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Murdering the Truth: A Critical Post-Mortem of K.K. Aziz's Historiographical Claims

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Abstract

K. K. Aziz's *The Murder of History* (1985,1993) is a landmark revisionist critique that exposed systematic distortions of historical facts within Pakistan's state-prescribed curricula. Written during a period of intense sociopolitical transition, the book challenged institutionalized "myths" used to bolster national identity at the expense of academic integrity. This study critically examines Aziz's claims by employing a qualitative research design within a critical realist framework. The research systematically verifies Aziz's assertions against primary sources, including archival records, biographical works, and official documents. The analysis distinguishes between factual inaccuracies, interpretive disagreements, editorial mistakes, and curriculum design categories that Aziz often conflates. Findings reveal that while Aziz draws valuable attention to textbook errors, his generalizations frequently overstate the case, conflating institutional shortcomings with broader historical scholarship. The study contributes to South Asian historiography by providing an evidence-based evaluation of Aziz's work and offers methodological insights for textbook criticism. The research underscores the importance of distinguishing between textbook production flaws and the discipline of history itself.

Key words: historiography, textbooks, critique, myths, misrepresentation, verification, Indian Subcontinent

Introduction

Khursheed Kamal Aziz (1927–2009) was a historian and scholar who challenged Pakistan's official history. His book *The Murder of History: A Critique of History Textbooks Used in Pakistan* was first published in 1985 and reprinted in 1993. It is a key critique of South Asian history. Aziz studied at Forman Christian College, Government College Lahore and Victoria University in Manchester. He briefly advised Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, then went into exile during General Zia-ul-Haq's rule. This experience showed him how power uses history to control people. *The Murder of History* is still important today. It broke the myths that built Pakistani national identity. Its critique remains powerful because the problems it exposed still exist. Chapter one presents a comprehensive review of the existing literature relevant to the present study, which critically examines K. K. Aziz's "The Murder of History." The review is organized into four main sections. First, it explores the broader field of historiography in Pakistan, examining the debates surrounding national identity and historical narratives.¹ Second, it reviews the literature on the development and criticism of Pakistan's history textbooks and curriculum. Third, it situates K. K. Aziz within the context of Pakistani historical scholarship, examining his intellectual contributions and scholarly reception.²

The writing of history in Pakistan has been a contested intellectual terrain since the country's inception. The question of how to narrate the nation's past whether through a religious, nationalist, or secular lens has generated significant scholarly debate. This section reviews the key contributions to this field.

1.1 Problem Statement

K.K. Aziz's *The Murder of History* is a seminal critique of Pakistani textbooks, it lacks systematic verification against primary sources. The work frequently conflates clerical errors with interpretive biases, leading to broad generalizations that may misrepresent Pakistani historiography. This study aims to provide an evidence-based evaluation of Aziz's claims to determine their historical accuracy and methodological validity.

1.2 Research Question

1. What are the specific distortions in Pakistan National Curriculum highlighted by K.K. Aziz in the Book *Murder of History*?
2. How does the researcher validate the factual accuracy of the identified historical myth by cross referencing them with multiple primary and secondary historical sources?

1.3 Research Objectives

1. To identify and analyze the specific historical distortions in Pakistan National Curriculum highlighted by K.K. Aziz in Book "Murder of History."
2. To examine the process of validating the factual accuracy of identified historical myths by cross referencing them with the multiple primary and secondary historical sources.

1.4 Significance of the Research

This research provides the first systematic, evidence-based evaluation of K. K. Aziz's *The Murder of History*, a seminal text frequently cited in debates on Pakistani history education but rarely subjected to rigorous critical examination. By verifying Aziz's claims against primary sources, the study establishes a foundation for more informed discussions about historical accuracy and representation in Pakistan.

Literature Review

This chapter presents a comprehensive review of the existing literature relevant to the present study, which critically examines K. K. Aziz's *The Murder of History*. The review is organized into four main sections. First, it explores the broader field of historiography in Pakistan, examining the debates surrounding national identity and historical narratives. Second, it reviews the literature on the development and criticism of Pakistan's history textbooks and curriculum. Third, it situates K. K. Aziz within the context of Pakistani historical scholarship, examining his intellectual contributions and scholarly reception.³

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2.1 Foundational Narratives and National Identity

The early decades of Pakistan saw the emergence of what scholars have termed the "official nationalist narrative." This narrative, articulated by historians such as I. H. Qureshi in *The Muslim Community of the Indo-Pakistan Subcontinent*, framed the history of Muslims in South Asia as a distinct and separate trajectory culminating in the demand for Pakistan. Qureshi's work emphasized the cultural, religious, and political distinctiveness of Indian Muslims, tracing their identity from the advent of Islam in the subcontinent.⁵ This approach, while foundational, has been critiqued for its teleological framing reading the creation of Pakistan backward into every preceding historical event. This chapter details the methodological framework guiding this research. By employing a qualitative, descriptive-analytical design grounded in critical realism, this study systematically examines K. K. Aziz's *The Murder of History*. Through thematic and comparative analysis of primary and secondary sources, the research seeks to distinguish between legitimate critiques of textbook errors and broader generalizations that may obscure the complexity of historical scholarship. The methodology described provides a robust foundation for the findings and discussion that follow in subsequent chapters.

Similarly, he contributed to this genre with *The Making of Pakistan: A Study in Nationalism*, which, as noted in this analysis, focuses on the ideological development of Muslim nationalism. In this work, Aziz examines the intellectual and political currents that led to the demand for a separate Muslim state. However, as the analysis reveals, this earlier work by Aziz exhibits some of the same selective emphases he later critiques in textbooks. For instance, the analysis notes that in *The Making of Pakistan*, Aziz "give no proper space in value to Jinnah 14 points and Iqbal Address 1930" a critique that echoes his own later complaints about textbook omissions. This irony highlights the complexity of Aziz's position within Pakistani historiography.⁶

The Sole Spokesman Jinnah, the Muslim League and the Demand for Pakistan, offered a revisionist account that challenged the nationalist narrative. Jalal argued that Jinnah's demand for Pakistan was a strategic bargaining tool rather than a fixed ideological commitment. This interpretation sparked significant controversy and debate within Pakistani academic circles, illustrating the contested nature of foundational historical narratives. Jalal's work represents a shift toward more critical and nuanced readings of Pakistan's origins, a tradition with which Aziz's *The Murder of History* aligns in its critical posture, even if their substantive conclusions differ.⁷

2.2 The Textbook as a Site of Ideological Production

Scholars have long recognized that textbooks are not neutral conveyors of information but rather sites where dominant ideologies are reproduced. In the Pakistani context, K. K. Aziz's (1993) *The Murder of History* represents the most sustained and detailed critique of textbook content. Aziz's central argument, as evidenced in the analysis, is that Pakistani history textbooks are riddled with factual errors, interpretive biases and omissions that collectively constitute a "murder of history."

Rahman (2004), in *Denizens of Alien Worlds: A Study of Education, Inequality and Polarization in Pakistan*, examines how the centralization of textbook production under state control has led to the dissemination of a uniform, state-sanctioned narrative.⁹ Rahman's work suggests that the problems Aziz identified are not merely a matter of editorial negligence but are rooted in structural features of Pakistan's education system.¹⁰

2.3 Grievances and allegation of Fatima Jinnah

Fatma Jinnah (1966) "My Brother" provides an intimate portrait of Muhammad Ali Jinnah from a familial perspective. As cited in the analysis document, Fatima Jinnah's account of the relationship between Jinnah and Liaquat Ali Khan, as well as her allegations regarding administrative failures during Jinnah's final illness, have been subjects of debate.¹¹ The analysis notes that these allegations were "written after she either lost or was made to lose the election against Ayub Khan," suggesting a political context that may have influenced her narrative. This example demonstrates the need for critical engagement with even seemingly personal accounts.

Jinnah of Pakistan is widely regarded as a comprehensive biography of Pakistan's founder. Similarly, *A Political Biography*, cited in the analysis, contributes to the literature on the poet-philosopher who is often credited with articulating the idea of Pakistan. Jalal's work emphasizes the political dimensions of Iqbal's thought, particularly his Allahabad Address of 1930. This biographical tradition has been essential in establishing the intellectual genealogy of Pakistan's creation.¹²

2.4 Critical Approaches to Pakistani Historiography

A growing body of scholarship has critically examined the practices and assumptions of Pakistani historians. He in *The Murder of History*, represents a self-critical moment within Pakistani historiography, with a historian turning his analytical tools upon the educational materials produced by his own country.¹³

Rubina (1995), in her work on education in Pakistan, has examined how school curricula construct national identity. Her analysis complements Aziz's critique by focusing on the ideological functions of education rather than solely on factual accuracy.¹⁴ Rubina (1995), in *Fifty Years of Pakistan*, has explored the relationship between educational policies and state-building in Pakistan, providing a broader context for understanding the production of textbooks.¹⁵

2.5 Comparative Perspectives on Textbook Criticism

The phenomenon of critical textbook analysis is not unique to Pakistan. Scholars in other contexts have similarly examined the role of textbooks in shaping national narratives.¹⁶ Apple and Christian-Smith (1991), in *The Politics of the Textbook*, provide a theoretical framework for understanding textbooks as cultural artifacts shaped by political and economic forces.¹⁷ Foster and Crawford (2006) have examined how history textbooks in various countries construct national identity, often through omission and selective emphasis.¹⁸

The analysis document draws on comparative examples to contextualize certain critiques. For instance, the discussion of Pakistan Resolution Day (23rd March versus 24th March) is placed alongside similar discrepancies in the celebration dates of events in other countries, such as American Independence Day (celebrated on July 4th despite the vote occurring on July 2nd) and Queen Elizabeth II's official birthday. This comparative approach, while not developed into a full theoretical framework in the existing literature, suggests a useful avenue for understanding how nations construct commemorative narratives. Understanding K. K. Aziz's intellectual context is essential for critically engaging with *The Murder of History*. This section reviews the literature on Aziz's broader scholarly contributions and the reception of his work. The reception of *The Murder of History* has been mixed. On one hand, the work has been praised for its meticulous cataloguing of errors and its courage in criticizing state-sanctioned narratives.

2.6 Public Impact

K.K. Aziz's *The Murder of History: A Critique of History Textbooks Used in Pakistan* (1993) is widely regarded as the most influential yet controversial intervention in Pakistani historiography. While the work was framed as an academic critique of factual errors in state-sanctioned textbooks, scholars note that its primary impact was in attracting public attention rather than transforming academic practice.¹⁹ Aziz's method cataloguing hundreds of mistakes ranging from wrong dates and misspelled names to printing errors succeeded in provoking debate outside university circles, making historiography a matter of public concern for the first time.²⁰

2.7 Method Critique

Critics argue that Aziz's focus was disproportionately directed toward minor editorial and printing issues. Pages of the book are devoted to typographical mistakes, inconsistent spellings of historical figures, and discrepancies in dates of events like the Pakistan Resolution.²¹ While Aziz contended that such errors collectively amounted to a "murder of history," reviewers like Tariq Rahman have observed that the emphasis on surface-level mistakes sometimes overshadowed deeper methodological or interpretive critique.²² This repetitive documentation gave the book a polemical tone that resonated with journalists and the public, but drew criticism from academic historians for lacking theoretical engagement.²³ The reception of *The Murder of History* was therefore mixed. On one hand, it was praised for its courage in exposing state narratives and for democratizing historical criticism.²⁴ On the other hand, historians noted that Aziz's own earlier work, *The Making of Pakistan* (1967), displayed selective emphases he later criticized in others, raising questions about consistency.²⁵ Thus, the book's legacy lies less in its scholarly precision than in its role as a public intervention that turned textbook content into a national controversy.

2.8 Gaps in the Existing Literature

This review of the literature reveals several gaps that the present study seeks to address, while *The Murder of History* is frequently cited, there has been no comprehensive, systematic effort to verify Aziz's claims against primary sources. The present study addresses this gap by subjecting a range of Aziz's critiques to rigorous factual verification using archival records, biographical works and official documents. The existing literature does not adequately distinguish between different types of errors in historical texts. Aziz himself treats factual errors, interpretive disagreements and editorial mistakes as equivalent. This study develops a more nuanced framework for analyzing the nature and significance of different types of errors.

The existing literature does not adequately situate Aziz's work within broader discussions of historiography and textbook criticism. This study draws on comparative perspectives from other national contexts and from the broader field of historical methodology to provide a more comprehensive evaluation.

2.9 Theoretical Framework

This study uses four key theories to analyze history textbooks and K. K. Aziz's critiques in *The Murder of History*.

2.9.1 Historiography Theory

Historiography is the study of how history is written. According to E. H. Carr, History is not just a list of facts, it is how a historian interprets those facts. This theory is vital because it helps in distinguish between a factual mistake (an objective error) and an interpretive difference (a matter of opinion).

2.9.2 Textbook Theory

Textbooks are not neutral. Michael Apple argues that they represent "official knowledge" approved by the state. This theory explains that textbooks often prioritize political ideology and national identity over pure historical accuracy to meet government goals.

2.9.3 Nationalism Theory

Benedict Anderson describes a nation as an "imagined community" History textbooks are tools used to build this community by creating a shared memory. This theory explains why textbooks focus on specific "heroes" and national narratives while ignoring others.

2.9.4 Critical Realism

This philosophy suggests that while historical events actually happened (objective reality), our understanding of them is filtered through social and political lenses. It allows this research to stay balanced, acknowledging that facts exist, but recognizing that both textbook writers and K. K. Aziz have their own perspectives.

2.10 Analytical Framework

To systematically study the errors identified by Aziz, this research categorizes them as follows:

Category	Description
Factual Errors	Wrong dates, names, or places.
Interpretive Differences	Different points of view on the same event
Ideological Narratives	Content driven by Nationalism or state policy
Editorial/Policy Issues	Spelling mistakes or topics added/removed by the curriculum
Curriculum Policy Issues	Topics included or excluded due to policy
Simplification for Students	Simplified history for school level

3.1 Research Design

This study employs a qualitative research design to critically analyze K. K. Aziz's *The Murder of History* and to evaluate his claims regarding errors in Pakistani history textbooks. The research is exploratory and analytical in nature, as it seeks to identify the types of errors present in textbooks and to assess

whether Aziz's criticism is academically justified. The study utilizes a content analysis method, in which selected textbook content and Aziz's claims are examined and compared with primary and secondary historical sources. The research adopts a critical approach informed by historiography, theories of nationalism, textbook studies, and critical realism to differentiate between factual errors, interpretive differences, editorial mistakes and curriculum policy issues. A purposive sampling technique is employed to select relevant examples from Aziz's book and corresponding passages from textbooks. The collected data are then analyzed using a thematic and categorical approach based on the analytical framework developed for this study. This research design facilitates a systematic and balanced evaluation of textbook content and Aziz's arguments.

3.2 Sources of Data collection

The primary source for this study is K. K. Aziz's *The Murder of History* (1985 and 1993 editions). Secondary data for comparative verification includes government reports, official publications, academic articles, correspondence, and contemporary journalistic records to ensure an evidence-based assessment.

3.3 Data Analysis procedure

The data of the study was analyzed using qualitative thematic analysis and documentary analysis. The process involves a systematic examination of the KK Aziz, *The murder of History* to categorize and evaluate the nature of the critique. To ensure rigorous interpretation of the text, the analysis is structured through following stages.

Categorization of Errors

Comparative Verification

Contextual Evaluation

Frequency and Impact Assessment

Synthesis of Findings

3.4 Limitations

The analysis is confined to the critiques Aziz presents in *The Murder of History*. It does not assess the full corpus of his work or provide a comprehensive evaluation of all Pakistani history textbooks.

3.5 Ethical Considerations

This research adheres to the principles of academic integrity and ethical scholarship. All sources are properly cited and the work of other scholars, including K. K. Aziz, is treated with respect and is subjected to fair and reasoned critique. The study does not aim to engage in ad hominem argumentation but rather to contribute to a more nuanced understanding of historiography in Pakistan.

4. Analysis of the Study Quaid-e-Azam and Liaquat Ali Khan Relationship and Allegations against PM Liaquat Ali Khan

On page 2, K.K. Aziz examines the relationship between Liaquat Ali Khan and Muhammad Ali Jinnah, arguing that Jinnah did not trust Liaquat Ali Khan, that their relationship was poor, and that Liaquat Ali Khan was not in Jinnah's favour."

This assertion, however, is contestable. Historical evidence suggests that the relationship between Quaid-e-Azam and Liaquat Ali Khan was cordial and collaborative.²⁶ Both were seasoned politicians with considerable political experience who shared a commitment to the creation of a separate state

for Indian Muslims.²⁷ While Aziz focuses on political events from 1940 to 1947, he overlooks the broader context of their partnership. Fatima Jinnah also addressed their relationship in *My Brother*, completed after Pakistan's 1964 presidential election. She referenced Liaquat Ali Khan's visit to Ziarat, the incident involving the dilapidated ambulance, details concerning Jinnah's health, and the Liaquat–Desai Pact all of which indicate mutual trust and cooperation.²⁸ The shifting from Karachi to Ziarat was the decision of the personal physician, Colonel Ilahi Baksh. Fatima Jinnah agreed to stay at the Ziarat Residency. The junk ambulance reflected administrative incapability, irresponsibility, and possibly the conspiracies of those who later removed Liaquat Ali Khan from the way in 1951.²⁹

Liaquat Ali Khan rejected the entire agreement and dismissed it as a hoax or a fabricated story. He mentioned that no such pact had been negotiated between him and Bulabhai Desai that would bind the Muslim League. Congress also rejected the dialogues of Bulabhai Desai because he was not officially authorized for dialogues and pacts. Both were top leaders of political parties and had a good friendship. Both belonged to the pragmatic school of thought, and it was personal communication between them to move toward political conciliation in India. Liaquat Ali Khan communicated with Desai on the following occasions.³⁰

- Breaking the political deadlock between Congress and the League
- Working for parity representation, where Congress and the League would enjoy equal representation in the future legislature
- At that time Jinnah was ill, and Liaquat Ali Khan attempted to secure a viable constitutional framework

K.K. Aziz and other critics frequently highlight the incident mentioned by Miss Fatima Jinnah in her memoirs, where she described the vehicle sent to transport Quaid-e-Azam from the airfield as a “junk” or broken-down ambulance. While this term is often used to imply a deliberate conspiracy by Liaquat Ali Khan, an objective analysis suggests that it was a case of grave administrative negligence and lack of capability within the newly formed state's machinery.

When Quaid-e-Azam moved to Ziarat, Liaquat Ali Khan did meet him. In his final days, Jinnah's health had deteriorated significantly consequently, isolation and illness took a severe toll on him. The primary reason for this isolation and serious condition was Jinnah himself, as he did not want anyone to find out about his worsening health. Liaquat Ali Khan had gone there specifically to visit him and they discussed administrative matters. Providing a junk ambulance was an administrative failure and an act of negligence, perhaps it was a conspiracy by the same elements who later removed Liaquat Ali Khan from their path on 16th October 1951.³¹ I present several global examples of heads of government or heads of state who died within their own governmental systems due to administrative negligence and lapses, where heads of state lost their lives as a result.³²

- James A. Garfield, 1881: President Garfield did not die from his assassin's bullet, but from severe medical malpractice.
- George Washington, 1799: Though he had already left office, his death is a classic case of aggressive, failed emergency medical intervention.
- Joseph Stalin of the USSR, 1953: Stalin's death involved a critical administrative delay driven by fear.

- Zachary Taylor of the USA, 1850: After falling ill with a stomach ailment (likely cholera), Taylor was treated with the “heroic medicine” of the time, including large doses of ipecac, calomel, and opium; it was a failure of administration and the medical team.
- William Henry Harrison, USA, 1841: Harrison fell ill shortly after his inauguration. His doctors treated his pneumonia with outdated emergency folk remedies like leeches and Virginia snakeroot.
- Yuri Andropov, USSR, 1984: Andropov suffered from kidney failure during his tenure. The administration chose to conceal his condition and keep him in a sanatorium-style environment rather than providing transparent, high-level emergency care.
- Houari Boumediene, Algeria, 1978: He fell into a coma due to a rare blood disease. There were significant delays in diagnosing the condition, and he was eventually flown to the USSR for treatment.

Liaquat Ali Khan presented Jinnah’s name for the Governor-Generalship of Pakistan to the British government on July 5, 1947. Moreover, Jinnah nominated Liaquat Ali Khan as:

- Secretary General of the Muslim League in 1936
- Deputy Leader of the Muslim League in the Central Legislative Assembly in 1941
- Convener of the Sind Muslim League Action Committee in 1943
- Chairman of the Central Parliamentary Board in 1945
- Representative of the Muslim League for the Cabinet Mission Plan in 1946
- Financial Minister in the Interim Government in India
- Prime Minister of Pakistan

These points suggest that Liaquat Ali Khan and Muhammad Ali Jinnah had a good and friendly relationship, and Jinnah had full trust and confidence in him.³³

Liaquat Ali Khan and USSR, USA Invitation

“On page 8, Aziz states that Liaquat Ali Khan ignored and refused the invitation to visit the Soviet Union”. On June 2nd, 1949, the Soviet Union extended an invitation to Liaquat Ali Khan through the Pakistan Embassy in Tehran, and in the invitation the date of 15th August was suggested. However, the Pakistan Government proposed alternative dates, such as 5th November 1949, because on 15th August the Pakistan Government wanted to celebrate the 2nd Independence Day. Despite Pakistan proposing alternative dates, the Soviet Union reportedly dragged its feet. Moscow insisted on the exchange of resident ambassadors before the visit but delayed approving the Pakistani envoy until late October and failed to nominate their own envoy to Karachi. In May 1950, US President Truman invited Mr. Liaquat Ali Khan to visit the USA, which Pakistan accepted, and he visited on May 03, 1950.³⁴

At that time, Pakistan was facing numerous challenges, including financial, administrative, border, military, and foreign relations issues. Pakistan decided to align with the United States, which had greater power, financial resources, and political influence. Meanwhile, the US, USSR, and India had good relations. The USA invited Liaquat Ali Khan to visit the US, and this was a good decision at that time because only the USA was the major financial and military power capable of supporting Pakistan during this critical period.

Muslim League Campaign in NWFP for Joining Pakistan

“On page 11, Aziz criticizes that the textbook does not mention the existence of the Red Shirts in the context of Quaid-e-Azam’s campaign in NWFP. He argues that the author focused on Quaid-e-Azam’s popularity but omitted the role of the Red Shirts.”

However, according to the referendum results in 1947, 51% of the vote was cast, and 50.5% were in favor of Pakistan. The slogan of the Muslim League was Pakistan, and the textbook passage refers to Jinnah’s campaign in NWFP and the popularity of the Muslim League’s stance on independence in NWFP.³⁵

“Pathan” Means “Muslim”

“On page 12, Aziz states that ‘Pathan’ means Muslim.”

This statement by K.K. Aziz is incorrect. Not all Pathans are Muslims.³⁶ Some tribes, such as the Kakar sub-branch of the Pashtoons living in Baluchistan, were non-Muslim and migrated to India after partition.³⁷ This tribe is now settled in Rajasthan, India.³⁸

Jinnah Did Not Study Law in London

“On page 13, Aziz states that Jinnah did not study law in London.”

According to records and references, Jinnah gained admission to Lincoln’s Inn on June 5, 1893, at the age of 19 (some records note that he cleared his preliminary examination on May 25, 1893).³⁹ He was officially called to the Bar on April 29, 1896.²⁵ This contradicts Aziz’s statement and highlights an error in his research.⁴⁰

Pakistan and Global Precedents of Official Day Celebrations

“On page sixty-five, the Karachi Text Board mentions March 23 as the date of the passing of the Pakistan Resolution, which is incorrect. I agree with Aziz’s stance that the Pakistan Resolution was passed on March 24, 1940.”

The theme of the Lahore Resolution, presented by Moulvi Fazal Haq, was: “That geographically contiguous units are demarcated into regions which should be constituted, with such territorial readjustments as may be necessary, so that the areas in which Muslims are numerically in a majority, as in the North-Western and Eastern Zones of (British) India, should be grouped to constitute independent states in which the constituent units shall be autonomous and sovereign.”⁴¹

The resolution was presented on March 23, 1940, and thousands of people welcomed it. After 11 hours, on March 24, it was passed by vote.⁴² Aziz repeatedly emphasizes such errors in his book, highlighting this particular issue more than 50 times. However, this is not a blunder, because there are many examples where an occasion originated on one date but was officially commemorated on another. It is clear that the Muslim League Working Committee officially announced on February 22, 1941, that Pakistan Resolution Day would be celebrated on March 23rd.⁴³ Now, the repeated discussion of the March 23 and 24 difference more than seventy times in his book is unnecessary. I present some major occasions that are officially celebrated on dates different from their actual occurrence. To understand the adoption of the Lahore Resolution date, it is also necessary to consider why the resolution was presented, which the author ignored. The following are examples from around the world where events originated on one date but are officially celebrated on another.⁴⁴

- Jesus Christ: His actual birth date is unknown (scholars suggest spring or autumn). Celebrated date: December 25 (Christmas), chosen by the early Church.

- William Shakespeare: Baptized on April 26, 1564. Celebrated date: traditionally observed on April 23, which is also the date of his death.
- Guru Nanak (Founder of Sikhism): Actual birth date April 15, 1469. Celebrated date: Guru Nanak Jayanti is observed according to the KartikaPurnima lunar calendar (usually in November).
- George Washington: Actual birth date February 22, 1732. Celebrated date in the U.S. Presidents' Day, observed on the third Monday of February.
- Queen Elizabeth II: Actual birth date April 21st; officially celebrated on June 2nd.

Sayyid Jamal al-Din Afghani: Afghanistan or Iran

"On page 16, K.K. Aziz cites Nekki, claiming that SayyidJamaluddin Afghani was Persian and born in Asadabad, Iran."

A majority of historians British, Turkish, Arabic, Pakistani, Afghan, and some Iranian scholars argue that he was born in Asadabad, Afghanistan, and identified himself as a Sadat and by birth an Afghan.⁴⁵ He worked for many years as a legal advisor to the King of Afghanistan, Dost Muhammad Khan, and later Amir Muhammad Azam Khan.⁴⁶ With conflicting accounts, the issue remains complex. However, given Afghani's own claim and the historical context, Aziz's statement appears questionable. K.K. Aziz relies on Nekki's statement but does not accept the claim of Jamaluddin himself, who declared himself Afghan.⁴⁷

Here, I present a brief introduction to the scholar who influenced K.K. Aziz, Ms. Nikki R. Keddie. By profession, she was a historian and Professor of Middle Eastern History at UCLA. Her area of specialization was the modern Middle East, Islamic reform movements, and political ideologies. She authored *Sayyid Jamal ad-Din "al-Afghani": A Political Biography* (1972, University of California Press).

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Pakistan and Global Precedents of Independence Day Celebrations

"On page 23, K.K. Aziz criticizes the Text Board for mentioning August 14 as Independence Day, claiming that Pakistan was established on August 15th."

The Independence Act was signed by King George VI of the United Kingdom on July 18th, 1947.⁴⁹ According to the Act, on August 15, 1947, Pakistan and India would become separate dominion states.⁵⁰ In 1947 and 1948, during the first two years, Pakistan officially recognized and celebrated its independence on August 15. The first commemorative postage stamps issued by Pakistan Post in July 1948 specifically listed the independence date as August 15, 1947. In June 1948, the cabinet decided to shift the Independence Day celebration from August 15 to August 14. In 1949, for the first time, the Independence Day ceremony was celebrated on August 14th.⁵¹

Reasons: Quaid-e-Azam held the independence ceremony on August 14, 1947. Lord Mountbatten transferred power, as a representative of the Crown, to Quaid-e-Azam Muhammad Ali Jinnah on August 14 as Governor-General of Pakistan. Lord Mountbatten, the last Viceroy, needed to be in New Delhi for India's midnight ceremony on August 15 to assume charge as Governor-General of India; therefore, he first transferred power to Jinnah on August 14th.⁵² This is not a new practice or unique to Pakistan; many countries celebrate independence on dates different from the actual day. Global precedents of Independence Day celebrations include the following.⁵³

- Jamaica: Independence Day is August 6, but it is celebrated on the first Monday of August.
- United States: Congress voted for independence on July 2, 1776, but it is celebrated on July 4.
- Bangladesh: Liberation date is December 16, 1971, but it is also commemorated on March 26.

- Mexico: Independence was achieved on September 16th, 1810, but it is officially celebrated on September 15th.
- Bahrain: Formally declared independence on August 15th, 1971, but celebrates it on December 16th.
- Cyprus: Gained independence from the UK on August 16 but celebrates it on October 1 due to extreme summer heat.⁵⁴
- Algeria: Gained independence on July 3th, 1962, but celebrates it on July 5.
- Morocco: Gained independence on March 2, 1956, but celebrates it on November 18th.⁵⁵

There are many examples in history where a state gained independence on one date and officially celebrates it on another. However, such differences are not generally considered the propagation of incorrect history, although this criticism is often raised by some Pakistani authors.

Founder of All India National Congress

“On page 23, K.K. Aziz questions A.O. Hume's role as the founder of the Indian National Congress.”

Actually, A.O. Hume is widely recognized as a founder of the Congress, which was formed in 1885 to address political issues between locals and the British.⁵⁶ In 1879, after the Maharashtra uprising led by Balhward Phadak, A.O. Hume realized that there was a need for a peaceful platform for resolving issues between Indians and the British.⁵⁷ The main idea was presented by A.O. Hume, and then the INC was established on December 28, 1885.⁵⁸

War of Independence 1857

“On page 27 and page 38, Aziz critiques a Lahore textbook labeling the 1857 war as ‘holy jihad’ and a war of independence, while the author claimed that it was a war of mutiny.”

This was a war between local residents of India and foreign rulers. This war is considered a war of independence for Indians and a mutiny for the British.⁵⁹ The Indians wanted to take power back from the British, so they started a war against them. There are different reasons in different regions but the objectives were the same to withdraw the British from India. Clearly, it is a war of independence.⁶⁰

Name of Clement Richard Attlee

On page 35, Aziz critiques the textbook's use of “Lord Attlee” and says it should be “Mr. Attlee.”

Actually, this textbook was written in 1992, and Attlee became a member of the House of Lords in 1955.⁶¹ When the textbook was written, Attlee had already become Lord Attlee, so if the issue is with the Mr./ Lord title, both usages are questionable. His full name was Clement Richard Attlee; the author did not mention the full name of the Prime Minister of the UK.⁶²

1965 Pak India War

“On page 53, Aziz praises the Karachi textbook's claim that Pakistan's military forced India to accept the ceasefire in 1965.” However, he asserts that there is no truth to this statement and that the ceasefire was brought under a United Nations Security Council resolution.

In fact, Russia played a significant role behind the ceasefire.⁶³ A question arises: in the 1971 war, when India was in a dominant position, why did Russia not intervene? In fact, in the 1965 war, Pakistan was in a dominant position and Russia intervened to stop the war.⁶⁴ In 1965, the Security Council passed Resolution No. 211 on September 20, 1965, and India agreed to stop the war,⁶⁵ but in the 1971 war, when India was in a dominant position, the Security Council passed several resolutions,⁶⁵ such as No. 303, No. 307, and No. 2793, but India did not follow the resolutions, and both the UNO and USSR failed to stop the war until Pakistan surrendered.⁶⁶

Domain of the textbook board

On page 33, Aziz raises a question about the NWFP (now K-P) textbook giving very little space to Zia-ul-Haq's rule, mentioning only four lines. On page 24, he raises a question about why a Lahore textbook discusses the 1965 Pak-India War in a chapter titled "Babul Islam."

In previous pages, he raises the question that textbooks give more space to some topics in the syllabus. However, this is the duty of the textbook board, curriculum designers, and syllabus makers. It is not the fault of history regarding the decisions of the textbook board.

Aligarh Movement Role in Indian Muslims' Financial Support

"On page 100, the author criticizes the statement of the Lahore textbook: 'Aligarh Movement made the Muslims economically affluent.'"

This statement is correct. The Aligarh Movement educated Muslims and worked for Muslim rights in government services.⁶⁷ The Aligarh Movement worked for the interests of Muslims; by the end of 1882, over 20% of graduate students of MAO College had secured government jobs.⁶⁸

Independence Act 1947

"On page 150, the author mentions that the Crown assent of the Independence Act was on July 15, 1947."

But actually, the Crown assented to the Independence Act on July 18, 1947.⁶⁹

"A Study in Nationalism (page 24), he says that the Secretary of State for India sanctioned this scheme in June 1905."

The correct date was July 15, 1905. He mentioned the wrong date.⁷⁰

Quaid-e-Azam Nomination as Governor-General of Pakistan

"On pages 54 and 55, the author says that Jinnah was not the elected Governor-General but was appointed by the British King, and on page 66, he writes that Jinnah himself chose to be Governor-General."

The author repeated this statement in the chapter. In historical documents, the decision to nominate Muhammad Ali Jinnah as the Governor-General of Pakistan was officially communicated to Lord Mountbatten (the last Viceroy) by the All-India Muslim League.⁷¹ While the British government initially pressured the Muslim League to accept a joint Governor-General (Mountbatten) for both India and Pakistan, the League's leadership under Jinnah's firm direction formally notified the British on July 2, 1947, that they wanted Jinnah to hold the post for Pakistan.⁷²

It is a well-established global precedent that the leader of a liberation movement or the architect of a revolution often assumes the role of Head of State or Head of Government upon independence.⁷³ At the time of Pakistan's creation, Quaid-e-Azam Muhammad Ali Jinnah served as the President of the All-India Muslim League; his subsequent appointment as Governor-General aligns with numerous historical parallels across the world.⁷⁴

Liaquat Ali Khan presented the name of Quaid-e-Azam for Governor-Generalship to Lord Mountbatten on July 2, 1947, and then sent a letter confirming it on July 5, 1947. The UK Prime Minister announced his name in the House on July 10, and the Crown authorized it on July 18, 1947.⁷⁵

Separate Nationalism Stance of the Muslim League

"On page 52, the author claimed that under the Lucknow Pact, the Indian National Congress did not accept Muslims as a separate nation, but the textbook mentions that 'Congress recognized Muslims as a separate nation.'"

The author admitted that Congress agreed to the separate electorate system in India in the Lucknow Pact. However, Congress indirectly acknowledged Muslims as a separate entity.⁷⁶ The reason Muslims wanted a separate electorate system was based on ideology, culture and religion. Therefore, by accepting this system, Congress effectively recognized Muslims as a distinct nation.⁷⁷

Translation of Quran

“The author cited that the textbook mentioned the first translation of the Quran in Sindhi language is incorrect and that the first translation of the Quran was done in Latin.”

The author did not discuss the era of Umar bin Abdul Aziz, when Sindh was under his rule and the Quran was translated into the Sindhi language, which was the official language of Sindh at that time, in 884 AD.⁷⁸ The Quran was later translated into Latin in 1143 by Robert of Ketton in France.⁷⁹ These references focus on the historical records of the 9th-century Sindhi translation commissioned during the era of the Abbasid Caliphate.⁸⁰ Historical records indicate that a scholar from Iraq living in Sindh translated the Quran into the local language at the request of the Raja of Mehruk during the late 9th century.⁸¹

Objective Resolution

“On page no 151 the author cited that the objective resolution was passed by the assembly in 1949”.

The Objective Resolution was formally passed by the Constituent Assembly on **12 March 1949**.⁸² While the author critiques minor typographical or grammatical errors in other works, he himself overlooks this historically significant date in his discussion of the background and context of the Objective Resolution. This omission undermines the accuracy of his narrative, as the date marks a crucial milestone in the constitutional history of Pakistan.

Name correction

“On Page 118 the Author quoted the in text book the name of Secretary of state Mr. Montague mention wrong, lase “e” is not included in his name , his name was Montagu.”

His actual name was Edwin Montagu, KK Aziz point out mistake of the extra word “e” in pronoun, but he ignored the actual name of the former Secretary of State for India from 1917 to 1922.⁸³

Nomination of the Members of Legislature 1892

“On page 126 the author cited that, in the election of 1892.”

It was not an election; in fact, it was a nomination-based recommendation.⁸⁴ The British did not use the term election for this process, which was conducted under the Act of 1892 in British India.⁸⁵

1st Round Table Conference and Muslim League

“In this book, on page number 44, in the second paragraph, he writes ‘the Muslims went away from the first conference’.

The sentence “the Muslim went away” is grammatically incorrect. However, in fact, “the Muslims did not walk out,” because the Muslim League leadership attended the first Round Table Conference until the end. Both “went away” and “go away” are incorrect here as they imply that the Muslims left, whereas they were actually present.⁸⁶

Iqbal Address at Allahabad in 1930

“On page number 46, the author cited that the last and least important (3rd RTC) conference was held from November to December 1933”.

The correct date is November to December 1932.⁸⁷ The third Round Table Conference was held in 1932, so the mentioned date 1933 is incorrect.⁸⁸

Referendum in NWFP 1947

“In this book, on page 48, the writer cites that the Indian National Congress won majorities in eight provinces in the 1937 Indian provincial elections.”

Actually, Congress obtained absolute majorities in five provinces.⁸⁹ They formed governments in eight provinces, forming coalition governments in the North-West Frontier Province and Assam where they did not have a clear majority. Congress performed strongly in the 1937 provincial elections held under the Government of India Act of 1935.⁹⁰ It won 714 out of a total of 1,585 provincial assembly seats, with absolute majorities in 5 of the 11 provinces.⁹¹

“KK Aziz cites on page 137 that Iqbal’s proposal was that Punjab, Sindh, NWFP, and Baluchistan should be merged into one province in the Indian Federation.”

Iqbal presented his historic address on December 29, 1930, at Allahabad.⁹² In fact, he did not study the complete address of Allama Iqbal. The author has quoted Iqbal’s address more than seventy times in the book *Murder of History*. In the third section of his address, Iqbal stated that he would like to see Punjab, NWFP, Sindh, and Baluchistan amalgamated into a single state.⁹³

Allama Muhammad Iqbal presented his historic presidential address at the 25th annual session of the All India Muslim League on December 29, 1930, at Allahabad.⁹⁴ The original English edition was published by Kapur Art Printing Works, Lahore, in 1930 and consisted of 23 pages.⁹⁵ Its Urdu version was translated by Syed Nazeer Niazi and printed by Sufi Manzil, consisting of 48 pages, with approximately 7,500 words.⁹⁶

Jinnah Birthplace

In the Murder of History, K.K. Aziz cited that the birthplace of Quaid-e-Azam is controversial; a few historians mention Jhirk town of Thatta (Sindh), while the majority of historians believe that his birthplace is Wazir Mansion in Karachi near Sindh Madrasatul Islam.

Analysis of the facts:

Sindh nationalist intellectual historians argued for Jhirk based on local traditions and folk stories, but there are no authentic historical sources for confirmation.⁹⁷ Government committees were formed to investigate the birthplace issue, and school records were examined.⁹⁸ Various school records, including Sindh Madrasatul Islam.⁹⁹ The enrollment records of Sindh Madrasatul Islam show that Quaid-e-Azam Muhammad Ali Jinnah was enrolled under serial number 114.¹⁰⁰

Church Mission School, and Lincoln’s Inn admission records, mention Karachi as his birthplace.¹⁰¹ Personal statements by Jinnah and family accounts, especially Fatima Jinnah’s book *My Brother*, also confirm Karachi as his birthplace.¹⁰²

The birthplace issue was politicized by some local political figures, but there is no documentary evidence that Jinnah was born in Jhirk.¹⁰³ The Government of Pakistan officially declared Karachi as the birthplace of Quaid-e-Azam in 1953 when Wazir Mansion was acquired and declared a national monument.¹⁰⁴

Titles of Liaqat Ali Khan

On page 166, the author cited that there is no official evidence regarding the titles of Liaqat Ali Khan, Such as Shaheed-e-Millat and Quaid-e-Millat.¹⁰⁵

Quaid-e-Millat (Leader of the Nation) and Shaheed-e-Millat (Martyr of the Nation) were public titles given after Jinnah’s death and after Liaquat Ali Khan’s assassination.¹⁰⁶ The Government of Pakistan officially uses these titles in state ceremonies, official publications and public commemorations.¹⁰⁷

Government publications, such as *Speeches and Statements of Quaid-i-Millat Liaquat Ali Khan (1941–1951)* published in Lahore in 1987, officially used the title Quaid-i-Millat.¹⁰⁸ Modern administrative orders, such as government notifications renaming public places after Shaheed-e-Millat Liaquat Ali Khan, also demonstrate official usage of these titles.¹⁰⁹

National Dress of Pakistan

On Page 171, the author states that the textbook mentions Shalwar Qamiz as the national dress of Pakistan. This statement is totally wrong because a national dress is something people wear on special occasions, but shalwar qamiz is worn by a relatively small number of people.

A national dress serves as a primary symbol of representation for a state's citizens. Alongside flowers, logos, anthems and flags, these symbols define a country's historical, cultural, religious or political significance.¹¹⁰ The importance of these symbols does not depend on public popularity rather, their legitimacy stems from their official declaration by the government.¹¹¹

Scholars Eric Hobsbawm and Hugh Trevor-Roper argue that national dresses are rarely based on what people wear daily. Instead they are defined by ruling elites, intellectuals and state institutions to establish a national identity.¹¹²

In his seminal work, *The Invention of Tradition* (1983), Hobsbawm explains that many "ancient traditions" *are actually recent inventions created to serve modern nation-states. He asserts that a national dress does not require mass, but daily usage to be valid.*¹¹³ *Its true purpose is to create a sense of unity, continuity, and legitimacy for the state and the ruling class*".¹⁴¹

Similarly, Morgan notes *"that national dress is not determined by a majority vote or daily habits. Instead, it is established by the power of the state and cultural elites who designate a specific garment as a symbol of identity"*.¹¹⁵

Historical Origins of the Shalwar Kameez

Historical and archaeological evidence suggests that a precursor to the modern shalwar kameez was worn during the Kushan Empire (1st–3rd century CE).¹¹⁶ The Kushans first entered the region through northern Afghanistan and the Hindu Kush mountains under King Kujula Kadphises (c. 50–60 CE). By 127 CE, they had captured Punjab and much of Sindh.¹¹⁷

The Kushan administration introduced this style of dress to the region, which explains its deep cultural roots in present-day Pakistan.¹¹⁸ Prominent archaeological evidence of this attire is found in Gandhara art and sculptures discovered in sites such as Taxila and Mathura.¹¹⁹

During the Islamic period, particularly after the Arab conquest of Sindh in the 8th century and later during the Ghaznavid and Mughal periods, the shalwar and long tunic became common dress in the regions of present-day Pakistan.¹²⁰ Muslim rulers and Central Asian elites introduced and popularized trousers (shalwar) and long shirts (kameez), which were more suitable for mobility, military activity and modesty requirements in Islamic culture. Over time, this dress became widely adopted by local populations in Sindh Baluchestan Khyber Pakhtunkhwa and some parts of Punjab. By the Mughal period, the Shalwar kameez had become a common dress among both urban and rural populations in the region, eventually evolving into the modern national dress of Pakistan.¹²¹

Pakistan's national dress, the Shalwar Kameez, has a very deep historical, cultural and civilizational connection with this land. ¹²² Additionally, this dress has been used by the Sufis and saints of this region, which is why it has been granted the status of national dress. ¹²³

In many countries, national dress is not chosen based on how many people wear it daily (quantity), but rather on its symbolic value (quality) as declared by the state. ¹²⁴

Country	National Dress	Context and Usage
Scotland	Kilt	Declared the national dress; primarily worn for weddings and formal events.
Japan	Kimono	Worn for weddings and ceremonies; it became the official national wear during the Meiji era (1868-1912).
South Korea	Hanbok	Used for festivals or the Lunar New Year; the government has actively promoted it as the official dress since 1996.
Vietnam	Ao Dai	Often worn by schoolgirls and hospitality staff; promoted by 20th-century nationalists as a symbol of identity.
Egypt	Galabiyya	A common rural dress, but its 2009 proposal as an official national costume was met with public indifference.
India	Sari & Kurta	Globally recognized symbols; however, their use as national representation faced criticism during the 2024 Paris Olympics.
Belize	Deer Dance Regalia	A sacred Maya costume; the community rejected its use as a national costume to protect its spiritual significance from politics
Bangladesh	Jamdani Sari	A historic craft; its promotion as "national" sparked controversy over the exclusion of Hindu-Bengali influences in favor of Mughal heritage.

The case of the shalwar kameez which adopted as a national dress in Pakistan follows the above mention international pattern of "invented tradition."

In 1973, Zulfikar Ali Bhutto declared the shalwar kameez is Awami Libas (People's Dress) to build a connection with the common man. ¹²⁵ Later, in 1982, General Zia-ul-Haq mandated the shalwar kameez as the official attire for government officials and state employees as part of his "Islamization" policy. Because it was declared national by the state and subsequently gained widespread public acceptance, it has become a highly successful example of a modern invented tradition. ¹²⁶

State vs. States under Lahore resolution

"One page 45 and in chapter 2nd, Aziz strongly emphasized that the original resolution used the term "Independent States" (plural), not a single Pakistan. According to him, this shows that the All-India Muslim League leadership had not clearly conceived a single unified state in 1940. He argued that later

narratives retrospectively imposed the idea of one Pakistan, which was not explicit in the original document”

The primary script of Lahore Resolution was written by Sir Zafar Ullah Khan under the supervision of Muslim League Working Committee and Presented by A. K. Abdul Haq on 23rd March 1940. ¹²⁷

The core theme of the Lahore Resolution: That geographically contiguous units are demarcated regions which should be constituted, with such territorial readjustments as may be necessary that the areas in which the Muslims are numerically in a majority as in the North Western and Eastern Zones of (British) India should be grouped to constitute 'independent states' in which the constituent units should be autonomous and sovereign. ¹²⁸

“Quaid E Azam speech on 23rd march 1940 he says the Musalmans are a nation, and they must have their home land, their territory and their state. We wish to live in peace in harmony with our neighbor as free and independent people”. ¹²⁹

In this statement of Jinnah it is clear mentioned that according to the definition of the nation we are a separate nation and we must have their home land, their territory and their “state”. Jinnah clear cut demand for a separate independent state. There Jinnah the President of All India Muslim League clear cut use word state. ¹³⁰

Original script of 1940 Lahore Resolution, used the plural "states. Word. ¹³¹ The official correction of "States" (plural) to "State" (singular) was a deliberate political act by the All-India Muslim League during their Legislators' Convention in Delhi from April 7 to April 9, 1946. ¹³¹

The 1946 Delhi Resolution: At this convention, chaired by Muhammad Ali Jinnah, a fresh resolution was passed which explicitly demanded "a sovereign independent State" (singular). When the discrepancy was pointed out by leaders like Abul Hashim of Bengal, Jinnah initially dismissed the plural "s" in the 1940 document, he declare it is that typographical error which was made indecently in drafting time. Jinnah demanded clearly in his speech for a separate independent state on 23rd March 1940. ¹³²

Many historians have challenged and rejected the critique of K. K. Aziz regarding the Lahore Resolution. Their disagreement is not total, but they argue that Aziz overstates ambiguity and underestimates political intent.

- The Lahore Resolution was not a clear blueprint for Pakistan, but a vague political strategy, later reinterpreted to fit the narrative of a single Muslim state. ¹³³
- Historians argue that the intent was always a single Muslim homeland, even if the wording appeared plural. The absence of the word “Pakistan” does not mean the absence of the idea. ¹³⁴

Here are ten international examples where typographical or linguistic mistakes occurred in official documents and were later corrected or clarified.

- UN Resolution 242 (The "Missing The"): Perhaps the most famous example in history. After the 1967 Six-Day War, the English version of the resolution called for the withdrawal of Israel from

"territories" (plural, but without the definite article "the"). The lack of "the" suggested withdrawal from some territory. However, the French version used "des territoires" (the territories), implying all of them.¹³⁵

- The Treaty of Waitangi (Translation Error): This treaty was signed in 1840 between the British Crown and Maori chiefs in New Zealand. The English version said the Maori ceded "sovereignty" (singular authority). The Maori version used the word kawanatanga (governance), which they understood as letting the British "govern" while they kept their rangatiratanga (absolute sovereignty).¹³⁶
- The Webster-Ashburton Treaty (1842): This treaty settled the boundary between the US and British North America (Canada). A "typographical mistake" occurred because both sides used different, inaccurate maps during the negotiation.¹³⁷
- UN Resolution 1441 (Iraq): The resolution warned of "serious consequences" (plural) if Iraq failed to comply. Diplomatic experts argued whether this contextually meant "automatic military action" or "further UN meetings." While not "corrected" in a single document, the disagreement led to the 2003 invasion, after which the UN clarified its "peace building" mandates to avoid such ambiguous pluralities in the future.¹³⁸
- The U.S. Constitution: The "Pennsylvania" Spelling: In the original hand-written U.S. Constitution, the state of Pennsylvania is spelled "Pensylvania" (missing one 'n').¹³⁹
- The Confederate Constitution (1861): When the Southern states drafted their own constitution, they copied much of the U.S. Constitution but made significant typographical changes regarding sovereignty. They used the phrase "Each State acting in its sovereign and independent character" to fix what they perceived as a "mistake" in the original U.S. Preamble ("We the People").¹⁴⁰
- The Irish Constitution (Bunreacht na heireann): Because the document is written in both Irish and English, several "typographical mistakes" appeared where the English word didn't match the legal weight of the Irish word.¹⁴¹
- UN Resolution 435 (Namibian Independence): The original text regarding the "primary responsibility" for maintaining law and order during the transition was contextually vague, leading to clashes between South African forces and SWAPO. A subsequent UN Secretary-General report (1989) had to "re-interpret" and correct the operational context of the resolution to ensure a peaceful election.¹⁴²
- The Magna Carta (1215): The original document was a "typographical mess" because it was signed under duress. It used terms that granted rights only to "Free men" which in 1215 meant only about 10% of the population. Over centuries, through various "Confirmations of the Charters," the context of "Free man" was legally expanded (corrected) to include all citizens, forming the basis of modern due process.¹⁴³

There I mentioned two major events parallel to the context of Lahore Resolution.

The most direct parallel to Lahore Resolution "States vs. State" example. During the drafting of the Acts of Union between England and Scotland, early drafts and correspondences fluctuated between calling the new entity the "United Kingdom" (singular) and the "United Kingdoms" (plural).

United States of America is the federation of 50 states, but its common sense says that it should be called United States of America. But it is called United State (singular). Historical linguists note that before the American Civil War, people said "The United States are," but after the war, reflecting a shift towards a more unified national context, people began saying "The United States is." This change reflects the evolving perception of the United States as a single, unified entity rather than a collection of separate states.

Critical analysis

The interpretation of the Lahore Resolution by K. K. Aziz, particularly his emphasis on the phrase "independent states," has generated significant historiographical debate. Aziz argues that the resolution did not envision a single Pakistan but rather multiple sovereign Muslim entities, thereby challenging the conventional nationalist narrative. However, this claim has been critically reassessed by scholars such as Ayesha Jalal, Ian Talbot, and Stanley Wolpert, who contend that Aziz's approach is overly textual and insufficiently contextual.

These historians argue that the ambiguity in the resolution was a deliberate political strategy adopted by Muhammad Ali Jinnah and the All-India Muslim League to maintain flexibility in negotiations with the British and the Indian National Congress. Furthermore, they assert that the absence of the word "Pakistan" does not negate the existence of a conceptual demand for Muslim political autonomy, which gradually evolved into the idea of a unified state.

While Aziz's critique is valuable in exposing the simplifications of state-sponsored historiography, it is often criticized for relying on selective evidence and failing to fully account for the broader political developments between 1940 and 1947. Therefore, although his argument is significant as a revisionist intervention, it does not provide a complete explanation when analyzed within the wider historical and political context.

Drawing a conclusion from the international examples I have presented, unintentional typographical errors are found not only in the Lahore Resolution but across the world, and such errors are later corrected. A single typographical mistake does not entitle a critic to alter an entire narrative

Simon commission and Muslim League

The KK aziz cited on page 132 that the textbook mentions the statement: "Congress and the Muslim League both rejected the Simon Commission." The author claims that the rejection statement is incorrect because the Muslim League was divided into two groups, and the Shafi group accepted the Simon Commission."

However, the decision of the Shafi group was not the decision of the central organization or core committee of the All India Muslim League, it was only the opinion or consensus of a leadership group in Punjab. The central organization, led by Jinnah, he was the leader of the party in that time. On behalf of All India Muslim League at that time he rejected the Simon Commission proposals while the Shafi group issued a separate statement supporting cooperation with it. ¹⁴⁴

Institutional Legitimacy: The All India Muslim League (AIML) as a central body was weakened by the 1927 split. The group led by Jinnah held the legal and constitutional continuity of the central organization.¹⁴⁵

Shafi Group's Status: This was a "breakaway" or "splinter" group. In political science, even significant actions of a splinter group cannot be taken as the official policy of the parent organization.

Reunification Clause: By 1930, when the groups merged, it was under the 14-point agreement, which fundamentally contradicted the Simon Commission's findings. (For example, the Commission rejected the 1/3 central representation demanded in the 14 points.) The decision of M.r Shai was not the decision of the Muslim League as a whole. A faction or splinter group cannot represent the "will of the party" until a formal reunification happens under an agreed consensus.¹⁴⁶

De Jure vs. De Facto: The Jinnah-led faction maintained the central organizational structure. Their rejection was the official party line. While the Shafi group acted as a "consensus-oriented" regional bloc (primarily Punjab-based) rather than the national executive.¹⁴⁷

Comparative study: Here the comparative discuss the case of Jinnah and Shafi statement legal position with international politics. In each case, a faction or splinter group took a position that was later reversed or not treated as the official policy of the whole party.

1. Chinese Communist Party split in 1930 between two groups one leading by Mao Zedong due to Strategy against Nationalists. Mao's line became official; earlier factional decisions lost legitimacy.¹⁴⁸

2. African National Congress (ANC) Split between Pan Africanist Congress, (Nelson Mandela vs Robert Sobukwe) in 1959. Due to approach to apartheid resistance. But ANC remained main body; PAC decisions not considered ANC policy.¹⁴⁹

3. Irish National Movement split in 1922 into pro- and anti-treaty factions on Anglo-Irish Treaty. But, Anti-treaty stance did not represent unified national movement.¹⁵⁰

4. The British Labour Party (1981): When the "Gang of Four" broke away to form the Social Democratic Party (SDP), their pro-European policies were not credited to the Labour Party. Labour remained officially "anti-EEC" at the time. One faction's cooperation with an idea does not change the parent party's official platform.¹⁵¹

5. The US Republican Party (1912): When Theodore Roosevelt formed the "Bull Moose Party" (a splinter of the Republicans), his progressive policies were his own. The central Republican organization (under Taft) remained conservative. Historians do not say "The Republicans accepted Progressive reforms in 1912" they say the party split.¹⁵²

6. The 1912 US Republican Split. When Theodore Roosevelt formed the Progressive ("Bull Moose") Party, his acceptance of radical reforms was not considered "Republican Party policy." The central Republican organization under William Howard Taft remained the official voice of the party, which rejected those reforms.¹⁵³

7. British Labour Party (1981): The Gang of Four: When four senior leaders (Roy Jenkins, David Owen, Bill Rodgers, Shirley Williams) left the Labour Party to form the Social Democratic Party (SDP), their pro-European Economic Community (EEC) stance was never considered Labour Party policy. Labour remained officially anti-EEC until it formally changed its platform years later.¹⁵⁴

8. Nationalist Congress Party (NCP) India (2023): In July 2023, when Ajit Pawar broke away from his uncle Sharad Pawar's NCP and claimed his faction was the "real" party, the Election Commission

applied the "test of majority" to determine the legitimate leadership. Until a final decision, Sharad Pawar's faction was widely considered the original party.¹⁵⁵

Conclusion. These five international examples prove a universally accepted principle in political science: The decision of a breakaway faction is never considered the decision of the central party unless that faction is formally recognized as the legitimate leadership.

Theory of Party Splintering in perspective of Political Science: In the context of political science and historiographical analysis, the Theory of Party Splintering serves as a vital framework for distinguishing between temporary factional movements and authentic institutional policy. It establishes that a party's legitimate identity is rooted in its official organizational structure and constitutional continuity rather than the political influence of a breakaway group.¹⁵⁶

The Theory of Institutional Legitimacy in Party Splintering: The Theory of Party Splintering posits that when a political organization divides due to ideological or leadership conflicts, the "legitimate" party identity is not determined by the size of a faction, but by institutional continuity.¹⁵⁷

1. The Principle of Central Authority: Drawing on the work of Maurice Duverger and Giovanni Sartori, this theory treats parties as formal institutions rather than informal associations. Legitimacy is anchored in the control of the national executive leadership, the central committee, and the legal party constitution. A splinter group, regardless of its influence, remains a faction until it either captures or officially replaces the recognized central apparatus.¹⁵⁸

2. Policy vs. Factional Stance: A critical distinction is made between Party Policy and Factional Decision.¹⁵⁹

- Official Policy: Represents the consensus of the recognized central authority.
- Factional Stance: Represents the views of a breakaway group, which lacks institutionally binding authority over the parent party's platform.

3. The Reunification and Consensus Rule: Under this framework, "party policy" is a product of timing. If factions eventually reunite, a new consensus is formed. Prior decisions made by a single faction during the period of division are generally treated as historical outliers rather than the official trajectory of the unified party.¹⁶⁰

4. Application to the All-India Muslim League: Applying this to the Jinnah-Shafi split, the theory suggests that the Jinnah faction is typically identified as the bearer of national institutional continuity. Consequently, the Shafi group's positions while politically significant constitute a factional deviation rather than the official, binding policy of the All-India Muslim League as a singular entity.¹⁶¹

Summary for your Response: The Theory of Party Splintering dictates that in the event of a schism, institutional legitimacy remains with the faction that preserves the party's central organization and constitutional framework. Therefore, the actions of a splinter faction cannot be retroactively assigned as the official policy of the parent party.

Chaudhri Rahmat Ali

On page 23, the author notes that the name "Pakistan" was proposed by Chaudhry Rahmat Ali in 1933. Aziz characterizes the treatment of Chaudhry Rahmat Ali as a "national tragedy" and a profound injustice on the part of the Pakistani state. According to Aziz, the individual who provided the nation with its name and geographical identity was ultimately marginalized by the very state he helped to conceptualize. He repeatedly contends that an injustice has been done to Chaudhry Rahmat Ali with

regard to the recognition of the name "Pakistan," arguing that textbooks have not accorded him sufficient space, nor has he been granted appropriate official acknowledgment.

In reality, the name "Pakistan" was proposed in 1933 by Chaudhry Rahmat Ali,¹⁶² it has been appreciated by both the Government and the people of Pakistan. Textbooks, which are designed to promote national integration, have recognized individuals in accordance with their services; thus, Chaudhry Muhammad Ali has been duly acknowledged in this regard.¹⁶³ However, it is also a matter of historical record that after 1940, Chaudhry Rahmat Ali underwent a significant shift in his ideological position and became opposed to the creation of one single Muslim state in India especially Pakistan in its eventual form.¹⁶⁴ He rejected the idea of a single, united Pakistan and instead described its establishment as a grave blunder for the Muslims of South Asia.¹⁶⁵ He advocated for the creation of multiple independent Muslim states in the subcontinent, such as Banglaistan and Osmanistan.¹⁶⁶

In 1947, he published a pamphlet titled *The Greatest Betrayal*, in which he sharply criticized Muhammad Ali Jinnah, referring to him as "Quisling-e-Azam" (a term implying supreme betrayal) for accepting the British-backed plan of partition.¹⁶⁷ He argued that the acceptance of a reduced territorial state constituted a "deadly blow" to Muslim interests and would result in the mass violence and displacement that indeed accompanied Partition.¹⁶⁸ In this pamphlet, he accused the leadership of accepting a truncated Pakistan that excluded key Muslim-majority regions he had originally envisioned, including parts of Bengal and Hyderabad.¹⁶⁹ Earlier, in 1943, he had also published the "Foundation Series," in which he proposed various independent Muslim states, including entities such as Furqanistan, Haideristan, Siddiqistan.¹⁷⁰

The most controversial aspect of his critique was his alleged characterization of Muhammad Ali Jinnah as "Quisling-e-Azam." The term "Quisling" is derived from Vidkun Quisling, a Norwegian politician who collaborated with Nazi Germany during the Second World War, and whose name has since become synonymous with treachery. By employing this term, Chaudhry Rahmat Ali effectively accused the founder of Pakistan of betraying the very cause of an independent Muslim homeland.¹⁷¹

Between 1940 and 1947, he produced several pamphlets and publications opposing the Muslim League's conception of Pakistan while advancing his own radical alternatives. Shortly after the acceptance of the partition plan, he issued a statement titled "The Great Betrayal," in which he vehemently condemned Muhammad Ali Jinnah for accepting what he described as a diminished Pakistan.¹⁷²

In textbooks, wherever possible, the government has accorded him that protocol. Yet, some authors attempt to distort history by attributing the entire credit for naming Pakistan and giving it an identity solely to Chaudhri Rahmat Ali.¹⁷³ This constitutes an injustice to the other three individuals who genuinely contributed to providing Pakistan its identity.¹⁷⁴ According to Prof. Dr. Fakhru'l Islam, The students of Islamia College Peshawar have the honor of having raised the banner of Pakistan long before the Muslim League was able to do so. It was a group of four young men Mohammed Aslam Khan Khattak, Inayatullah Khan of Charsadda, Chaudhri Rahmat Ali, and Sahibzada Mohammed Sadiq, who conceived the idea of Pakistan. They organized the Khyber Union at Cambridge in 1929 and later the Pakistan Movement, and published the pamphlet "Now or Never", which proposed a solution to the problems of the Muslims of the Subcontinent.¹⁷⁵

The students from the NWFP were the real leaders of the Cambridge-based Pakistan Movement. However, post-independence writers have portrayed Chaudhri Rahmat Ali as the sole champion of this

movement and have entirely ignored the other three persons. Undoubtedly, Chaudhri Rahmat Ali was a committed member of the group, but ignoring the other three is tantamount to concealing historical facts.¹⁷⁶

Aziz repeatedly discuss in his book that Chaudhri Rahmat Ali was not rewarded for his services and was exiled. In reality, the author attempts to erase history by ignoring the services of the three other individuals besides Chaudhri Rahmat Ali, and he argues in defense of a person who was, from the outset, opposed to the creation of the present Pakistan.

Publications of the Chaudhry Rahmat Ali before partition of India and his anti-Pakistan statement.

S No	Year	Title	Core Argument / Stance
1	1942	<i>The Millat of Islam and the Menace of "Indianism"</i> ¹⁷⁷	Argued that Muslims were being trapped by the concept of "India." He called for the complete rejection of any "Indian" identity in favor of a sovereign "Dinia."
2	1942	<i>The Millat and the Mission</i> ¹⁷⁸	Outlined his "Seven Commandments of Destiny," proposing that the entire Indian subcontinent be renamed the Continent of Dinia and divided into multiple Muslim states.
4	1943	<i>The Millat and her Minorities</i> (Series) ¹⁷⁹	A series of pamphlets (e.g., <i>Foundation of Haideristan, Siddiqistan, Maplistan</i>) arguing for the creation of separate Muslim enclaves all over India to prevent them from being "lost" in a Hindu-majority state.
5	1944	<i>The Millat and her Ten Nations</i> ¹⁸⁰	Formally launched the All-Dinia Milli Movement, moving away from a single "Pakistan" to a plan for ten different Muslim nations across South Asia.
6	1946	<i>India: The Continent of Dinia, or the Country of Doom</i> ¹⁸¹	A direct attack on the British and Congress plans for a united or federal India, which he believed would lead to the destruction of the Muslim "Millat."
7	1946	<i>The Pakistan National Movement and the British Verdict on India</i> ¹⁸²	Critiqued the British "Cabinet Mission Plan," arguing it was a conspiracy to keep Muslims under Hindu rule.
8	1947	<i>The Greatest Betrayal Pakistan: The Fatherland of the</i>	His most famous critique of the 1947 Partition. He famously labeled Muhammad Ali Jinnah "Quisling-i-Azam" (the Great Traitor), accusing him of accepting a "mutilated, moth-eaten" Pakistan.

		<i>Pak Nation</i> ¹⁸³	He strongly criticizes the form in which Pakistan was created.
9	1948	<i>The Muslim Minority in India and the Saving Duty of the UNO</i> ¹⁸⁴	He continues to advocate his earlier idea of multiple Muslim homelands , suggesting Pakistan was an inadequate solution. He calls upon the United Nations (UNO) to intervene, which reflects his belief that Pakistan failed in its moral and political responsibility toward all Indian Muslims.

From a broader perspective, textbooks have accorded Chaudhry Rahmat Ali a level of importance commensurate with his contributions. The inclusion of his later ideas many of which challenge the sovereignty and unity of the state, within educational curricula could be considered both inappropriate and potentially detrimental, as it may foster an anti-state mindset among students.

Comparative Historical Analysis: Founders in Opposition

The following historical figures mirror the trajectory of Choudhry Rahmat Ali. These individuals played foundational or heroic roles in the establishment or service of their respective states, yet later diverged ideologically from the systems they helped create. Consequently, they faced exile, imprisonment, or political isolation. History is replete with such "disillusioned architects" revolutionaries who constructed the house but ultimately found themselves unable to reside within its walls. ¹⁸⁵

Roger Williams: Regarded as the founder of Rhode Island, Williams was a staunch advocate for religious freedom and the separation of church and state. Despite his foundational role, his radical theological and political views led to his exile from the Massachusetts Bay Colony in 1635. ¹⁸⁶

Patrick Henry: A preeminent orator of the American Revolution and the first Governor of Virginia, Henry is immortalized by his "Give me Liberty, or give me Death!" speech. However, in the post-revolutionary era, he became a leading Anti-Federalist. Due to his fierce opposition to the U.S. Constitution, he was politically isolated and largely sidelined by the Federalist establishment. ¹⁸⁷

Jacob Venedey: A prominent leader of the 1848 German Revolution and a member of the Frankfurt National Assembly, Venedey was a tireless advocate for German unification and democratic reform. His convictions ultimately led to his exile by the Prussian government. ¹⁸⁸

Subhash Chandra Bose: A titan of the Indian independence movement and a two-time President of the Indian National Congress, Bose eventually broke with the party leadership over strategic and ideological differences. This rift led to his ouster from the party and his subsequent self-imposed exile to seek external military support for liberation. ¹⁸⁹

Sheikh Abdullah: Initially a crucial ally of Jawaharlal Nehru, Abdullah was instrumental in Kashmir's accession to India in 1947. However, his later advocacy for Kashmiri autonomy led to his dismissal as Prime Minister of Jammu & Kashmir. He was subsequently imprisoned or interned for nearly 11 years on charges of "conspiracy against the state." ¹⁹⁰

Michel Aflaq: As the primary philosopher and founder of the Ba'ath Party, Aflaq's ideology shaped the modern histories of Syria and Iraq. Despite his influence, he faced repeated exile from both nations following internal party purges, eventually living as a stateless intellectual. ¹⁹¹

Benedict Arnold: Long before his name became a synonym for treason, Arnold was a brilliant American General and a hero of the Battle of "Saratoga" a victory essential to the birth of the United States. His

eventual defection resulted in his permanent exile and the erasure of his military contributions from the national heroic narrative. ¹⁹²

Conclusion

These precedents demonstrate a recurring historical phenomenon: individuals who play a foundational role in the state's inception often find themselves at odds with the established order they helped secure. When these figures adopt an ideologically rigid stance against the evolving state, they frequently face exile or systemic political marginalization. ¹⁹³

While the state may continue to acknowledge their initial "heroic" achievements in history textbooks to maintain a cohesive national origin story, the curriculum carefully excludes their later anti-state critiques and ideological dissent. This selective memory ensures that the state preserves its foundational myths while silencing the voices that eventually challenged its authority. ¹⁹⁴

Quaid E Azam and his Bar-At-Law

"KK Aziz clams the certificate of the Jinnah that it was diploma not a degree"

Between 1893 and 1896, Quaid-e-Azam Muhammad Ali Jinnah obtained his Bar-at-Law from the famous Lincoln's Inn in London. During this period, several other brilliant Indian minds were also studying there, who's later became the judges, legal assistant and barrister on the base of Bar-at-Law degree.

1. Sir Shah Muhammad Sulaiman: A brilliant barrister and educationist. He became the first Indian Chief Justice of the Allahabad High Court.
2. Sir Abdur Rahim: He became the Judge of the Calcutta High Court and President of the Central Legislative Assembly.
3. Chitta Ranjan (C.R.) Das: A famous barrister from Bengal who trained in London at the same time as Jinnah and later founded the "Swaraj Party."
4. Sir Syed Raza Ali: A renowned barrister and politician who served as India's Agent-General in South Africa.
5. Manmohan Ghose: One of the first Indian barristers to practice in London; he provided guidance as a senior contemporary during Jinnah's student days. ¹⁹⁵

Legal status of the Bar-at-Law

In the British system, a university degree was not a requirement to become a judge in that time, the Bar-at-Law was sufficient. And the degree of Bar at Law had more scope instead of the LLB. In that era, a Barrister was considered superior to an LLB holder. ¹⁹⁶

Many famous Indian and British judges rose to the top based solely on their Bar qualification:

Indian Examples

1. Justice M.R. Jayakar: Barrister from Lincoln's Inn; Judge of the Federal Court of India.
2. Justice Syed Mahmood: Son of Sir Syed Ahmed Khan; first Indian Judge of the Allahabad High Court. ¹⁹⁷
3. Justice Badruddin Tyabji: First Muslim Barrister and later Judge of the Bombay High Court.
4. Sir Dinshah Mulla: A barrister whose books on Hindu and Muslim law are still authorities today; he became a Judge of the Privy Council in London. ¹⁹⁸

British Example

1. Lord Mansfield: The founder of British Commercial Law. He studied Classics at Oxford and did his Bar-at-Law at Lincoln's Inn.

2. Lord Denning: Often called the greatest judge of the 20th century. He studied Mathematics at Oxford, not Law, and became a judge through Lincoln's Inn. ²⁰⁰
3. Lord Reading: He didn't even finish school and worked on a ship before joining Middle Temple to become a Barrister and eventually the Lord Chief Justice of England. ²⁰¹

The Judges who succeeded on Bar-at-Law" degree.

In the British legal system, the "Bar-at-Law" was so prestigious that one could become a high-ranking judge without ever holding a university law degree. ²⁰² Notable examples include:

- Justice M.R. Jayakar: A barrister from Lincoln's Inn who became a judge of the Federal Court of India and a member of the Privy Council in the UK.
- Justice Syed Mahmood: Son of Sir Syed Ahmed Khan. He became the first Indian judge of the Allahabad High Court based solely on his Bar-at-Law from Lincoln's Inn.
- Lord Denning: Perhaps the most influential English judge of the 20th century. He had a degree in Mathematics from Oxford, not law, and became a judge through his qualification at Lincoln's Inn.
- Lord Reading: A former Viceroy of India who didn't even finish school but became the Lord Chief Justice of England after qualifying as a barrister at the Middle Temple.

Bar-at-Law system in Lincoln's Inn vs Distance Education

Despite the vast technological gap, both the 1896 training at Lincoln's Inn and modern distance education share a core commitment to decentralized access. In 1896, the Inn allowed students to study independently across the British Empire, provided they returned to "keep terms," mirroring today's hybrid models. ²⁰³ Both systems prioritize self-directed learning, placing the burden of mastery on the student rather than constant classroom supervision. Ultimately, both eras leverage the best available communication tools whether postal mail or high-speed internet to bridge the gap between legal tradition and the aspiring practitioner. ²⁰⁴

Bar-at-Law system in Lincoln's Inn vs Distance Education in Pakistan

There are surprising philosophical similarities between the old Bar-at-Law system and the modern Distance Learning model of AIOU:

1. Lack of Regular Classes: Just as AIOU students study at home, 19th-century Bar students did not have daily lectures. They were given books for independent study.
2. Reading for the Bar: The system relied on "self-study" in libraries, similar to AIOU's model of learning through provided materials.
3. Exam-Centric: Both systems prioritize passing a rigorous final examination over daily attendance.
4. Social Tradition (Workshops): The "12 Dinners" at the Inns of Court acted as mandatory social networking sessions, much like AIOU's "Tutorial Meetings" or workshops.
5. Examination system: in the course complication in both the system examination were held by the university.

The historical record of eminent jurists who ascended to the bench solely via the Bar-at-Law qualification substantiates the argument that the Inns of Court functioned as a rigorous, self-directed vocational system. A comparative analysis reveals a significant structural parallel between the 19th-century Bar-at-Law and contemporary distance education. Just as modern digital degrees maintain

legal equivalence to traditional on-campus instruction, the Bar-at-Law certificate was the statutory benchmark for professional competency in its era. Consequently, it can be concluded that these qualifications were not merely valid, but represented a foundational precursor to the modern asynchronous learning models, bridging the gap between historical legal tradition and current educational innovation.²⁰⁵

Strength of the members in 1st constitutional Assembly of Pakistan

“One page 151 the author mention the Strength of the members in 1st constitutional Assembly of Pakistan, 76”

The first Constituent Assembly of Pakistan originally consisted of 69 members when it was established in July 1947. Its membership was later increased to 79 members to provide representation to princely states (such as Bahawalpur and Khairpur), refugees and the Tribal Areas.²⁰⁶

Initial Membership Distribution (69 Members)

The initial 69 seats were split from the 389-member Constituent Assembly of undivided India to serve the newly formed state of Pakistan. The distribution among the provinces was as follows:²⁰⁷

S. No	Area	Members
1	East Bengal	44
2	West Punjab	17
3	Sindh	04
4	Northwest Frontier Province	03
5	Baluchistan	01
6	Princely states & Tribal region	10
Total strength		79

By the time the membership reached 79, the political landscape within the assembly was dominated by the Muslim League.²⁰⁸

Domain of curriculum designer

“On page 28, Aziz claims that the Lahore textbook focused only on separate electorates in the Shimla Deputation and did not mention other demands.”

This is the responsibility of policymakers and curriculum designers to decide what content should be included in the syllabus. Holding historians responsible for curriculum selection is not justified.

“On page 10, Aziz critiques the Lahore Board’s history book for mentioning Data Ganj Baksh alongside major religions and prophets.”

This is also a curriculum design issue rather than a historical issue; curriculum experts and textbook designers deal with such matters.

In conclusion, K.K. Aziz’s critiques highlight how the interpretation of history can become complicated. While he points out flaws in textbooks, in many cases these are textbook or printing issues rather than historical distortions. History is complex, and instead of focusing only on small textual mistakes, broader historical narratives should also be discussed.

K.K. Aziz also discusses grammatical issues, spelling mistakes, and errors made by textbook boards. He calls this *The Murder of History*, but in many cases these are not murders of history; rather, they are

printing mistakes or textbook board errors. For example, on page 10, Aziz points out an error where the Karachi Textbook Board used "title" instead of "titles" for Liaquat Ali Khan. This highlights the type of mistakes he critiques.

K.K. Aziz highlights numerous errors in Lahore and Karachi textbooks, such as the Cripps Mission date mistake (1942, not 1940). It is clear that the Punjab Textbook Board did not properly review and proofread the material before publishing.

Historiographical Analysis of K.K. Aziz's "The Murder of History"

According to the foundational principles of historiographical theory, the academic flaws in K.K. Aziz's "The Murder of History" becomes significantly pronounced. Historiography is not merely the recording of past events; it is a social science governed by strict methodological protocols which Aziz frequently violates.²⁰⁹

The core pillars of historical methodology, Objectivity, Source Criticism, Contextualization and Causality are designed to ensure that history remains an empirical discipline rather than a collection of myths or ideological assertions.²¹⁰ When measured against these standards, Aziz's work exhibits several critical failures.

1. Confirmation Bias (Violation of the Rule of Objectivity)

The first rule of historiography mandates that a historian must be as impartial as a judge, setting aside preconceived notions of guilt or innocence.²¹¹ However, Aziz evaluates the Pakistani curriculum through a specific liberal lens. In historiography, when a scholar decides a priori that they are only searching for "lies," they inevitably ignore facts that contradict their thesis. This constitutes "confirmation bias" a violation of the "Ulysses Principle" which requires scholars to bind themselves against such subjective selection.²¹²

2. Lack of Historical Reasoning (Violation of the Principle of Charity)

Historiographical theory dictates that to reject a historical claim, one must provide a solid alternative argument based on source criticism.²¹³ Aziz frequently dismisses textbook claims as "stupid" or "lies" (such as page 203 the Road to Ruin) without explaining the social or political context behind their creation. Mocking a subject is not a historical argument; it is merely an expression of personal emotion that substitutes polemic for analysis.

3. Anachronism (Judging the Past by Present Standards)

Anachronism, the application of modern values to past events is considered a major logical fallacy in historical method.²¹⁴ Aziz labels the "Ideology of Pakistan" as "prejudice" by viewing it through a modern, globalized secular lens. He fails to account for the specific psychology, insecurities and necessities of the 1947 partition environment. As Zachary Schiffman notes, the historian's duty is to recognize that "different historical entities exist in different historical contexts" judging the past by today's standards is a failure to understand history's temporal landscape.²¹⁵

4. The Fallacy of Hasty Generalization (Inductive Leap)

Historiography warns against the fallacy of generalization, wherein a historian judges an entire nation or its history based on a few examples.²¹⁶ K.K. Aziz takes errors from a few textbook boards and uses them to brand the entire Pakistani nation as "liars and hypocrites." This is an "inductive leap" drawing a massive conclusion from a tiny, non-representative sample. As a rule of inference, such a leap is

considered "academic suicide" for a serious historian, as it violates the logic of representative sampling.²¹⁷

5. Colonial Historiography (Dismissal of Indigenous Perspective)

By treating British colonial records as objective "truth" while simultaneously dismissing local sentiments as "myth," Aziz promotes "Colonial Historiography" history written strictly from the colonizer's perspective. A historian of a free nation is obligated to value the "Indigenous Perspective" and engage with the "hidden transcripts" of native populations. Aziz dismisses these native viewpoints as the "murder of history," thereby replicating the very epistemic violence he purports to critique.²¹⁸

6. Case Study: The Mutiny of 1857

A significant point of contention in evaluating K.K. Aziz's historiography is his treatment of the 1857 uprising. While Nationalist schools of thought categorize it as the War of Independence 1857, Aziz often adhered to a more Revisionist perspective. Critics argue that by adopting a framework similar to Anglo-American colonial history which often distinguishes between noble revolutions and disorganized mutinies.²¹⁹ Aziz downplays the political agency of the Indian rebels. By skeptically viewing the 1857 conflict as a series of localized revolts rather than a unified "war of independence" despite the presence of parallel administrative efforts under figures like Bahadur Shah Zafar, Aziz is often accused of methodological inconsistency. He is frequently criticized for applying a rigorous, legalistic standard to South Asian movements while accepting the revolutionary legitimacy of Western historical events.²²⁰

Conclusion

K.K. Aziz turned technical errors in textbooks into an allegation of a deep ideological conspiracy. From the perspective of historiographical theory, he acted more like a hardline critic than an impartial researcher. Consequently, *The Murder of History* reads less like a documented history and more like a protest piece, flawed by anachronism and confirmation bias.²²¹

5 Findings of the Study

This chapter presents the research findings based on an analysis of K.K. Aziz's *The Murder of History* and a verification of his claims using primary and secondary sources. The study examined whether the errors identified by Aziz were genuine historical distortions, editorial accidents, or simply differences in interpretation.

5.1 General Findings

The study finds that while K.K. Aziz highlighted many mistakes, these errors vary in nature. Not all mistakes were deliberate falsifications of history. Aziz's work is important for starting a debate on textbook quality, but he often exaggerated the importance of minor errors. Furthermore, he failed to distinguish between the responsibility of historians and the domain of Textbook Boards. The decision of what content to include and how much space to give it is a matter of curriculum policy, not a "murder of history."

5.1.2 Classification of Errors

The research identifies four distinct types of issues within the textbooks:

- Factual Errors: Inaccurate dates, names, or locations.
- Editorial/Printing Mistakes: Spelling, typing and grammatical errors.

- Interpretive Differences: Instances where Aziz disagreed with the historian's perspective rather than the facts.
- Curriculum/Domain Issues: Decisions by the Textbook Board regarding the quantity and quality of content.

Many errors identified by Aziz were editorial rather than historical distortions. This suggests that the problem lies with the review committees and proofreaders, not necessarily the historical record itself.

5.1.3 Findings on Key Historical Figures

Quaid-e-Azam Muhammad Ali Jinnah: Issues regarding the Quaid E Azam Muhammad Ali Jinnah, his birthplace, death, career, Iqbal Address 1930, Lahore resolution 1940, celebration of independence date, Jinnah Liaquat relationship, Liaquat Ali Khan foreign policy, are often matters of different interpretations among mainstream historians. These are differences in historiography, not a "murder" of basic facts. Sometime Textbooks provide simplified versions regarding any content according to the psychology of the student's grade, to create a generalizing understanding. It is a requirement of educational psychology for younger students and is not a deliberate distortion. KK Aziz was a great historian but not an educator, he did not under the psychology of the child.

5.1.4 Repetitive Critique

In his book *The Murder of History*, K.K. Aziz adopts a critical approach, repeatedly highlighting the same statements or errors. This creates the impression that the entire national narrative is flawed, as he prioritizes sensational criticism over nuanced analysis. Aziz's method makes the book more critique-oriented than a balanced examination. As a result, it mainly resonates with readers who already perceive Pakistan's history as entirely incorrect, rather than clarifying the distinctions between textbook inaccuracies and broader historical scholarship. By consistently emphasizing this point, he fosters the perception that the Government of Pakistan has been propagating a distorted version of history.

5.1.5 Commendable Efforts, Costly Errors

While K.K. Aziz deserves praise for identifying factual errors in Pakistan's textbooks, his own attempt at critique and correction is riddled with mistakes. These range from editorial and printing errors to major factual inaccuracies and outright incorrect statements. What could have been a definitive corrective exercise is thus undermined by the very carelessness he condemns in others. A detailed, reference-based analysis of these lapses is presented in the "Analysis" chapter, where each error whether a misattribution, a misprint, or a misleading claim is systematically documented. In short, while Aziz's intent to challenge distorted narratives is laudable, the execution suffers from a troubling lack of scholarly rigor.

5.2 Conclusion

This study evaluated K.K. Aziz's *The Murder of History* to determine the validity of his claims. The research concludes that while Aziz performed a valuable service by exposing poor quality control in Pakistani textbooks, his analysis was often one-sided and lacked a clear methodology.

The study finds that the "murder" Aziz describes is often a mix of simple editorial negligence and curriculum simplification. By using Critical Realism, we can see that while factual errors (dates and

names) must be corrected, many of Aziz's other complaints were actually interpretive differences. Furthermore, through Textbook Theory, it is clear that the Textbook Boards must simplify complex history for young minds. Aziz's failure to recognize the difference between a professional history book and a school textbook led him to be hyper-critical. The research also concludes that the blame should be placed on the textbook production system including the boards and review committees—rather than the entire field of Pakistani history. Aziz's habit of repeating the same errors multiple times served to attract readers through shock value but weakened the academic balance of his work.

In conclusion, the problem is not a wholesale "Murder of History," but rather a failure in the textbook editing process and a lack of skill in curriculum development. Future improvements should focus on professionalizing the textbook boards and ensuring that simplification for students does not cross the line into factual inaccuracy.

5.3 Future Recommendations

5.3.1 Fix Textbook Editing

Textbook boards should hire professional editors and proofreaders. They must check every book before printing. This will reduce spelling, typing and grammar mistakes. A simple quality check can save history from small but embarrassing errors. Pakistan should create a digital system to track textbook errors. Teachers, students and researchers can report mistakes online. The system will collect, verify and fix errors quickly. This is a low-cost and high-benefit solution

5.3.2 Train History Writers and qualified Review Committees

Writers of school textbooks need special training. They should learn how to simplify history for young students without changing facts. Educational psychology must be part of their training. This way, they can match content with a child's mind, not distort reality. Government should form independent committees to check textbooks. These committees must include historians, educators, and child psychologists. They will review content before approval. This will stop political or personal bias from entering school books

5.3.3 Separate Critique from Sensation

Future researchers should avoid K.K. Aziz's style of repeating errors for shock value. Instead, they should offer balanced criticism. A good critique shows both strengths and weaknesses. Sensation attracts readers, but only honesty builds trust.

5.3.4 Focus on Real Errors, Not Interpretations and Improve Textbook Printing Process

Not every disagreement is a mistake. Future studies must clearly separate factual errors (wrong dates or names) from interpretive differences (different opinions). Textbook boards should only fix real factual errors. Different historical views can be healthy for young minds. Printing mistakes are not "murder of history." But they still need attention. A simple solution is to have a multi-step proofreading system

5.3.5 Bridge Gap between Historians and Educators

Historians like K.K. Aziz write for experts. Educators write for children. Future research should bring both sides together. A good textbook needs historical accuracy and child-friendly language. Neither side should dominate the other.

"The goal is not to blame anyone. The goal is to make better textbooks. Small fixes in editing, training and review can save Pakistan's history from real murder not the fake one."

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