Hasan Shah
Assistant Professor, Department of Political Science and IR, University of Central Punjab, Lahore
Dr. Iftikhar Ahmad
Assistant Professor, department of International Relations, University of Management and Technology Sialkot

Abstract

The Arab spring brought about the radical political changes in the Middle East and North Africa and it had a considerable effect on the security landscape in Israel. This paper takes a closer look at the causes and the processes of the Arab Spring and specifically the uprising in Egypt in 2011 and the protest that ensued in Bahrain. The Egyptian revolution was inspired by the previous Tunisian revolution and swiftly gathered extensive groups of the population in opposition to the economic challenge, political oppression, and corruption. One of the most crucial aspects to the success of the Egyptian movement was the move by the military to join the civil resisters and not become pro-President Hosni Mubarak. The strategic calculations of the military were influenced by economic interests, autonomy of the institutions and fears of the possible loss of the United States military assistance. The Bahraini protests are also analyzed by the paper and were a result of the historical sectarian and political resentment between the Sunni ruling elite and the Shi majority population. Unlike in Egypt, the ruling governments in Bahrain reacted using force thus the protest movement was brutally suppressed. Through these cases, the paper demonstrates the interplay of domestic political movements, military institutions, and international actors which is very complex, during the Arab spring. It also analyzes in what ways these developments changed the strategic environment in Israel, introducing uncertainties as well as new security issues in the area.

Keywords: Arab Spring, Egypt, Bahrain, Military Defection, Middle East Politics, Israel's Security Environment.

Introduction

The Egyptian uprising was inspired by the successful movement in neighboring Tunisia, where a street vendor set himself on fire on 17 December 2010 to protest the nation's dire economic conditions (Alimi & Meyer, 2011). Within ten days, this immolation had mobilized thousands to protest while lawyers and teachers embarked on a national strike (Goldstone, 2011). Although Tunisian president Ben Ali attempted to appease the population with promises of new elections and new jobs, it was simply too little too late. By 14 January 2011, the military refused to shoot at protesters. When Ben Ali realized that he had lost control of the armed forces, he fled to Saudi Arabia (Gelvin, 2012). Eleven days later, on 25 January 2011, tens of thousands of Egyptians gathered in Cairo's Tahrir Square to protest deteriorating economic conditions, police brutality, corruption, and political repression. Additionally, they called for the resignation of President Hosni Mubarak. Mubarak responded by sending out troops. However, instead of

cracking down on civil resisters, the military defended them, often protecting protesters from aggressive police and paramilitary groups (Schneider, 2011).

Then, on 29 January 2011, the military once again revealed that it was siding with the movement as soldiers openly refused to shoot at civil resisters (Nepstad, 2011b). By 7 February, 1.5 million people gathered in Cairo to demand regime change. To stop these demonstrations, Mubarak made several concessions, including a promise to not seek re-election. But civil resisters were not appeased and protests continued. By 11 February 2011, when it was clear that the military had jumped ship, Mubarak fled Egypt. Why did the Egyptian armed forces side with civil resisters instead of supporting Mubarak? Although it is impossible to know precisely what went through the minds of military leaders, we can deduce from the political situation that their decision was, to some extent, shaped by financial concerns. Specifically, the military was on the verge of losing significant assets if Mubarak stayed in power and handed the presidential office over to his appointed successor, his son Gamal. Over the course of several decades, the Egyptian military acquired valuable real estate and numerous industries (Anderson, 2011).

By one estimate, the military commands up to 40% of the Egyptian economy (Gelvin, 2012; Hammer, 2011). As one analyst wrote, 'The military has, over decades, created an industrial complex that is well oiled and well-funded. In over 35 factories and companies it produces everything from flat screen televisions and pasta to refrigerators and cars. It owns restaurants and football grounds. And it is not just manufactured goods: the military provides services, managing petrol stations for example' (Tadros, 2012).

Ironically, Hosni Mubarak had allowed the military to acquire such lucrative business holdings as a way to keep officers loyal (Hashim, 2011). As long as he was in power, the military would prosper; thus officers had a vested interest in protecting his regime. But all of this was likely to change if Gamal Mubarak took office and implemented privatization policies that would dismantle the military's business holdings. Thus there was a strong economic incentive for the military to side with civil resisters, forcing Mubarak out (Droz-Vincent, 2011; Goldstone, 2011).

The military's decision may have also been shaped by the US response to the conflict. The Obama administration initially supported Mubarak but then changed its stance, calling on him to resign (Gelvin, 2012). If Egypt's military chose to side with Mubarak and defy Obama, the armed forces might have jeopardized the $1.3 billion in aid it received from the United States on an annual basis (Kechichian & Nazimek, 1997; Youssef, 2011).

Moreover, according to Hashim (2011: 118), Egypt's military clearly wished to maintain 'its arms relationship with the United States, which has provided the Egyptian armed forces with some of the most sophisticated weaponry in the world'. Thus the military might have incurred additional financial losses if it remained loyal to the Mubarak regime. Furthermore, since the United States was an important, longstanding ally for Egypt, Obama's withdrawal of support may have amplified the perception that the regime was fragile. Thus, as troops witnessed escalating civilian demonstrations, global media coverage of the uprising, and declining international support, they might have concluded that Mubarak's days were limited.

As Kou (2000) argues, militaries are more likely to defect if they believe the regime is going to collapse.

Finally, the military probably believed that defectors would not be punished. This was not a case of individual defections culminating in wide-scale desertions. Rather, the Egyptian military as a whole shifted its support from the regime to the movement. Since the entire institution sided with the movement, there was virtually no one left in the military to impose sanctions on defectors. It is true that the secret police were still largely defending Mubarak and could have

carried out arrests. Yet how does a police force arrest and incarcerate the entire personnel of the armed forces?

In short, the Egyptian military's decision to side with the nonviolent movement was shaped by economic motivations, the perception of regime fragility, and the belief that defectors would not be punished. Shortly after Mubarak was deposed in Egypt, civil resisters in Bahrain staged protests in the capital city of Manama. Bahrain, a former British protectorate, had come under the rule of the Khalifa family in 1971. In 1973, they implemented a constitutional monarchy that protected the royal family's political supremacy but also established a national assembly. One of the major tensions that immediately emerged was that the Khalifas, who dominate the nation's highest political and military posts, are Sunni Muslims. In contrast, roughly 70% of Bahrain's population is Shi'ite Muslim. Bahrain's Shi'ite citizens have long expressed frustration that they do not have equal access to housing and educational opportunities, that they suffer higher unemployment rates than their Sunni counterparts, and that they are not proportionately represented in the nation's political institutions.

These frustrations periodically erupted into protests, which were quickly repressed by the Bahraini police (Bahry, 2000; Lawson, 2004). Inspired anew by the events in Tunisia and Egypt, Bahraini citizens organized demonstrations in February 2011. They demanded an end to torture, the release of political prisoners, genuinely free elections, and a representative consultative council. Moreover, civil resisters demanded an end to the 'political naturalization' of Sunnis from other nations. In order to increase the proportion of Sunnis in the population, the monarchy had been recruiting Sunni foreigners to join Bahrain's armed forces. Estimates are that roughly half of Bahrain's security forces are comprised of Sunni immigrants, primarily from Pakistan, Yemen, Syria, and Jordan (al-Shehabi, 2011).

In exchange for their service, these recruits are granted financial rewards and citizenship. The demonstrations began on 14 February 2011. The main location for the protests was Manama's 'Pearl Roundabout', a monument named after Bahrain's pearl industry, where thousands of civil resisters camped. To stop the movement, the Bahraini king, Hamad ibn Isa al Khalifa, ordered his troops to attack the demonstrators on 17 February. Security forces dutifully carried out the orders, killing four people in the process. However, instead of thwarting the movement, the state-imposed violence actually strengthened it as a growing number of outraged citizens – including lawyers, teachers, trade unionists, engineers, and Shi'ite religious leaders joined the struggle. In fact, by one estimate, the demonstrations mobilized 200,000 citizens – approximately 25% of the entire adult population (Humphreys, 2011).

Moreover, the crackdown radicalized the movement: instead of appealing for reforms, civil resisters began demanding an end to the Khalifa regime (Gelvin, 2012). As the movement expanded and adopted revolutionary goals, the regime responded with greater repressive force (Chick, 2011). To reinforce its military power during the conflict, the Bahraini regime invited other countries to send security forces in March 2011. Saudi Arabia commissioned 1,000 soldiers and the United Arab Emirates sent 500 policemen. Additionally, King Hamad declared a state of emergency. Since then, civil resisters have continued to fight for a new regime but they have failed to win over the armed forces and they have not been able to oust the Khalifa family (Gelvin, 2012).

Since then Egyptians have suffered successively the caprices of a military junta, a year of disastrous rule by the elected Muslim Brotherhood government of President Mohamed Morsi, then another popular uprising last summer the biggest ever to oust Morsi and his cronies. But that led to a de facto takeover by a military strongman, Gen. Abdel Fatah al-Sisi, the current defense minister. Ever since, al-Sisi and his officers have been hell bent on crushing the

Brotherhood forever and at any price even if it means stripping rights away from liberals, secularists, journalists, and just about anyone else who might want to question the authority of men with peaked hats and eagles on their shoulders.

Meanwhile the economy is in tatters and the future looks damn bleak. "A lot of people are going to be going to Tahrir this January 25," says a once-prosperous Egyptian businessman who's had to fire half his employees, "but this year they are going to be protesting *against* January 25." Unfortunately, protests against protests won't solve the country's problems. The same businessman, who attended a meeting with Secretary of State John Kerry and other prominent Egyptians last November, admitted that, amid all the complaints, none of the Egyptians had a clear democratic strategy to rescue this country of 85 million people. Kerry just said he'd ponder what he'd heard, and went to bed.

The nightmare that looms ahead now is likely to be a pseudo-democratic process meant to legitimize a popular dictator. To turn the title of a classic Gabriel García Márquez on its head, this will be "The Spring of the Patriarch." The first milestone: a referendum on January 14 and 15 to approve a new constitution. The next will come around the end of the month most likely after the January 25 anniversary when General al-Sisi is widely expected to resign from the army so he can legally run for president in April or so. (We could make a nod here to the will-he-won't-he equivocations about his intentions in the Egyptian press, but why bother? His country is calling him. Or so he'll say.) The fix will be in. But Al-Sisi's pharaonic style is genuinely popular with many of his countrymen. There's really no doubt he'll win. As the electoral spectacle moves forward over the next few months, the remnants of the Muslim Brotherhood will operate underground, which is where many of them are most comfortable. After all, the organization's clandestine structures date back 80 years. The military and security apparatus will continue to do all it can to crush what it has branded a terrorist organization. The trial of Morsi, now due to begin February 1, will be just a sideshow. The real action will be among lesser figures in the prisons, where torture has always been commonplace, and now is likely to have free rein.

Blood will be shed so often at street demonstrations and in small-scale attacks on the army and police that it will cease to make headlines in Egypt or internationally. But a process of radicalization among the Brotherhood's people will intensify, and whether in the name of their old organization, or Al-Qaeda, or as-yet-unheard-of "groups" and "fronts," "brigades" and "companions," they will do their worst to make Egypt ungovernable. They can also be counted on to work with the formal and informal networks of radical jihadists that now stretch across Africa and from the Sinai to Syria and Europe.

Some investors will bet that al-Sisi's iron fist can calm things down. Indeed, many already have. Billions of dollars in support from al-Sisi's backers in Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates have helped shore up the economy. The Cairo stock market jumped 10 points when the military ousted Morsi in July, and the index is now as high as it was on January 24, 2011, the day before this all began.

Tourism especially European and American tourism will be slow to revive. But Egypt, with all of its ancient monuments and the white strands of sand next to crystalline waters on what's now called the Red Sea Riviera, is one of the world's great destinations. In the 1980s, Palestinian terrorists repeatedly struck Egyptian targets, but after a lull the tourists returned. In the 1990s, jihadists fought a savage little war to try to overthrow Mubarak, and in 1997 they slaughtered 58 sightseers at a temple in Luxor. But after a few months, tourists came back. (One of ex-President Morsi's signal stupidities last year was to name a former head of the group behind that massacre as his appointed governor of Luxor.

Egypt is eternal, one might say, but its problems are infernal. No wonder Kerry said he had a lot to ponder before going to bed. It would be a miracle if he's been able to get any sleep since.

Mohamed Bouazizi the Tunisian fruit vendor whose self-immolation is recognized as the first act of defiance of the Arab Spring could never have known that when he set himself ablaze his act would ignite a revolution with global ramifications whose most recent ramblings are heard in downtown Manhattan, at the very seat of capitalism. This revolution about the restoration of human dignity has quickly morphed and metastasized into the first major challenge to the inhumane side of globalization itself to a Wall Street-driven economy that widened the gap between rich and poor and weakened the middle class all over the world. But, from the doom and gloom of forsaken Sidi Bouzid, a city in central Tunisia, to the glam and glitter of Wall Street, the trajectory of the Jasmin Revolution was all but linear (Hedi Jaouad Professor of Foreign Language and Literature 2017).

Needing some eloquent symbolism to anchor their own narrative of heroism, Tunisians conveniently condensed their revolution to 23 days, when in fact it lasted a bit longer (Dec. 17 to January 14, 2011) to better contrast it with the 23-year eternity of Ben Ali's stifling rule. These are the "23 days" of mass demonstrations, kept alive by the sheer determination of Facebookers and Twitterers, the new digital jihadis for democracy, whose messages and images were relayed by TV stations around the world, which have changed the geopolitical landscape of North Africa and the Middle East, perhaps forever. After a thundering success in nearby Egypt, the protests spread elsewhere in the region Bahrain and Yemen, Libya, and Syria are, as we write, in the final birthing pains of their own revolutions. (The rest of the surviving Arab regimes are unpopular and illegitimate. All ripe for a radical change. Their days are numbered. Petro-monarchies have resorted to direct-cash bribes to buy time while they work hard to quash the Arab Spring in their countries.)

From the Middle East, echoes of the slogans of the Arab Spring were heard as far as the Middle Kingdom. In China in early February, 2011, human rights activists called for demonstrations to protest against corruption, lack of social and political reforms. They also dubbed their movement the Jasmine Revolution, a nod to Tunisians. Fearful of its own Arab Spring, the Chinese security apparatus quickly moved to block the word "jasmine" from the Internet, but in vain. "The authorities might have a hard time eradicating the word [jasmine] completely," the *New York Times* reports, citing the popularity of the word in China. For now, China hasn't seen its revolution spread. But in a nation of gaping inequalities and Internet-savvy youth, one wonders how long that can last.

If proud that their revolution is cited and celebrated, ironically, Tunisians are not fond of, and often take umbrage with, of the made-in-France namesake, "Jasmin Revolution," despite the fact that jasmin is the quintessential Tunisian symbol (the jasmine flower is highly prized, associated with Mediterranean sensuality, grace, elegance, and joie de vivre). Tunisians much prefer *Thawrat al-Karama* (the Dignity Revolution) or *Thawrat al-Shabab* (the Youth Revolution). The revolution by and for the youth, especially the tens of thousands of college graduates who often remain jobless many years after graduation, are the ones who suffered the most indignities in an economic and political system that mortgaged their future. In many people's minds, *Karama* and *Shabab* have become coextensive, often used interchangeably.

The fruit vendor, Bouazizi, was both indignant and young; educated and jobless. His profile is this generation's profile: the any man or any woman in an interconnected, globalized world that has ditched its commitment to the middle class. From China, the revolutionary spirit spread to Europe where, in places like Spain, the most popular refrain heard in the streets of Tunisia was reprised in the term "cambio," or change. Youth unemployment in Spain stands at the staggering

rate of 46.2%, and living costs are skyrocketing. For the disenchanted youth the only way to restore dignity is through regime change. The Tunisian Karamaistas (from Karama) are now dubbed by the Spanish press, a direct translation from the Arabic, as *los indignados* (the indignant). Now the revolution has flown to Manhattan, "the irresistible capital of the cheque" (as Ruben Diario called it).

Today the birthplace of the Tunisian revolution has become a prism through which one assesses globalization itself. Tunisians' struggle came to represent all that is ailing our societies across the world: endemic corruption, unemployment and rising cost of living. A point of no return, certainly not back to the status quo. Inadvertently, perhaps, the country released, like Aladdin, the "genie" of liberty, a global challenge to the political establishment and warning to a Wall Street run amok. At all the "Occupied" squares around the world, one word keeps cropping up: dignity (*karama*), a moral value hardly associated, to be sure, with youth culture, but one that is now at the center of a new social discourse.

Historians will not fail to remember that to the people of Tunisia, a far earlier scene brings back to memory a present day Tunisia: Hannibal, the great Carthaginian commander, had swallowed a poison instead of remaining a humiliated man at the mercy of his Roman tormentors. On the eve of his death he is said to have jested, in his last agony, "Free the Romans of the long anxiety of life.... Mohammed Bouazizi set Tunisians, Arabs and several other citizens free of the prolonged dread of tyranny and injustice. The name of the poor young fruit peddler will reverberate in every new "Occupied Wall Street" location, now popping up like mushrooms in the world. All the votes that will be cast in Tunisia on Sunday will pay homage to his memory (Al-Mousawi 2016). The seismic effect of the Arab Spring in the region not only changed the political situation in the region, but it also gave rise to a new cultural thinking. It renewed the emphasis on Arabic arts and literature as the prism through which different scholars tried to make sense of social changes that were going on. In this year, it is the fifth anniversary of most of the uprisings. Words Without Borders has issued an anniversary issue, though little has otherwise been noteworthy. In this issue, Elisabeth Jaquette and Nariman Youssef, as editors, coin post-Arab Spring literature as the reflection of a historical moment, whether that moment is the crisis of war, or the anarchy of growing paramilitary organizations, or the stampedes of repression of coups and transition governments.

The Queue by Egyptian writer Basma Abdel Aziz is one of the novels that exhibits the authoritarian backlash of the Arab Spring. It was written in Arabic in 2013 and to be published in English in May. It takes place in an unnamed nation following the repression of a popular insurrection and describes a tyrannical universe that would have given the far-evil committee in Sonallah Ibrahim eponymous novel authority to its head. The Gate is the name of the draconian government where the subjects are required to obtain authorization, in a queue which is getting longer every day, to perform the most trivial of activities. It did not take long before the Gate could subject all the procedures, paperwork, authorizations and permits, as well as eating and drinking, to its orders and control. Even window-shopping came to be charged a fee. Although the fact that the Gate is embedded in all spheres of people lives makes the novel a dystopian presupposition, it is not hard to regard it as a realist image of certain contemporary regimes. Schoolboy detained in post-coup Egypt after bringing a ruler to school with the Rabaa sign (a gesture of an anti-coup position), and 14 women, including the 15 year old, had also been jailed after distributing yellow balloons in support of dethroned president Morsi. This is quite unlike literature set in the backdrop of the Arab Spring, of which Egypt was the most prolific in its production. Earlier Egyptian literature was euphoric in nature and more documentary in nature.

An eyewitness report on the first 18 days of protest, Take Mona Prince Is My Name. Prince captures, breathlessly, the desperate and tiring shuffle between the Tahrir Square and back to oust Mubarak out of office forcefully. It is a part of the huge collection of Arab Spring literature that fits into the Egyptian category such as the books of Ahdaf Soueif, Cairo: My City, Our Revolution, Saad Al-Kersh, Al-Thawra Al-Aan: Yawmiyat Min Midan Al-Tahrir, and that of Ezzedine Choukri Fishere, Bab Al-Khuruj. The literary work in Tunisia has been varied in that the works have remained stuck on the years of President Zine el-Abidine Ben Ali. Recently the most esteemed Arabic literary award, the International Prize of Arabic Fiction was given to the Tunisian writer Shukri Mabkhout for his book The Italian. He says that it was inspired by the Arab spring, but the setting of the novel is during the dark stage in the transition between the reign of President Habib Bourguiba and that of Ben Ali in the 1980s. To a certain degree, this retroactive production can be likened to post-Saddam Iraqi production, where it is only now that it has been able to comfortably accept the repression and censorship of the Saddam years. The other post-Spring work is also retrospective and depicts the society during the Ben Ali rule in such form as Akhlat by Kamel Zoghbany and Al-Hay Yrawah by Kamel Riahi.

It is essential to know what writers, who were also present during not only uprisings but also literary movements that were in full blossom at this time, have to say about literature following the Arab Spring. According to the novelist Abdel Aziz, the tone of this early Tahrir Square literature is that of emotion, considering the amount of violence is high. According to Sherif Dhaimish of Darf Publishers, greater Arabic literature of the time is defined by an initial burst of optimism, succeeded by disenchantment. However, the demarcations between the initial stage of euphoria and the disappointment that ensued are not as obvious, given that the uprisings have to do with very different systems of rule. Egyptian literature follows this periodization, perhaps, with its first harvest of euphoric reports at Tahrir. In Syria, first protests by no means resulted in a particular literary optimism. An eloquent illustration is the use of prose-poem Waiting for Death by Samar Yazbek who depicts the all-around death and violence in Syria in 2011. "The killers are everywhere. Death is everywhere." Viewing the protests by the state has been cruel: "the pictures of tortured children and of the young men killed come back. Some of the scenes of sectarianism are permeated with suffocation and entrapment: gangs go to our Sunni neighbors and threaten them, telling that we will kill them. They approach us and then say that they will murder each and every Alawite. Syrian short-story writer Rasha Abbas (author of short-story collection The Gist of It), is concerned that the texts that are inspired by the spirit of revolution, such as texts about Egyptian texts inspired by Tahrir Square, might drown out the themes of political resistance.

Such a struggle, according to her, did not just disappear with the emergence of protests. It is understandable that those are the issues that will concern most writers, but they should not be the only ones that are written about, etc. I do not believe that there is a reason to force slogans into a piece of text. Indeed, the overpowering cultural perplexity that was at its climax during the revolts is an obsession among authors. So monumental has been the literary production, that Youssef Rakha, the Egyptian writer of The Sultan Seal, referred even to what he called an Arab Spring Industry that is oriented towards the profitable business of political analysis. The opinion piece, the talk show appearance and the facebook status update surpassed other generic options. Theorizing Arab spring has been the most popular literary activity. Abdel Aziz believes that the literary wave is a favorable development, as far as it has provided people with the bravery to express themselves.

The effect of breaking down the political walls of fear as well broke down the personal fears of being judged. Similarly, Abbas also applauds the death of auto-censorship and fear that have

enabled individuals to document the mundane: people have become bold enough to write more about themselves. everyday life and feelings that would not have been thought of as serious before or would have been disregarded or derided at least without mourning.... Writers and artists were not the only ones who were involved in the cultural blitz. Literature was another artifact that the analysts used as the means of tracing the route to the uprisings. It has been contended by Stanford scholar Alexander Key that the rebellion was the focus in the literature before the rebellion occurred, that the unrest could be observed in the pages of the books: "Rebellion is not the main focus in modern Arabic literature as genre until it penetrates into the 2000s with these novels. Syrian writer Abbas is conscious of literature being frantically clutched as an object of the spring and makes fun of this easy structure. We can, as an amusement, write a scholarly article on a book to be published in 2020 and say, its scattershot and daring style is true to the spirit of the revolution which abolished every taboo.

 In the meantime, The Guardian has just released the opinions of prominent Arab authors on the 5th anniversary, and it looks like a ragtime quilt of pathetic essays. Although nearly every author is a world-renowned figure, the distribution is unbalanced considering the views brought to the table include both those who witnessed the Arab Spring directly and those living beyond the region This uneven assortment of political commentary and literary opinion regrettably echoes Rakhas idea of the Arab Spring Industry, in which the events of the Arab spring have overshadowed the literature. Although most of the authors interviewed in this article argued that the parameters of literature could not be drawn after Arab Spring, their commitment to the disputed ground of this debate cannot be ignored. From modernization to human development The present day method of development and political change is a result of modernization theory. Seymour Lipset also emphasized the contribution made by four pointer of economic development2 wealth, industrialization, urbanization, and education2 on the development of democratic governance (Lipset 1959; Lerner 1958).

As early as this date, Lipset claimed that education enhanced personal ability to take political action and democracy: Education is supposed to make men widen their perspectives, to make them cognizant of the. Necessity to norms of moderation, restrains them in following extremist and monistic principles, and enhances their rational electoral choices. (Lipset 1959: 78). Lipset modeled the transition to a democracy and stability of a regime as being synonymous. Concepts, therefore, disregarding both the association between modernization and revolution as well as the. Potential of democratic revolutions of the kind that happened in Eastern Europe in the late 1980s. The connection and proximity between modernization and revolution was made clear in the 1960s when Samuel Huntington wrote that the rise and unfulfilled expectations, the popular frustration, and the violent revolution in society that did not have effective political institutions could be the results of modernization, including urbanization and the increased literacy level (Huntington 1968). Being a conservative and a Malthusian, Huntington advised the policy makers against encouraging excessive modernization. Although numerous individuals cited the role of education and literacy, there is empirical research on the same in the. The tradition of modernization was still concentrated on the general relations between the indicators of economic or industrial change and democracy (Moore 1966; Przeworski and Limongi 1997). However, as a mere aggregate correlation, the modernization-revolution argument is compromised by the Malthusian argument that regime change is not caused not by human progress, but by human misery and vice versa, social and health interventions are the very factors that improve the political positions of a regime.

The fact that basic services are provided can be specifically significant in setting the legitimacy of a state, as well as popular assent, especially in autocratic or transitory regimes (Reich 1995;

McNicoll 2006; Glassman 2007). Those were indeed some of the motivations in Egypt where the unelected regime of the President Hosni Mubarak and the opposition forces like the Muslim Brotherhood resorted to health and welfare programs to advance conflicting demands on popular legitimacy (Al-Awadi 2004; Grynkewich 2008). It is only possible to balance the modernization and Malthusian models by looking at the temporal aspects in the development process, which implies that the type of simple interventions may have both short-term advantages and long-term disadvantages to regimes. Simple treatments are usually self-destructing efforts that do not have much effect in the long run. This change is most evident in cases of immunization programs, which can result in herd immunity, but numerous other health-related interventions produce lasting and permanent success or alternative sources of supply (Omran 1971). After the fulfillment of basic needs, more complex and costly needs tend to take place. This change can be seen in the fact that the proportion of health spending of national income is steadily growing and in the expansion of development agendas in the national and international debate (Thornton 2001; Hughes et al. 2010).

The recent literature looks at how the escalation of social expenditure pressures, fear of globalization and the sense of inequality is causing regime change in the middle-income nations (Haggard and Kaufman 1997; Acemoglu and Robinson 2001; Rudra 2005). 3It is not as obvious whether the temporal sequence of simple advancement to escalating hopes is a direct causal derivative of increases in human capability, which is an affiliate procedure catalyzed by. Some higher development process (raising living standards), or a by-product of developmentalist thinking. One of the main claims of this essay is that the fact that development priorities are broadening is in fact an outcome of human development progress in the past. This cause and effect association is not just the expression of the increasing aspirations, but it also represents particular physiological and social connotations of the life course model of human development.

Human capital improvement on the eve of the Arab Spring

Table 1: Regional Human Development Indicators (1980–2010)

Indicator	Arab States	Asia	Latin America / Caribbean	Sub-Saharan Africa
Countries Included in Comparison	17 core Arab states plus Palestinian Territories	25 countries	23 countries	46 countries
Human Development Index (HDI)	Increased from 0.425 in 1980 to 0.630 in 2010; about 1% average annual increase; reached 59th percentile globally	Faster HDI growth than Arab States	Growth similar to Arab States	Slowest progress
GDP Growth Rate	Less than 1% per year	More than 5% per year	Less than 1% per year	Nearly 0% growth
Life Expectancy at Birth	Increased from 58.6 years to 71.4 years (about 13-year increase); 0.7% annual growth	0.5% annual growth	0.5% annual growth	0.3% annual growth
Infant Mortality Rate (IMR)	Declined from 154 deaths per 1,000 births in 1960 to 30 per 1,000	2.7% annual reduction	3.4% annual reduction	Declined from 151 to 86 per 1,000 births;

	births; 3.6% annual reduction			1.2% annual reduction
Expected Years of Schooling	Increased from 8.0 years in 1980 to 11.4 years in 2010; 1.2% annual growth	1.3% annual growth	1.0% annual growth	Improvement slower than other regions
Health and Early Life Improvements	Significant improvements in life expectancy and child survival	Not specified in detail	Not specified in detail	Slower improvements

Table 1 shows the major improvements in human development indicators in Arab States between 1980 and 2010 compared with Asia, Latin America, and Sub-Saharan Africa. The Human Development Index in Arab States increased from 0.425 in 1980 to 0.630 in 2010, reflecting an average annual growth of about 1 percent. Life expectancy at birth improved significantly from 58.6 years to 71.4 years, while infant mortality declined sharply from 154 deaths per 1,000 births in 1960 to about 30 per 1,000 births. Although GDP growth in Arab States remained below 1 percent annually, social indicators such as health and survival improved considerably. Expected years of schooling also increased from 8.0 years in 1980 to 11.4 years in 2010. Overall, the data highlights notable progress in human development in the Arab region during this period, though Asia experienced faster economic growth.

Conclusion

The Demographic and Health Surveys (DHS) can be used to monitor cohort change in height of women aged 15+-49. Findings of Bozzoli et al. (2009) show that there is an overwhelming association between the likelihood of dying at an early age and the height of women aged 20+ - 49 in 124 Demographic and Health Surveys selected across 60 countries.4 Based on the results, Figure 1 shows change in cohort completed height of women of 20 plus in selected DHS samples by region. In Sub-Saharan Africa, however, the increase in height was reduced, but that could be challenging to decipher with regards to selective mortality caused by the HIV/AIDS epidemic and the inclusion of increasingly poor African states. It is however instructive to point out the growth in height of women in the two regions with the women in the chosen Arab countries becoming taller than their counterparts in Sub-Saharan Africa. There was also dramatic increased adult survival. According to World Health Statistics life tables, the female likelihood of death between 15 and 60 years of age in Egypt has decreased by 18.2 to 13.0 in 1990 to 2009 or 29% decrease. This human development advancement has been greatly under-reported especially when it is compared to the focus that was given to enduring shortages in other sectors such as employment, women status, human rights and political autonomy that have been cited as factors that caused the revolutions. A series of controversial and publicized Arab Human Development reports (HDRs) has been published by the UNDP Regional Bureau for Arab States throughout the 2000s. The most popular one was the report issued in 2005, titled Towards the Rise of Women in the Arab World, that provided a scathing examination of the physical, social, economic and political cost, to women and society, of women not working and the discrimination against women and girls (UNDP 2006). The report recorded gains in basic health, education and nutrition but these gains never had any worthy space in the political discussion or even in the popular press where the talk was all about the squandered opportunity of the half of the population being locked out of the public life. Other HDRs of Arabians were concerned with the opportunities of adolescents, political freedom and access to information technology. The the tone of growing anticipation and even the fact that there is an Arab HDR help depict the fact that

there is. Development elite had grown fast to hype their demands to advance a more ambitious and elaborate development agenda. What follows is my argument that there was also an analogous mobilization and expectation process at the population level particularly in younger cohorts. The development of grievances and expectations starts with the emergence of the political consciousness (Kuhn 2018).

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