



## ADVANCE SOCIAL SCIENCE ARCHIVE JOURNAL

Available Online: <https://assajournal.com>

Vol. 04 No. 01. July-September 2025. Page#. 4785-4795

Print ISSN: [3006-2497](https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.19970585) Online ISSN: [3006-2500](https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.19970585)Platform & Workflow by: [Open Journal Systems](https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.19970585)<https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.19970585>

## Constitutionalism as Leadership Strategy: Comparing Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto's Foundational Parliamentarism and Asif Ali Zardari's Revolutionary Pragmatism in Pakistan's Democratic Trajectory

Kashif Hussain Dahot

M. Phil Scholar, Shah Abdul Latif University Khairpur

[kashifhussains94111@gmail.com](mailto:kashifhussains94111@gmail.com)

Dr. Siraj Ahmed Soomro

Associate professor in Pakistan Studies, Shah Abdul Latif University Khairpur

[siraj.soomro@salu.edu.pk](mailto:siraj.soomro@salu.edu.pk)**ABSTRACT**

*The history of parliamentary politics in Pakistan is defined to a greater extent than most post-colonial nations by the constitutional judgments made by individual rulers who must act within the context of a constantly weak institution and civil-military rivalry. The paper provides a comparative study analysis of two transformative leaders in the Pakistan's political history both belongs to Pakistan Peoples Party (PPP) one is ex-Prime Minister Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto (1973-1977) and the other one is President Asif Ali Zardari (2008-2013) and again from 2024 to till today on how their difference in constitutional worldviews created both differences and similarities in the parliamentary development in Pakistan. Based on qualitative interview data on elite opinions, primary constitutional documents, parliamentary debates and an in-depth assessment of the scholarly literature, the study contends that the authentic constitutionalism substantially formed the normative constitution of parliamentary sovereignty in the most enduring and sustainable manner with the adoption of the unanimous 1973 Constitution and also created institutional weaknesses by centralizing the various governance practices. The following leadership of Zardari, with its pragmatic coalition-building and explicit devolutionary reform, operationalized the federal pledge of the charter drafted by Bhutto, in the landmark 18th Constitutional Amendment (2010), about parliamentary supremacy, and a fundamental rebalancing in intergovernmental relations. The paper also contends that the two leadership paradigms of charismatic rupture and pragmatic consolidation do not exist to oppose each other however, they are sequentially needed on the path toward parliamentary democratization in the hybrid-regime setting. The results have some implications to the comparative democratization theory especially the analysis of the relationship among the agency of the leadership, constitutional engineering and resilience of institutions in highly institutional states which are not elected. The research work is also a complement to a developing literature on constitutional design, federal redesign and democratic consolidation in South Asia and the global South in general.*

**Keywords:** Constitutional Leadership, Parliamentary Democracy, Devolution, Pakistan Peoples Party, 18th Amendment, 1973 Constitution, Democratic Consolidation, Civil-Military Relations, Federalism, South Asia.

**Introduction**

One of the oldest questions in the comparative democratization community is how constitutional documents as utopian guidelines are being transformed or even fail to be transformed into working parliamentary facts. The use of the constitution has led to a paradox in which democratic design and authoritarian executive behavior coincide in many post-colonial states, through the role of both acts as a popular legitimation and executive entrenchment tool. Perhaps the most analytically challenging example of this paradox in South Asian is Pakistan. The nation has had four military coups, three constitutions abrogated, its eastern wing seceded in 1971, and a self-perpetuating cycle whereby civilian governments however democratically elected have continually failed to institutionalize their power against the gravitational pull of extra-parliamentary centers of power since independence in 1947 (Jalal, 1995).

Both political personalities have contributed hugely to the extent and longevity of their constitutional intrusion: Z.A Bhutto as Prime Minister from 1973 to 1977 and a Chief Martial Law Administrator was instrumental in introducing the 1973 Constitution which remains the cornerstone of Pakistan's legal and political system. His governance emphasized socialist reforms nationalization and people-centric policies. Whereas, Asif Ali Zardari who is twice a democratically elected President in the country between 2008 and 2013, and again returned to the presidency in 2024. They were both of the main leaders of Pakistan Peoples Party (PPP), but ruled in radically different political periods and contributed very different approaches to leadership to parliamentary consolidation. A charismatic populist and ardent constitutional architect, Z.A Bhutto guided the unanimous passage of the 1973 Constitution a document that, to this day, continues to be the constitutional instrument central to the Pakistani state more than 50 years later. In his turn, Asif Ali Zardari strategized the 18th Constitutional Amendment that was ratified in 2010 through the entire process known as the most important devolutionary reform in the history of post-independent Pakistan (Rumi, 2020; Shafiqat, 2019) to overcome the challenged democratic restoration that followed the ten-year military dictatorship led by General Pervez Musharraf

Nevertheless, the comparative politics literature, with very few exceptions, has been studying them separately although it is clear that both play vital roles in the constitutional direction of Pakistan. Z.A Bhutto is often analyzed in the context of populist socialism and political economy in the Cold War period (Wolpert, 1993; Jones, 2020), and Zardari is the most commonly evaluated in the prism of political survival, coalition politics, or anti-corruption scandals (Babar F. , 2025). What conspicuously lacks is a methodical comparative enquiry that views both leaders as constitutional agents' decision-makers whose decisions on institutional structure, the division of power, and the working process of parliament brought about cumulative consequences on the quality and the sustainability of Democratic order in Pakistan. This is the gap that is being addressed in this paper.

The analytical approach followed in this paper is largely based on the idea of constitutional leadership that was embraced in comparative constitutionalism, according to which the transformative moments in constitutional life are not the effects of the structural factors but are under the imperative influence of the agency of political leaders their ideological devotion, the ability to establish a consensus, and their This framework is combined with the lessons of the democratization theory, specifically the literature on the so-called democratic consolidation and

the so-called hybrid regimes thus giving the structural backdrop against the backdrop of which such leadership decision-making exercises can be made (wolpert, 1993).

The study will be conducted following three related goals: first, to track how the respective types of leadership in the cases of Bhutto and Zardari influenced the shape and content of parliamentary change in their respective terms; second, to assess the constitutional intervention both leaders made in empowering or unwillingly debilitating the parliamentary system in Pakistan; and third, to generalize on the research results and suggest the theory of guide the sequential development of leadership models to

The paper continues in the following way. The qualitative comparative design and data sources are described in the methodology section. The main three themes that structure the results and discussion section include the topic of the constitutional engineering and its paradoxes; the topic of federalism and the need to devolve; and the topic of the civil-military constraint on parliamentary sovereignty. The summary generalizes the results and shares recommendations on further studies.

### **Research Methodology**

The study is conducted in the form of a qualitative comparative study, the data provided by the elite interviews is used in conjunction with the primary source analysis, such as documents, and systematic reviews of the secondary academic literature. The qualitative choice of methodology fits epistemologically the goals of the research: the paper aims at knowing constitutional leadership as a process through which decisions were made, through which political calculations were made, and what institutional consequences ensued instead of estimating the number or distribution of consequences that can lend to quantitative treatment. Qualitative approaches, as Mahoney and Thelen (2010) argue, are best at tracing the mechanisms by which political agency works in relation to structural limitations to create institutional change, which is the analytical task that needs to be undertaken.

Research Design Qualitative Comparative Analysis (QCA) and Case Study Method.

The comparative framework adheres to the logic of the structured, focused comparison (George and Bennett, 2005) where two cases the tenure of Bhutto (1971-1977), its presidency, are analyzed through the same set of analytical questions and dimensions. This design permits in-case depth as well as cross-case comparison, to allow finding of patterns, mechanisms and deviations which a single case study approach would hide. The focal point is the constitutional leadership episode in which at a given phase of time, a given leader was having consequential decisions on the constitutional and parliamentary structures in Pakistan.

### **Primary Data: Elite Interviews.**

Semi-structured elite interviews were carried out with senior political figures that were involved in parliamentary politics during or closely followed the two periods. The participants of the interviews were former Chief Minister Syed Qaim Ali Shah Jilani, Member of National Assembly Dr. Syeda Nafisa Shah Jilani, MPA Syed Nasir Hussain Shah, former Senate Chairman Senator Raza Rabbani, and others. The sample of these individuals was chosen by purposive sampling where non-probability techniques prioritize the depth of information over the breadth of representation (Bryman A. , 2016) and based on their direct participation in the procedures of legislation and constitutional action that will be studied.

The interviews were carried out in the period between December 2024 and May 2025 in such places as Sindh House Islamabad, Parliament Lodges Islamabad and Khairpur. Each interview was

around thirty to forty minutes long, typed exact and then thematically analyzed. The semi-structured design enabled a normal cross-interview comparability and retained the flexibility needed to follow unforeseen analytical pursuits, which is of especial concern in elite interview research, where the most significant revelations can be made through unintended turns of thought.

### **Secondary Data: Archival and Documentary Sources.**

Primary documentary sources comprise the text of 1973 Constitution of Pakistan and subsequent amendments, full text of 18th Constitutional Amendment (2010), verbatim documents of National Assembly and Senate debates upon the tenures, official government policy documents, and government publications. These references were carefully assessed in order to provide the history of legislative development of key changes in the constitution and, in contrast, to confirm or situate the testimonies of interviews.

The main sources of secondary media include peer-reviewed journal articles, academic monographs and book chapters along with authoritative journalistic archives and institutional reports. The literature review placed a strong emphasis on the sources which directly relate to constitutional development, federalism, civil-military relations, and political leadership in Pakistan, although comparative literature on South Asian democratization and the general constitutional theory were briefly accessed.

### **Data Analysis**

The thematic analysis was conducted on interview transcripts and documentary sources after the six-step process identified as the familiarization with the data, initial code generation, candidate theme creation, checking the theme against the entire data set, defining and naming the themes and generating the analysis account (Braun and Clarke 2006). The frequency and importance of the most important constructs (provincial autonomy, parliamentary supremacy, coalition governance) in both the interview and documentary data were also identified using content analysis as a measure of some degree of systematic rigor to support the interpretive approach of thematic analysis.

### **Validity, Reliability and Ethical considerations.**

Elite interviews, primary constitutional documents, archival literature of the legislature, and secondary academic literature represent multiple forms of triangulation that can increase the trustworthiness of results and their internal validity (Creswell and Poth, 2018). Member-checking was used wherever appropriate and important interpretive statements were presented to interviewees to confirm. Each interviewee gave informed consent, and anonymity of the participants was maintained in situations whereby attributions were politically sensitive but the majority of the interviewees agreed to participate under attribution due to the historical rather than confidential nature of information being discussed.

### **Results and Discussion**

#### **Constitutional Engineering and Its Paradoxes: Bhutto's Foundational Achievement and its Internal Contradictions**

By far, the most significant single act of constitutional statesmanship that has been done in the history of post-independence Pakistan is the 1973 Constitution. In early 1972 as a country where two previous constitutions had been either conceived by a small elite group or produced by martial law, Bhutto held an unusual all-party constitutional committee consultation that was a process of consultations unprecedented in the country which secured unanimous backing in

parliament on 10 April 1973 (Wolpert, 1993; Jones, 2020). The document made Pakistan a parliamentary federal republic, added a two-house legislature with a Senate intended to equally represent provinces, entrenched a thorough bill of fundamental rights, and very explicitly established the presidency as subordinate to the Prime Minister and the parliament. Bhutto once made the most daring move as Senator Raza Rabbani observed in the interview; the 1973 Constitution was a new social contract and a parliamentary order to Pakistan.

The political environment was truly miraculous as the constitutional accomplishment. Pakistan had been left behind in the disastrous break up of its eastern region the secession of Bangladesh in December 1971 in a state of far systemic and psycho-emotional trauma. The military, the military defeat of which had caused the crisis, was still politically important, even with the discredited leadership. Grievances were acute among the provinces, especially in Baluchistan and North-West Frontier Province (NWFP). The fact that Bhutto was able to reach not only the consensus of cross-party parties under such circumstances illustrates just the type of constitutional leadership agency that Ackerman (1991) describes as decisive during the periods of constitutional moments when the political leaders are able to use an exceptional popular mandate to recast the constitutive rules of the political game.

However, the constitutional success was marred at the beginning of the era by what can only be termed as a paradoxical foundation of the constitution; Bhutto at the same time instituted parliamentary sovereignty on paper and at the same time weakened it in a practice. His work to establish a paramilitary organization, the Federal Security Force (FSF), that was answerable to no one but him has been widely recorded in the literature to crack down on political dissidents (Raza, reproduced by Panhwar; Jones, 2020). In 1973, he fired about 1,300 civil servants thus weakening the bureaucratic system on which a properly run parliament is based (Hussain, cited in thesis). His move against Baloch nationalist leaders such as jailing Wali Khan and Khair Bakhsh Marri on treason charges later quashed by Zia was a betrayal of his own federal compact of the constitution. Such a paradox is precisely managed by Jalal (1995) when she observes that the increasing centralization of power by Bhutto, his lack of tolerance towards political dissent and the employment of the state machinery to curb dissent killed the very institutions of democracy which he has claimed to champion.

The simple hypocrisy or cynicism are not sufficient explanations of this paradox. It seems that Bhutto actually felt that a robust central executive was a thought-provoking factor to the sort of radical social and economic transformation he had dreamed of where parliamentary democracy without a decisive government would become factional flora that would be befriended by entrenched elites. One can see an intellectual tradition in the way Bhutto theorized politics, though often marked by the attention it gave to the commanding heights of state at the expense of slower tempos of parliamentary discussion (Amin, 1990). The policy formulation of this philosophy was his nationalization program of industries, banks, and educational institutions. Despite its economic transactions and understandings, which continue to be contended in the literature (Hussain, 2004; Shafqat, 2019), it articulated a vision of government where the parliament was a legitimation venue as opposed to an effective check on the executive.

The consequences were predictable in retrospect, if not in prospect. Centralizing policies of Bhutto that created political instability, and probably the questionable outcomes of the 1977 general elections, gave General Zia ul-Haq the pretext as well as the ostensible and arguably the real political opportunity to execute his coup on 5 July 1977. The constitution which Bhutto had

made was abrogated four years after its enactment. His later trial and execution in 1979, which many internationally saw as a politically motivated judicial murder, made him a martyr whose constitutional heritage was inspiration and bane to Pakistani democratic politics in decades since. The devotion of parliamentary democracy and social equity as Syed Qaim Ali Shah notes in his interview, inspired an entire generation and his martyrdom in struggle against military dictatorship made Bhutto sahib a poster child of opposition and martyrdom to democracy.

**Devolutionary Pragmatism: Zardari and the Federal Democracy in Action.**

The political climate that Asif Ali Zardari inherited in September 2008 was the opposite of that that Bhutto inherited in almost all its structural aspects. Where Bhutto had led in the high-point of his own personal popularity, with a wave of sweeping parliamentary majority, with a rich political realism charge on board, Zardari came to the presidency with conditions of acute delegitimization in which a legacy of past military rule under Musharraf, had systematically sabotaged civilian institutions (Zaidi, 2017; Babar, 2025). The Constitution of 1973 that survived Zia and a series of constitutional amendments that successively took away the power of the parliament, vested in the presidency and the army (particularly the Eighth and Seventeenth Amendments), was merely a shadow of what Bhutto had planned. Discretionary authority of the president to dissolve the National Assembly that had been reestablished and solidified during the military era constitutional engineering had made the tenure of parliament a political prisoner at presidential whim.

Zardari has reacted to this scenario on constitutional grounds through the promulgation of the 18th Amendment that took place on 8 April 2010 via the National Assembly following an eighteen-month consultative process in which a Special Parliamentary Committee made up of representatives of all significant parties participated (Rumi, 2020; Kanwal, 2017). The amendment, both in extent and procedure was of an extraordinary nature in the Pakistani standards. It brought a total of ninety-seven amendments to the constitution that eliminated the powers of the president to dissolve the National Assembly at will; devolution of subjects in the Concurrent Legislative List to the provinces; formulaic reconstitution of the National Finance Commission to allocate resources more fairly based on population, underdevelopment and poverty; and renaming of North-West Frontier Province to Khyber Pakhtunkhwa in recognition of the Pas In his interview with Senator Raza Rabbani, chairperson of the Special Parliamentary Committee, he explained the amendment as having not only rejuvenated the actual spirit of parliamentary democracy, overturning decades of centralization and military manipulations, but also provided the provinces with their true rights and powers.

In order to highlight the importance of the 18th Amendment, several analytical dimensions are worthy of highlight. The devolution of the Concurrent List subjects that comprised of health, education, environment and social welfare was a qualitative change in the intergovernmental relations, and at least constitutionally, this resolved the long-term complaint of smaller provinces that the federal center had historically expropriated policy areas that rightfully belonged with provincial governments. These imbalances from 1950s Rumi (2020) records how this imbalance has been a cause of subsequent political conflict since the 1950s; the constitutional resolution of it was therefore not a technical matter of the Constitution but a substantive resolution to decades of provincial alienation. As Syed Nafeesa Shah Jillani noted in her interview, "Although the framework provided by Bhutto was meant to be the power of the provinces, the centralized

one tended to drown provincial voices, as it turned out to be in the case of the 18<sup>th</sup> Amendment that abruptly changed this situation.

Second, it was a democratic achievement in its own right that the amendment was passed through a truly consultative process by the parliament instead of the executive or the military. The fact that Zardari willingly gave up the presidential powers that his predecessors vigorously protected, and managed to carry out this giving up in a manner that was open to the standard practice of a parliamentary debate represented a understanding of democratic governance as institutionally restraining and not aggrandizing in the person. This is what Linz and Stepan (1996) refer to as the behavioral aspect of democratic consolidation whereby political leaders come to perceive democratic rules as the only game in town as opposed to a commitment to bypass the same when it suits them. Sardar Ayaz Sadiq brilliantly summed up this aspect in his interview: "It was his steady hand that kept the system in motion as Pakistan gave parliament its actual voice and provinces their actual powers with the 18<sup>th</sup> Amendment.

Third, and arguably most importantly in the long-term democratic consolidation view, the government of Zardari saw out its own constitutional term and was able to preside over what can be called the first peaceful transfer of power between elected civilian government in Pakistan in May 2013. This shift however small-scale as it could be in the more developed democracies was a true institutional innovation within a political system where no elected government had ever served out its term without military takeover, presidential veto or duress at the hands of extra-parliamentary forces. Peaceful democratic succession according to Shafqat (2019) is in itself a kind of institutional consolidation that makes it ordinary to expect changes of government by the many elective processes at the expense of coercive ones.

To evaluate the Zardari presidency, however, analytically alone, without facing the fact of its significant vulnerabilities and contradictions, would be incomplete. The corruption scandals that surrounded his whole rule could at best be summed up in the sobriquet Mr. Ten Percent applicable since the first administration of Benazir Bhutto but even then, it was not merely a media invention despite the fact that so many of the individual instances were politically driven or procedurally faulty as documented by Babar (2025). A serious flaw in service delivery, economic management, and accountability of the administration also characterized the governance experience of PPP government in the years 2008-2013, which was one of the reasons why the party was overwhelmingly defeated in the 2013 general elections. With at least some degree of reason, critics have claimed that Zardari gave generous policy space to the military holding as long as it continued to guarantee democratic continuity came at significant cost to the policy space assigned to the elected civilian government on the issues of security and foreign policy (Saeed, *Democracy in Pakistan: Crises and Conflicts*, 2019) The civil-military "bargain" enabling parliament to serve its full term might have done so at the expense of deep-rooted civilian control of most significant consequences of policy in the state.

#### **The Civil-Military Constraint: Differences between Strategies and Institutional Legacies.**

The dependence between the elected civilian government and the military formation is what forms the long-standing structural obstacle of parliamentary sovereignty of political history in Pakistan. Bhutto and Zardari were all too conscious of this limitation and both worked out plans, which were fundamentally different in nature to move through it. Their divergent strategies and performances shed some light on the true strategic quandary of a core of civilian politics of hybrid-regime states.

The approach adopted by Bhutto was basically confrontational. After seeing the disastrous effects of untrammled military adventurism in 1971, he was resolved to instill and institutionalize civilian hegemony by a blend of structural reform and political aggressiveness. He placed retired or marginalized senior military officers whom he considered a political threat, established parallel security organs (primarily the FSF) in order to lessen his reliance on the army, and imposed the 1973 Constitution to establish a direct verbal linkage of military power to parliamentary control. In addition to establishing an educated society, Bhutto, as Nawaz (2018) archives, was implementing a set of policies that were aimed at limiting economic privileges of the military and decreasing organizational autonomy. In his interview, Syed Talat Hussain Shah, provided a candid evaluation as to as far as this strategy went: "The fault of Bhutto was to underrate the deep origins of military power upon which his struggle was directed against their supremacy: This challenge to their dominance proved fatal in his end.

The academic literature is much in line with this evaluation, but introduces considerable nuance. The detailed discussion of the phenomenon of "Milbus" the parallel enormous business empire of the military by Siddiq (2011) can be used to offer the structural basis as to why Bhutto needed such confrontational approach to create such a strong institutional push back. Threatening not just the political, but also the economic, interest of the officer corps, Bhutto was able to depress a kind of self-preservation logic among the military, which his mandate in parliament could not break through. The institutional action was fast and resolute when the 1977 election outcomes had given them a plausible excuse.

The policy of Zardari was based upon this historical lesson and on the experience of his own bitter past of eleven years of imprisonment: it was basically that of accommodationist. He wisely did not cite a contest with military prerogatives on any security and foreign policy issue, he kept in close contact with the army head, and he would cast his constitutional change proposals such as the 18th Amendment in a manner that did not unambiguously endanger the institutional interests of the military. According to Raza Rabbani in his interview, Zardari knew the boundaries of civilian influence and he resorted to dialogue and negotiation rather than confrontation as Zardari policy of reconciliation to all stakeholders including the military guaranteed continuity and did not lead to a direct conflict.

The effectiveness of this approach towards the attainment of democratic continuity can be seen. The effectiveness of such strategy in obtaining substantial civilian control is much more open to debate. The economic and institutional strength of the military essentially did not change under the constitutional reforms by Zardari, as Nawaz (2018) portrays and Siddiq (2011) substantiates with a structural background. The extent of parliamentary audit of the defense budget was still small; the promotion of military brasses as well as the military strategic doctrine were beyond any honest checks by civil agencies; the intelligence community had gone on working with less accountability to the democratically elected bodies. The 18 th Amendment restructured the constitutional relationship of federal and provincial governments, but failed to introduce any significant change to the constitutional relationship of elected governments and the armed forces.

This restriction is aimed at a larger theoretical message that comes out of the comparison constitutional engineering, though crafted at a high level and discussed during the political process, is incapable of acting by itself to eliminate the structural imbalances that define hybrid regimes. Bhutto was confrontational when it came to the military and this was institutionally

disastrous. Zardari used the accommodationist approach, which ensured continuity in democracy without addressing the imbalance. What the analogy implies is that the erosion of parliament's sovereignty in the matter of security policy might demand not the courage of an individual leader either the confrontational or the accommodationist type but the building of a long-term series of institutional devices: parliament committees endowed with real oversight authority, constitutional timetables in the ratification of defense budgets and senior promotions, and judicial checks and balances over executive and military. The development of these mechanisms did not take place systematically by either Bhutto or Zardari, which explains why the institutionally vulnerable nature of the parliamentary democracy when it comes to resisting extra-parliamentary pressure remains prevalent in Pakistan despite the sizeable pool of constitutional gains it has generated.

### **Conclusion**

It has been argued in this paper that the legacies of Zulfikar Ali Bhutto and Asif Ali Zardari represent sequential and complementary stages in the constitutional leadership history of Pakistan: an architectural stage of parliament and a devolutionary stage of operationalization of institutions. The comparative analysis of legacies can bring both comparatively new analytical understanding to both Pakistani politics and the theory of comparative democratization.

The initial aspiration to follow the evolution of their leadership styles within parliamentary reform shows a stark difference between the likes of Bhutto, whose leadership was charismatic, centralized, and constitutionally based, and Zardari, whose leadership is pragmatic, and coalition-based with a devolutionary orientation. Only the 1973 Constitution and the 18th Amendment are not competing feats; the latter followed based on the first in some way: the latter carried out the promise of the former while the former remained unfulfilled. The second of these goals to assess the constitutional actions taken by each of these leaders: these two indeed achieved both historic reforms of long-term impact; and each created institutions of governance practices which tended to weaken those very principles of institutionalism on which these reforms rested. The synthesis of these theories in the third objective indicates that a democratic consolidation in a hybrid-regime may proceed by some iterative layering, not through progressive evolution: charismatic rupture establishing constitutional norms, followed by pragmatic adaptation implementing those norms, followed by the need to deepen those norms further in ways neither charisma nor pragmatism can provide.

The weaknesses of the paper are that the paper operates on elite but not on mass-level views, which is bound to fulfill the viewpoint of institutions instead of living the democratic governance patiently. It can be concluded that future studies ought to incorporate data of citizens on the efficacy of parliament at citizen level with respect to these two periods. The termination of the analytic window in 2013, and the passing mention of a resume of the presidency of Zardari in 2024, also suggests a longitudinal follow-up study on whether the constitutional advantages of 2008 to 2013 still befalls the years to come. Extending the theoretical model of sequential constitutional leadership here further to encompass philosophical contributions made by Benazir Bhutto, Nawaz Sharif, and Imran Khan would further challenge the theoretical model. Lastly, a more disaggregated view of the record of implementation of the 18th Amendment such as the administrative capacity of the devolved provincial governments and the fiscal performance of the revised NFC framework would challenge whether constitutional devolution has increasingly

led to the improvement of effective governance or whether the disjunction between the constitutional text and institutional reality exists.

After all, perhaps the ultimate lesson of the Bhutto-Zardari comparison is that democratic consolidation in Pakistan, as in other places in the post-colonial world, requires visionaries who will create new rules of the political game and pragmatists who will render the redesigned rules to be functional within the parameters those historical inheritances place on them. The insolubility of neither of these attributes, and the overall progressive yet incomplete effect of an uninterrupted combination of the two are perhaps some of the contributions that the tumultuous democratic history of Pakistan could make to the scholarship of comparative politics of the greatest value.

#### References

- Baker B. (2008). "The PPP Government and the 18th Amendment" .
- Ahmed I. (2013). *Pakistan: The Garrison State*. oxford University Press.
- Babar F. (2025). *The Zardari Presidency (2008-2013) Now it must be told*. Lightstone publishers.
- Baker A. (2008 September 22). Pakistan: A Nation At Risk. *Time* pp. 11-14.
- Bhutto Z. A. (n.d.). *Pakistan And The Muslim World*. Sani H Panhwar.
- Bowen G. A. (2009). Document Analysis as a Qualitative Research Method. *Qualitative Research Journal* 9(2) . *Qualitative Research Journal* 27-40.
- Braun V. &. (2006). *Using Thematic Analysis in Psychology*. *Qualitative Research in Psychology*.
- Bryman A. (2016). *Social Research Methods (5th ed.)*. Oxford University Press.
- Burke J. (2008 September 5). Asif Ali Zardari: from jail to presidential palace. *The Guardian*.
- Burki S. (1980). Pakistan Under Bhutto 1971-1977.
- Chawla M. I. (2017). Era Of Reconciliation in Pakistan 2006-2017. *Journal of the Research Society of Pakistan*.
- Creswell J. C. (2018). *Research Design: Qualitative Quantitative and Mixed Methods Approaches (5th ed.)*. Sage Publications.
- Gadi M. (January 21 2018). Understanding The Real Zardari. *The News On Sunday Political Economy* .
- Ghafoor A. (2004). *Political movements in Pakistan* . Natinal Book Foundation.
- H.Syed A. (1978). Z.A Bhuttos Self-Characterizations and Pakistani Political culture. *Asian Survey* 1250-1266.
- Hughes R. G. & Shaffer R. (2021). The Bhutto family and Pakistan. *Intelligence and National Security* 925-936.
- Hussain I. (2018). *Governing the ungovernable :intitutional Reforms for Democratic Governance*. Oxford Press University.
- Hyder K. (Novermber 1972). Pakistan Under Bhutto. *University of California Press* 202-205 231-233.
- jadoon Z. (2023). "Pakistan Peoples Party Democratic and Socialist Party: A Brief History" .
- jalal A. (1995). *Democracy and authoritarianism in south Asia*. Iodon: cambridge university press.
- Jalal A. (2014). *The Struggle for Pakistan: A Muslim Homeland and Global Politics*. Harvard University Press.
- jillani S. N. (2025 April 14). Comparative Prliamentary Politics Of Pakistan. (K. H. Dahot Interviewer)

- Jones O. B. (2020). *The Bhutto Dynasty: The Struggle for power in Pakistan*. New Haven: Yale University Press.
- Kanwal I. (2017). "Political Development in Pakistan: Continuity and Change During Zardari Period".
- Kausar Shafiq A. B. (n.d.). Role of Pakistan Peoples Party in the political development in Pakistan. An Appraisal of Asif Ali Zardari(2008-2013).
- Khalique H. (August 2017). Zulfikar Ali Bhutto: Pakistan's most divisive political leader. . *Herald dawn*.
- Khan H. (2018 New edition). *Political and the Constitutional History of Pakistan*. oxford .
- Lashari N. (2006). *Bhuttos Vision of Pakistan*. Sani H.Panhwar.
- Lijphart A. (1971). Comparative Politics and the Comparative Method. The American Political Science Review.
- Muhammad Riaz Raza M. W. (n.d.). Image Of President Asif Ali Zardari as Portrayed by Daily Dawn and News. Adiscourse Analysis if Editorials .
- Mujtaba H. (December 27 2017). Bhutto was 'highly undemocratic'. DW News . *DW News* .
- Nawaz S. (2018). *The Military and Politics in Pakistan: A Chronicle of Interventions*. Harvard University Press.
- Panhwar S. H. (n.d.). *Pakistan And the Muslim World Zulfikar Ali Bhutto*.
- Paracha N. F. (3 April 2025). "Asif Ali Zardari: A Politician's Politician" . *The Friday Times* .
- Rabbani M. R. (2011). *A Biography of Pakistani federalism. Unity in Diversity*. LEO Books Islamabad.
- Raza H. (2017). "Pakistan Khappay: The Slogan That Saved Pakistan.". *Daily Times*.
- Raza R. (1997). *Zulfikar Ali Bhutto and Pakistan 1967-1977*.
- Raza R. (1997). *Zulfikar Ali Bhutto and Pakistan 1967-1977*. Retrieved from [https://sanipanhwar.com/uploads/books/2024-08-27\\_10-49-17\\_bf8c7cce6f5747c0f316bf2f262af8ee.pdf](https://sanipanhwar.com/uploads/books/2024-08-27_10-49-17_bf8c7cce6f5747c0f316bf2f262af8ee.pdf)
- Rumi R. (2020). *The Politics of Federalism in Pakistan: Intergovernmental Relations and Democracy*. Taylor & Francis.
- Shah S. N. (2024 December 21). Parliamentary politics of Pakistan. (K. H. Dahot Interviewer)
- Siddiq A. (2013). Discovering Democracy: Five years if Plotocal Rule In Pakistan. *Economic and Political weekly* 23-25.
- Syed Hassan raza Syed M. S. (n.d.). Portrayal of Asif Ali Zaedari In Editorials: A study of pre and post Presidential elections Coverage.
- Wolpert S. (1993). *Zulfi Bhutto of Pakistan his life and time* . oxford press.
- Zaidi S. (n.d.). *After the Assasination 2008-2013*. Dawn News. Retrieved from <https://www.dawn.com/news/1374113>