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## Prevention across a Federation: National Frameworks and Provincial Delivery in Pakistan's Counter-Extremism Architecture, 2014-2024

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### Abstract

*Prevention was specified again and again by Pakistan's national counter-extremism instruments between 2014 and 2024. It was never shown by the public record to have reached provincial delivery. That gap is reported here, and its weight is supplied by the Eighteenth Amendment. Education, health, youth affairs, and social welfare were devolved by that amendment. They now sit with governments that a federal ministry cannot be assumed to direct, finance, or deliver through on its own. Five national instruments are analyzed. A total of 305 action units is coded through genre-matched comparisons, and a constitutional and provincial-institutional audit is added. Within the matched agenda pair, at least one psychosocial mechanism is contained in 15.0% of National Action Plan 2014 units and in 21.4% of Revised National Action Plan 2021 units. Within the matched internal-security pair the shares are 41.7% and 45.8%, even though units are expanded from 36 to 177. The National Prevention of Violent Extremism Policy 2024 is read separately as a specialized genre. The policy is coded at 1.79 mechanisms for each of its 58 formal units. Design is therefore where the record is strongest, and delivery is where it thins. Activity or output measures account for 154 of NISP 2018's 177 indicators and for 50 of NPVE's 58 KPI clusters. Provincial or shared delivery is assigned by 51 NPVE actions. NISP 2014's Rs 32 billion principally funded security and institutional capacity, and not a costed preventive portfolio. Statutory provincial machinery arrived unevenly, in Punjab in 2014, in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa in 2021, and in Balochistan in October 2024. No comparable Sindh statute was identified inside the period, and a national policy instrument is expressly incorporated by none of it. National policy adoption cannot therefore be evaluated apart from provincial authority, appropriation, and reporting.*

### Keywords

*Pakistan; violent extremism; counter-terrorism; prevention; federalism; provincial government; NACTA; policy implementation; psychosocial mechanisms*

## 1. Introduction

Pakistan's first dedicated policy for the prevention of violent extremism was approved in December 2024. A decade of national policy-making had preceded it. In the first full calendar year that followed, 1,139 deaths from terrorism were recorded in the country (Institute for Economics & Peace, 2026, p. 20). Neither the success nor the failure of that policy is established by the sequence, and no such inference is drawn here. What is established is narrower. The stakes attached to prevention are not documentary. After ten years of national instruments, the public record still cannot show whether any of them reached the institutions that would have to deliver them.

Two different questions are faced by governments confronted by violent extremism. How can violent actors, financing, communications, and operational networks be disrupted? And how can the attraction of violent pathways be reduced, credible avenues for redress be created, and disengagement and reintegration be supported? Different interventions are needed by the two domains, and different standards of evidence. Implementation is not demonstrated by the appearance of preventive language in a policy.

Pakistan's official sequence offers a useful case. The first National Internal Security Policy (NISP) was issued in February 2014. Dialogue and a "comprehensive response" were paired in it with the isolation of violent actors and with enhanced deterrence, and a formal implementation plan was contained (Ministry of Interior, 2014, pp. 4-17). A 20-point National Action Plan (NAP) was then adopted after the attack on the Army Public School in Peshawar in December 2014. National consensus was concentrated by the plan in an emergency counter-terrorism agenda. Selected commitments were retained on religious persecution, seminaries, development, reconciliation, refugees, and criminal-justice reform (National Counter Terrorism Authority [NACTA], 2014). Internal security was then connected by NISP 2018-2023 with human security, education, social cohesion, political participation, rehabilitation, and regional inclusion (Ministry of Interior, 2018). Five kinetic priorities were separated from nine non-kinetic ones by Revised NAP 2021. A national countering-violent-extremism policy was called for, to be formulated, institutionalized, and implemented (NACTA, 2021). A dedicated five-pillar prevention framework was then established by the National Prevention of Violent Extremism (NPVE) Policy, approved in December 2024 (NACTA, 2024; NACTA, 2025a).

This sequence is often summarized as a transition from "hard" to "soft" policy. A broadening towards countering violent extremism has been identified by Pakistan-focused scholarship. A stronger human-security orientation in NISP 2018 has been identified with it, and an enduring need for kinetic and non-kinetic measures to be balanced (Basit, 2020; Iqbal & Salman, 2023; Makki & Akash, 2020; Shabbir, 2021). A simple transition narrative is nevertheless problematic for three reasons. It is historically incomplete. NAP was preceded by NISP 2014, and national-narrative work, youth engagement, deradicalization, rehabilitation, reconstruction, political dialogue, and the integration of mosques and seminaries into a national educational framework were already included in it (Ministry of Interior, 2014, pp. 7-17). The documents also belong to different genres. More categories and more implementation language will almost inevitably be contained in a long framework than in a short agenda. And documentary design and policy performance are different objects. Budget release, delivery, psychosocial change, or security impact cannot be established by an implementation table on its own.

Two questions are therefore asked. The first is how psychosocial prevention came to be specified across Pakistan's national counter-extremism instruments between 2014 and 2024. The second is how claims about design, financing, and institutional continuity are qualified by the division of competence that followed the Eighteenth Amendment. Three contributions follow. NISP 2014 is restored to the national sequence, and a targeted audit of provincial institutionalization is added. Like genres are compared, eight administrative and ethical components are kept apart, and the level at which a policy is issued is separated from the levels at which it is delivered and financed. Vertical translation is then treated as an observable chain. It runs from national priority to provincial authority, then to appropriation, implementation, and reporting.

## 2. From psychosocial risk factors to policy mechanisms

### 2.1 No single profile or pathway

The search for a universal terrorist profile has been rejected repeatedly. It is argued by Horgan (2008) that more is told by pathways and processes than by stable demographic profiles. It is warned by Githens-Mazer and Lambert (2010) that testable evidence may be displaced by conventional narratives. It is shown by Sedgwick (2010), by Kundnani (2012), and by Heath-Kelly (2013) that "radicalization" is a contested policy category. Pre-emptive risk governance can be supported by its use, and communities can be treated as suspect. Mechanisms are located instead by McCauley and Moskalenko (2008) at the individual, group, and mass level. A systematic review is reported by Wolfowicz et al. (2021). It covers 127 studies, 206 samples, and 1,302 effect sizes across more than 100 putative risk and protective factors. Violent behaviour is not caused by any single factor, and cognitive, intentional, and behavioural outcomes must be kept apart.

Poverty, education, grievance, religious identity, or group membership cannot therefore be turned into simple profiles of dangerous individuals (Krueger & Malečková, 2003). A mechanism or a context can still be addressed by a policy. No claim is required that everyone exposed to it will become violent. The documentary question is whether a plausible functional relationship holds between an intervention and such a mechanism. Proof that the mechanism operated is not required from a policy clause.

### 2.2 Three families of mechanisms

Three families of sensitizing concepts follow, and the 12 mechanism codes are derived from them. Observation, modelling, reinforcement, and the perceived legitimacy of influential actors are emphasized by social-learning theory (Bandura, 1977). Learning environments extend past formal schools. Religious institutions, families, peers, media, and digital platforms are taken in by them. Restrictive and formative measures must be kept distinct. Material promoting violence may be prohibited as a counter-terrorism measure. That is not the same intervention as helping citizens evaluate propaganda. Careful design and evaluation are needed by counter-narrative interventions, because a behavioural effect is not proved by intuitive appeal (Carthy et al., 2020). Education and curriculum, positive communication, digital and media environments, and community messengers are therefore coded separately.

Relative deprivation concerns a perceived discrepancy between experienced conditions and legitimate expectations. The discrepancy is often interpreted through comparison with other groups or regions (Gurr, 1970). Absolute poverty is not its equivalent, and violence is not inevitably produced by grievance. Its policy relevance lies elsewhere. Credible opportunities, fair services, participation,

recognition, complaint, and redress may or may not be provided by institutions. Personal deprivation is distinguished from group-based deprivation in a meta-analytic review. The strongest relationships with collective responses are found where group comparison is joined to perceived injustice and affect (Smith et al., 2012). Four distinctions result: socioeconomic opportunity, political and civic inclusion, services and regional disparity, and grievance or redress.

Group polarization describes how a position that was dominant to begin with tends to be intensified by discussion among like-minded participants (Myers & Lamm, 1976). Prevention should not be reduced to the psychological correction of individuals. A social-ecological account of resilience is argued for by Stephens, Sieckelinck, and Boutellier (2021), and institutions, structures, and community agency are recognized in it. Four categories are supported by that perspective: intergroup contact and cohesion, youth agency, women and inclusive agency, and disengagement and reintegration. Rehabilitation is not treated as only ideological. Family support, education, livelihood, legal status, community acceptance, psychosocial care, and protection from re-recruitment may all be involved in sustainable disengagement (Jawaid, 2020; Khyber et al., 2022).

### 2.3 Rights and institutional design

Benefits can be created by P/CVE policy while risks are generated at the same time. Stigmatization, overbroad categorization, and the securitization of education and social services are among them. That dilemma is identified in education by Davies (2016). Inclusive rights-oriented learning and active citizenship are argued for, and not the treatment of students as objects of surveillance. It is emphasized in a similar way by a United Nations Special Rapporteur that legality, non-discrimination, participation, and effective remedies are needed for legitimacy and for sustainable prevention (United Nations Human Rights Council, 2020). Prevention is placed alongside human rights, rule of law, dialogue, community engagement, youth, gender equality, education, employment, and strategic communications in the United Nations Plan of Action to Prevent Violent Extremism (United Nations General Assembly, 2015).

Framework-level references to constitutional rights or pluralism are recorded here. A safeguard code is given to a specific action only on a narrower test. Due process, privacy, proportionality, non-discrimination, participation, complaint, consent, or do-no-harm procedures must be contained in it or formally linked to it. The same principle of separation is applied to administrative design. An action can be named without a lead being assigned. A lead can be named without resources being provided. A deadline can be specified without an indicator being identified. An activity can be counted without an outcome being measured. Each component is therefore coded independently.

## 3. Pakistan's policy debate and constitutional context

### 3.1 Prior research

Assessments of targeted rehabilitation and of NAP implementation have been left behind by the P/CVE literature in Pakistan. Broader analyses of internal security and non-kinetic policy have been moved towards. Counter-radicalization and deradicalization initiatives were reviewed by Basit (2015), and a warning was given that strong effectiveness claims were not supported by the available programme information. Multiple rehabilitation models were found in a similar way by Jawaid (2020), and clearer evidence on evaluation, aftercare, and reintegration was called for. A structured juvenile programme is described by research on Sabaoon. Education, religious instruction, psychosocial work, family engagement, and vocational support are combined in it, although a national policy impact

estimate is not provided (Khyber et al., 2022). At the national-policy level, NAP is characterized by Basit (2020) as covering both counter-terrorism and CVE, with greater attention given by implementation to hard measures. A movement beyond an exclusively kinetic paradigm towards structural determinants is identified by Makki and Akash (2020). NISP 2018 is interpreted through a human-security framework by Shabbir (2021). The analysis is widened by Iqbal and Salman (2023) to non-kinetic responses at individual, organizational, and environmental levels.

### 3.2 Constitutional competence and provincial delivery

A constitutional fact shapes the policy field and cannot be treated as background. The Concurrent Legislative List was deleted by the Eighteenth Amendment. Concurrent federal and provincial legislative power over criminal law, criminal procedure, and evidence is expressly preserved by Article 142(b), and not by a current Federal Legislative List entry. Other matters outside that List are reserved to the provinces by Article 142(c). Federal executive authority generally follows federal legislative competence, and provincial executive authority follows provincial competence (Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan, 1973, arts. 97, 137 and 142(b)-(c)). The functions of seventeen federal ministries were transferred or reallocated by the official devolution process. Education, Health, Youth Affairs, and Social Welfare and Special Education are among them (Implementation Commission, 2011, pp. 10-13). Ordinary policing was provincial already.<sup>1</sup>

A national role is not eliminated by devolution. Inter-provincial matters and coordination are retained by the Federal Legislative List. Routes for consensual legislation or the entrustment of functions are provided by Articles 144 and 146-147. Federal-provincial fiscal transfers and grants are permitted by Articles 160 and 164. A limited federal power is also retained by Article 149(4). A province may be directed under it, for the purpose of preventing a grave menace to peace, tranquillity, or economic life. Article 149(2) was omitted by the Eighteenth Amendment, and not article 149(4). Policy on Federal Legislative List Part II matters is supervised and formulated by the Council of Common Interests, which is established under articles 153-154 and required to meet at least once in 90 days. A general federal authorization is not what those provisions amount to. Counter-extremism, education, health, welfare, and policing actions cannot all be delivered under them. The constitutional constraint is therefore not that a provincial action can never be financed or coordinated by the federation. It is that unilateral authority to legislate, appropriate, and deliver across devolved fields cannot be assumed to be possessed by a national ministry.

The point is stated directly by NISP 2018. The document is described in it as a federal framework. Provincial consultation is recorded. It is acknowledged that many recommendations fall within provincial jurisdiction. Detailed strategies are expected to be adapted by provincial governments. An Inter-Provincial Coordination Committee is proposed, and provincial Apex Committees are retained (Ministry

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<sup>1</sup> The consolidated text used here is the Constitution as amended through 2025, which includes the Twenty-seventh Amendment. That amendment postdates the study period, and its provisions were checked against the articles relied on in this section. None of articles 97, 137, 142, 144, 146, 147, 149, 153, 154, 160, or 164 is altered by it. Within this part of the Constitution its substitutions are confined to the renaming of the court named in two arbitration clauses and to provisions on the conduct of federal government business.

of Interior, 2018, p. 17). Federalism is therefore part of the policy's stated architecture, and not a limitation added from outside by the analyst.

### 3.3 Research gap

Three gaps remain. Policy evolution is sometimes reconstructed from NAP 2014 onward, even though NISP 2014 preceded it and an extensive preventive component was contained in it. Unlike instruments are often compared, or a move is made from adoption to implementation claims, without a common evidentiary rule. National texts are frequently read as if the social-policy and policing machinery required for delivery were also controlled by the issuing government. Those gaps are addressed here. The national sequence is restored, genres are matched, and the vertical chain is audited from federal framework to provincial institution, finance, and reporting. Causal attribution is not attempted.

## 4. Corpus and method

### 4.1 Corpus, exclusions, and source verification

Five official Government of Pakistan instruments are contained in the principal corpus: National Internal Security Policy 2014-2018; National Action Plan 2014; National Internal Security Policy 2018-2023; Revised National Action Plan 2021; and National Prevention of Violent Extremism Policy 2024. NISP 2014 is included for three reasons. The policy is the first national internal-security framework in the period. NAP is described by NACTA as the second consensual policy document after it. And the earlier framework is expressly built on by NISP 2018 (Ministry of Interior, 2014, 2018; NACTA, 2014). The National Security Policy 2022-2026 is acknowledged but not coded. That document is a whole-of-state strategy, and not an equivalent counter-terrorism or PVE action instrument (National Security Division, 2022). The United Nations Plan of Action is used only as an international benchmark. Textual borrowing is not tested, and no claim of institutional isomorphism is made.

Provincial instruments are excluded from the 305-unit denominator by scope, and not because provincial delivery was overlooked. Different constitutional and administrative work is done by a provincial policy or statute. Official legislation capable of carrying national priorities into provincial institutions during 2014-2024 is therefore examined by a targeted provincial audit. Three statutes are examined: the Punjab Strategic Coordination Act 2014, the Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Centre of Excellence on Countering Violent Extremism Act 2021, and the Balochistan Center of Excellence on Countering Violent Extremism Act 2024. The Sindh Code was searched as a negative case through 31 December 2024 (Government of Sindh, n.d.). On 27 July 2026, the official annual Act and Ordinance gazette lists for 2014-2024 and the master Act index were searched by title, and by full text for candidate instruments. Sixteen search strings were used, covering extremism, terrorism, coordination, apex, internal-security, deradicalization, and centre-of-excellence terms. The Punjab Act is retrieved by this protocol through both its title and its body, which serves as a comparator check. Potential Sindh false positives were reviewed functionally. A comparable dedicated PVE centre or strategic counter-terrorism coordination institution is created by none of them. The 2025 register was checked separately, so that the later Sindh Act could be verified as falling outside the cutoff.

All policy-content claims are based on official NACTA or Ministry of Interior texts. Source provenance is preserved by controlled local copies and SHA-256 checksums. File integrity is established by them, and not policy authority. Native extractable text is contained in both NISP documents. NPVE 2024 is an

image-only PDF, and its printed page is five pages behind the PDF page. OCR was used to locate candidate provisions. Of 4,378 line-level confidence records, 97 (2.22%) fell below 0.90 and 17 (0.39%) below 0.80, against a median of 0.987. These scores are a diagnostic and not proof of transcription accuracy. Every dispositive NPVE provision used in the findings was checked against a rendered page image.

#### 4.2 Genre matching and units of analysis

Three comparisons are made. NAP 2014 is compared with Revised NAP 2021 as a pair of national action agendas. NISP 2014 is compared with NISP 2018 as a pair of internal-security frameworks. NPVE 2024 is examined as a dedicated prevention framework, and as the institutional response to Revised NAP's non-kinetic mandate. Cross-genre statements are limited to changes in function and to institutional differentiation. Raw code totals are never used to rank a short priority list against a long policy framework. The primary unit is a formally delimited action, priority, or implementation-plan row. A complete population of 305 formal action units is produced by that rule.

Table 1. Formal action-unit population

| Policy instrument | Genre                          | Included units                                                             | <i>n</i>   |
|-------------------|--------------------------------|----------------------------------------------------------------------------|------------|
| NAP 2014          | Action agenda                  | Official 20 points                                                         | 20         |
| Revised NAP 2021  | Action agenda                  | Five kinetic and nine non-kinetic priorities                               | 14         |
| NISP 2014-2018    | Internal-security framework    | Non-duplicated NISP Implementation Plan rows, pp. 13-17                    | 36         |
| NISP 2018-2023    | Internal-security framework    | Distinct numbered, lettered, and unnumbered Annex A action rows, pp. 64-71 | 177        |
| NPVE Policy 2024  | Dedicated prevention framework | 51 thematic and seven institutional actions                                | 58         |
| <b>Total</b>      |                                |                                                                            | <b>305</b> |

Where the same NISP 2014 commitment appears in several places, only its implementation-plan row is entered into the denominator. Narrative diagnostic paragraphs are read and cited, but not added to it. Two numbering irregularities in NISP 2018 were resolved by treating each affected row as a separate substantive unit. That gives 177 rows, after every annex page was inspected visually. The number of actions within each pillar is stated by NPVE's headings, so the 58-unit population can be verified independently of OCR. A granularity diagnostic was also run inside the matched NISP pair. Action text in NISP 2014 averaged 15.8 words for each row (median 14), compared with 14.6 words in NISP 2018 (median 14). The larger NISP 2018 denominator is therefore unlikely to be merely an artefact of finer decomposition.

### 4.3 Coding and component extraction

A qualitative, directed content-analysis strategy is followed (Hsieh & Shannon, 2005). One or more of 12 mechanism codes can be given to each formal unit, grouped under the three families above. Exclusions are made explicit in the codebook. Enforcement-only media restriction is not coded as positive communication. General economic growth is not socioeconomic inclusion. Youth mentioned only as a risk category is not youth agency. Punishment without a pathway out is not reintegration. That rule is narrower than a reading in which any reform-oriented or developmental commitment would be treated as preventive. Fewer coded units are therefore returned by it.

Eight administrative and ethical components are extracted separately for every qualifying unit: concrete action; lead delivery institution; supporting or coordinating actors; deadline, duration, phase, or sequence; indicator or target; monitoring, reporting, review, audit, or evaluation; budget, cost, funding source, staffing, or capacity input; and an action-level right or safeguard. Components must apply to the same unit, or to an implementation block formally linked to it. An unrelated education provision cannot be upgraded by a timeline sitting elsewhere. General rights language cannot be treated as a privacy safeguard for every digital action. Indicators are also classified at action-row or KPI-cluster level, as activity, output, intermediate outcome, final security or social outcome, or unclear. Where measures at several levels are contained in one cluster, it is assigned to the category closest to an outcome.

Three further fields are recorded but not scored, and the federalism audit is guided by them: delivery level, financing route, and vertical specification. The last of these asks a single question. Are the responsible level, an available implementing instrument, a financing route where resources are needed, and a reporting relationship where levels are shared all identified by the same action? A future provincial budget demand is therefore not treated as a missing federal appropriation. A future demand is still less publicly auditable than a linked allocation.

### 4.4 Scope, reflexivity, and inference

The corpus is approached by the coding analyst as a public-policy researcher analyzing official texts. He did not take part in formulating or implementing them. The framework is informed by theory, and a risk is created by that, because academic categories may be found in broad policy language. Explicit inclusion rules, negative-case checks, and a requirement for source-anchored functional correspondence are used to reduce it. Policy design, authorization, appropriation, implementation, output, outcome, and impact are kept apart. The level at which a framework is issued is kept apart from the level constitutionally authorized to deliver it. Re-specification can be shown by national policy succession. Institutional persistence cannot be established by it alone, and neither can abandonment, because provincial legislation, organizations, and budgets may be carrying on. All derived files are regenerated by a build script from a fixed and inspectable assignment table. The extraction, counting, and tabulation steps are therefore reproducible. The interpretive coding decisions were made by the analyst, and are not algorithmically re-derived from the text by that script.

## 5. Findings

### 5.1 Mechanism distribution within genre-matched comparisons

At least one of the 12 mechanisms is contained in 151 units of the complete 305-unit register, and 239 assignments are multi-response. The corpus is described by those totals. They are not a score across

genres. The defensible comparisons are those inside the matched action-agenda pair and the matched internal-security pair.

Table 2. Mechanism coverage and assignment density

| Instrument       | Formal units | Units with at least one mechanism, <i>n</i> (%) | Mechanism assignments | Assignments per unit |
|------------------|--------------|-------------------------------------------------|-----------------------|----------------------|
| NAP 2014         | 20           | 3 (15.0)                                        | 4                     | 0.20                 |
| Revised NAP 2021 | 14           | 3 (21.4)                                        | 5                     | 0.36                 |
| NISP 2014-2018   | 36           | 15 (41.7)                                       | 15                    | 0.42                 |
| NISP 2018-2023   | 177          | 81 (45.8)                                       | 111                   | 0.63                 |
| NPVE Policy 2024 | 58           | 49 (84.5)                                       | 104                   | 1.79                 |
| <b>Total</b>     | <b>305</b>   | <b>151 (49.5)</b>                               | <b>239</b>            | <b>0.78</b>          |

Source: Study action-unit coding register. The coding is multi-response, so the assignments can go beyond the units that were coded. Raw differences across genres are not scores for effectiveness.

Inside the agenda pair, the share of units containing a mechanism is raised by 6.4 percentage points, from 15.0% in NAP 2014 to 21.4% in Revised NAP 2021. That increase is modest. It fits the way kinetic priorities are divided from non-kinetic ones by the later agenda. A strong quantitative claim about a trend is nevertheless ruled out by the small denominators.

Inside the internal-security pair, the preventive share is changed by only 4.1 percentage points, from 41.7% in NISP 2014 to 45.8% in NISP 2018. The bigger change is structural. Formal units are raised from 36 to 177. Units containing a mechanism are raised from 15 to 81, and assignments from 15 to 111. Mean and median action-text lengths in the pair are similar, so the expansion is not merely a matter of longer clauses. What the evidence supports is that delivery instruments were differentiated and multiplied. It does not support a sharp rise in the preventive share.

NPVE is a separate specialized genre. Its 58 formal units carry 104 assignments. That is 1.79 for each unit, and about 2.8 times NISP 2018's 0.63. At least one mechanism is contained in 49 of them (84.5%). That density is consistent with specialization, because learning, communication, inclusion, agency, cohesion, or reintegration mechanisms are more often combined by its actions. Implementation or effect is not shown by it.

## 5.2 Action agendas: NAP 2014 and Revised NAP 2021

NAP 2014 and Revised NAP 2021 are the closest genre match in the corpus. Both are short national priority lists, intended for action to be concentrated. Agenda structure and institutional differentiation are therefore what their comparison concerns. Substantial attention is given by NAP 2014's 20 points to immediate disruption and enforcement. Punishment in terrorism cases, temporary special trial courts, prohibition of militant outfits, strengthening of NACTA, countering of hate material, disruption of financing and online activity, and establishment of a counter-terrorism force are among them (NACTA,

2014). The agenda can be described as enforcement-centred on that basis. The list is nevertheless not exclusively coercive.

Six clusters point towards reform or prevention: action against religious persecution; registration and regulation of seminaries; administrative and development reforms in the former FATA with attention to displaced persons; a political reconciliation process led by the Balochistan government; a comprehensive refugee policy; and criminal-justice reform. Only three of the 20 units are returned by the mechanism codes, and they do not map neatly onto those six clusters. A codeable psychosocial mechanism has to be specified before any commitment qualifies, whether it is framed as reform or as enforcement. What the compressed public form of the remaining clusters supplies is the priority, without the intervention. Action-level indicators are not stated. The two-year duration for special trial courts is an isolated timeline, and not a general results architecture.

The agenda is brought down to 14 priorities by Revised NAP 2021, and an explicit conceptual division is introduced. Militant organizations, media and cyber networks, sectarian terrorism, financing, and related illegal activity are addressed by the five kinetic priorities. Court follow-up, capacity building for provincial counter-terrorism departments, a national CVE policy, seminary regulation, reconciliation in Balochistan, development and reforms in the merged districts, criminal-justice reform, legal oversight, and refugee issues are covered by the nine non-kinetic priorities (NACTA, 2021). The change is institutionally important, but it is also easily overstated. The comprehensive preventive programme is not itself contained in Revised NAP. What is mandated by its eighth priority is that a CVE policy be formulated, institutionalized, and implemented. Revised NAP is therefore a bridge. Kinetic action is formally retained by it, while a distinct non-kinetic policy field is authorized. Action-level deadlines, indicators, costing, and an evaluation framework are absent from its public list. That absence is a feature of the published agenda. Administrative implementation elsewhere is not ruled out by it.

Two findings are yielded. First, a movement was not made by the national agenda from an exclusively coercive NAP to a preventive Revised NAP, because enforcement and reform priorities are combined by both. Second, the significant 2021 change is the explicit differentiation of domains and the mandate for a dedicated policy. Greater clause-level operational detail is not what changed. Provincial authority is also depended on by many non-kinetic priorities. Provincial CTD capacity, seminary regulation, Balochistan reconciliation, and merged-district development are among them. Common priorities are stated by their national form. Provincial policy, legislation, or appropriation is not substituted for by it.

### 5.3 Internal-security frameworks: NISP 2014 and NISP 2018

The chronology is changed when NISP 2014 is restored. Dialogue with stakeholders, isolation of violent actors from support systems, and strengthened deterrence and state capacity were comprised by the policy's three-part framework. A Comprehensive Response Plan addressed reconstruction, rehabilitation, a national narrative, reconciliation, reintegration, youth engagement, the integration of mosques and seminaries, and legal reform. Law-enforcement and criminal-justice capacity were addressed by a Combined Deterrence Plan (Ministry of Interior, 2014, pp. 4-12). Prevention and enforcement were therefore designed as parallel components, before NAP was adopted. Responsibility and time are assigned by the 36-row NISP Implementation Plan to multiple preventive actions. A national deradicalization programme, a Youth Engagement Strategy, integration of mosques and seminaries into

the national educational system, and rehabilitation of victims are among them (pp. 13-17). Fundamental rights, pluralism, tolerance, accountability, and the rule of law are referred to by its objectives (pp. 5-6).

Responsibility, timeline, and approximate-cost columns are also contained in that plan. Rs 32 billion was estimated in the executive summary. It was divided into Rs 22 billion for provincial components and Rs 10 billion for federal components that would also support the provinces (Ministry of Interior, 2014, p. 20). What that aggregate means is qualified by the table. Its initial allocation is tied principally to the raising or strengthening of NACTA, the provincial CTDs, the Civil Armed Forces headquarters, and rapid-response capacity. The preventive rows draw instead on existing research allocations, on future proposals, or on federal and provincial financing. The Rs 32 billion is therefore evidence that security and institutional capacity were planned. The estimate is not a costed preventive portfolio.

The idea that prevention is taken in by sustainable security is retained by NISP 2018. The policy is also expanded through six pillars: Reorient, Reimagine, Reconcile, Redistribute, a Regional Approach, and Recognize. Insecurity is linked in its diagnostic framing with exclusionary narratives, youth alienation, regional disparities, and weak inclusion and accountability. Peace is presented as more than the absence of violence (Ministry of Interior, 2018, pp. 8-10). Detailed strategies adapted to their needs are expected to be prepared by the provinces, supported by an Inter-Provincial Coordination Committee and the provincial Apex Committees (p. 17). A common intervention and provincial responsibility can therefore be specified by a national annex row. That row is not the final provincial delivery instrument.

Under learning and communication, the earlier commitment to a national narrative is moved beyond. Curriculum reform, civic education, teacher training, exchanges, counselling, media measures, religious-leader engagement, and collaboration across madrassa, public, and private education are separated by NISP 2018 (pp. 46-50; Annex rows 65-90). The difference is one of instrument differentiation, and not the first recognition of learning. Under grievance, opportunity, and inclusion, transparent review and reintegration pathways are connected by the Reconcile and Redistribute pillars with livelihood, family assistance, compensation, social protection, skills, employment, credit, youth and women's participation, and targeted attention to less-developed regions (pp. 50-55; Annex rows 91-103).

Institutionally, responsible bodies are named by the 177-row Annex A. Indicator, timeline, and budget fields are provided, and quarterly reporting is called for (Ministry of Interior, 2018, pp. 64-71). The addition of indicators is a genuine development in design, compared with NISP 2014. A second distinction is introduced by what those indicators contain. Of 177 indicators, seven (4.0%) are measures of activity and 147 (83.1%) are outputs. Only two (1.1%) are intermediate outcomes, and one (0.6%) is a final security or social outcome. Twenty (11.3%) are unclear. Laws amended, bodies established, or trainings conducted are valid measures of activity or output. Changes in trust, inclusion, perceived fairness, disengagement, recidivism, or violence are not measured by them on their own.

Resource specification is still heterogeneous. The budget column's 177 fields are made up of 92 dashes (52.0%), 63 entries marked TBD (35.6%), 16 named or assigned financing routes (9.0%), and six blanks (3.4%). Those categories should not be run together. A provincial or departmental budget route is constitutionally coherent. A blank or undetermined entry is less specified. Neither is the same thing as an appropriated action. Rights and inclusion are prominent at framework level. Accountability, complaints, legal aid, gender participation, and religious minorities are addressed by selected actions. A

uniform safeguard field is not applied by the annex to every digital, education, policing, or reintegration intervention.

Continuity, change, and a shift in vertical specification are therefore revealed by the matched comparison. Psychosocial prevention and institutional planning are contained in both policies. The portfolio is broadened by NISP 2018, and dependence on provincial adaptation is made explicit. A fully costed preventive portfolio is provided by neither. The later policy is not simply "more operationalized" on a single scale. The later policy is more differentiated, and more explicit about multilevel delivery.

#### 5.4 NPVE 2024: specialization of prevention

A dedicated institutional identity is given to prevention by NPVE 2024. Evidence-informed responses, attention to political, economic, social, and psychological factors, pluralism, media engagement, community resilience, participation, human rights, and protection of vulnerable communities are included in its objectives (NACTA, 2024, pp. 1-3). The mechanism families used here are corresponded to by its five thematic pillars. Curricula, learning institutions, teachers, religious institutions, and national narrative are covered by Revisit. Print, electronic, and social media are covered by Reach Out. Youth, women, and vulnerable communities are covered by Reduce Risk. Science, innovation, art, culture, research, and cohesion are covered by Reinforce. Deradicalization, rehabilitation, reconciliation, livelihoods, and community support are covered by Reintegrate (NACTA, 2024, pp. 4-20).

Fifty-one thematic actions and seven institutional actions are contained in Part 2. Lead and supporting partners are named by the 58 formal rows. Short-, medium-, or long-term horizons are assigned, and KPIs are provided (NACTA, 2024, pp. 24-71). Prevention is made more visible and administratively traceable by this architecture than in either public action agenda. It also differs from NISP 2018, because prevention is made the organizing field, and not internal security as a whole. At unit level, provincial or shared federal-provincial delivery is assigned by 51 of the 58 actions (87.9%). That set is not the same as the 51 thematic actions. Five are provincial and 46 are federal-provincial, compared with six federal actions and one mixed or unclear case. Provincial delivery is therefore an observed feature of the action plan, and not simply an inference from framework language.

Three qualifications remain. First, the plan is not a fully costed portfolio. The absence of preset federal allocations cannot be interpreted apart from devolution. Funding is assigned through post-approval federal and provincial budget demands. Provincial education, youth, welfare, health, police, and planning bodies are named. Provincial PVE Centres of Excellence created through Provincial Assembly legislation are envisaged (NACTA, 2024, pp. 20-22 and 24-71). A constitutionally plausible financing and delivery route is what this amounts to. Complete costs, cost-sharing, appropriation dates, and linked budget lines are not specified by the public text.

Second, the KPI distribution is output-heavy. Fifty of 58 KPI clusters (86.2%) are outputs. Five (8.6%) are intermediate outcomes, and three (5.2%) are final security or social outcomes. None is classified as activity-only or unclear. Monitoring, evaluation, and impact analysis are referred to. A common method for psychosocial outcomes to be measured, or security change to be attributed, is not provided. Third, rights are more visible than in the public action agendas, and a dedicated vulnerable-community action with Ministry of Human Rights involvement is included. Action-specific safeguards are nevertheless uneven. Lawful-purpose, privacy, proportionality, complaint, consent, and do-no-harm procedures are

not automatically specified for every digital, educational, or case-management intervention by an explicit rights objective.

NPVE 2024 is consequently a major act of national specialization, and not the beginning of prevention or of provincial PVE machinery. Strands visible in both NISPs are consolidated by it, and Revised NAP's call for a dedicated policy is answered. Its future evidentiary value will depend on federal monitoring. Provincial authority, appropriation, activities, and outcomes would have to be connected by it.

Table 3. Indicator classification by instrument

| Indicator class                  | NISP 2018, <i>n</i> (%) | NPVE 2024, <i>n</i> (%) |
|----------------------------------|-------------------------|-------------------------|
| Activity                         | 7 (4.0)                 | 0 (0.0)                 |
| Output                           | 147 (83.1)              | 50 (86.2)               |
| Intermediate outcome             | 2 (1.1)                 | 5 (8.6)                 |
| Final security or social outcome | 1 (0.6)                 | 3 (5.2)                 |
| Unclear                          | 20 (11.3)               | 0 (0.0)                 |
| <b>Total</b>                     | <b>177 (100.0)</b>      | <b>58 (100.0)</b>       |

Source: Study action-row coding of NISP 2018 Annex A and NPVE 2024 Part 2. Each row or KPI cluster is classified once at its most outcome-proximate level. Percentages may not sum to 100.0 because of rounding.

### 5.5 Vertical design across the national instruments

The instruments are not scored against one another here. Unit-level patterns that differ would be reduced by any document-level grid to thresholds defined by the analyst. What is identified by Table 4 instead is the constitutional and fiscal function of each national instrument.

Table 4. National policy function, delivery level, and financing route

| Instrument | National policy function                                        | Delivery relation                               | Public financing route                                                                                                                                    | Evidentiary limit                 |
|------------|-----------------------------------------------------------------|-------------------------------------------------|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|-----------------------------------|
| NISP 2014  | Internal-security framework combining prevention and deterrence | Federal, provincial, and joint responsibilities | Rs 22 billion provincial and Rs 10 billion federal capacity estimate; preventive actions rely on existing allocations, later proposals, or shared funding | Not a costed preventive portfolio |

| Instrument       | National policy function                                         | Delivery relation                                                                                                                     | Public financing route                                                             | Evidentiary limit                                                                         |
|------------------|------------------------------------------------------------------|---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
| NAP 2014         | Emergency national priority agenda                               | Federal and provincial action varies by priority                                                                                      | No agenda-level financing architecture                                             | Provincial implementation cannot be inferred from the 20 points                           |
| NISP 2018        | Federal framework intended to guide all levels of government     | Many actions require provincial strategies; federal-provincial and intra-provincial committees are specified                          | 92 dashes, 63 TBD entries, 16 named or assigned routes, and six blanks             | A national annex is not the final provincial strategy or appropriation                    |
| Revised NAP 2021 | National kinetic/non-kinetic agenda and mandate for a CVE policy | Provincial CTDs and devolved reform fields are integral to the non-kinetic domain                                                     | No public agenda-level costing                                                     | Mandate and priority do not demonstrate provincial delivery                               |
| NPVE 2024        | Dedicated national prevention framework and action plan          | 51 of 58 actions assign provincial or shared federal-provincial delivery; provincial PVE centres are envisaged through provincial law | Post-approval federal and provincial budget demands plus action-level funding KPIs | No complete costs, cost-sharing formula, linked appropriations, or implementation results |

Source: Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan (1973); Implementation Commission (2011); Ministry of Interior (2014, 2018); NACTA (2014, 2021, 2024).

Three distinctions follow. The absence of a preset federal allocation for a devolved action is not the same thing as an unfunded action. It may be appropriated by the province, or financed by an intergovernmental grant. A constitutionally plausible route is not the same thing as a completed financing chain. Costs, cost-sharing, dates, releases, and expenditure are still left to be demonstrated where budget demands lie in the future. And coordination should be evaluated by whether authority, procedure, reporting, and follow-through are specified. It should not be evaluated by whether provincial partners are shown in a national document.

## 6. Implementation-context checks

The documentary sequence is qualified by five contextual checks. The article is not converted by them into an impact evaluation.

### 6.1 Political timing and policy continuity

NISP 2018 was approved on 29 May and publicly unveiled on 31 May 2018, at the end of the outgoing federal government's term (Dawn, 2018a, 2018b). It is not shown by timing that the policy was drafted without an expectation of implementation. A change of government was nevertheless crossed immediately by implementation responsibility. Continuity is therefore an empirical question, and not an assumption. A second interval is shown by the dedicated prevention-policy process. In December 2021 it was reported by the Press Information Department that a National Counter Violent Extremism Policy 2021 and an implementation plan had been drafted by NACTA and submitted for approval (Government of Pakistan, 2021). It is not established by the available evidence that the 2021 draft and the final NPVE 2024 text were identical. It is established that authorization was awaited by a developed policy proposal, before a dedicated policy was approved in December 2024 (NACTA, 2025a). The interval of approximately three years is relevant to institutional continuity. The effort or intent of any one organization is not measured by it.

### 6.2 Provincial institutionalization

It is shown by official provincial legislation that national policy succession is not the whole institutional history. Punjab's Strategic Coordination Act 2014 was passed on 27 October, assented to on 8 November, and gazetted on 10 November. It preceded NAP's adoption on 24 December by 44 days. A Provincial Security Council and a Strategic Coordination Board were established by it. Provincial security and counter-terrorism policy, compliance monitoring, coordination among security and criminal-justice agencies, evidence-led planning, public-information support for deradicalization, and performance monitoring are included among their statutory functions (Government of Punjab, 2014). A dedicated prevention form was moved further into by Khyber Pakhtunkhwa. A provincial body was created by its 2021 Centre of Excellence on Countering Violent Extremism Act. The body is authorized to prepare and review CVE strategies, conduct research and training, work with religious leaders and media, report annually, and receive provincial or federal grants (Government of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, 2021, ss. 7, 10 and 13). A comparable Centre of Excellence Act was passed by Balochistan's Assembly on 28 October 2024 and assented to on 31 October, before the national NPVE policy was approved in December (Government of Balochistan, 2024).

The timing is suggestive. A responsive national-to-provincial link is nevertheless not demonstrated by the statutory text. NISP, NAP, Revised NAP, NPVE, NACTA, and the Apex Committee structure are not named by the titles, preambles, or functions of the three Acts. What is evidenced by the statutes is provincial institutionalization alongside national re-specification, and not formal incorporation of a named national instrument. Institutionalization was also not uniform. No comparable dedicated Sindh CVE-centre statute was identified by the end of 2024. One was enacted by Sindh in 2025, outside the study period (Government of Sindh, 2025). The absence of a provincial CTD, of Apex-Committee activity, or of prevention programmes is not implied by this negative case. What is shown by it is that dedicated

statutory PVE machinery emerged at different times and in different forms. A purely top-down account is therefore ruled out, in which provincial PVE institutions were originated by NPVE 2024.<sup>2</sup>

### 6.3 Coordination capacity

Coordination is given weight in all five instruments, and a more central role is given to NACTA by the later policies. That role must be read against a change in the statute. Before the 2020 amendment, the Board of Governors was required by section 6(4) of the NACTA Act to meet at least once in each quarter. The words "each quarter of" were then removed. Only a yearly minimum is left. The Executive Committee is still required to meet quarterly by section 8(7), which was inserted by a separate amendment in 2017 (Government of Pakistan, 2013, ss. 6(4) and 8(7)). The April 2025 meeting was recorded by NACTA as the fifth meeting of the Board (NACTA, 2025b). High-level meetings have therefore been sparse over the life of the institution. A breach of the quarterly rule after 2020 is not established by that count, and capacity is not measured by meeting frequency alone. What is shown by the amendment history is that Board-level governance was formally relaxed inside the study period.

### 6.4 Continuing kinetic and preventive action

It is not shown by the policy sequence that counter-terrorism was replaced by prevention. Azm-e-Istehkam was approved by the Central Apex Committee on 22 June 2024. The reinvigorated national counter-terrorism campaign was publicly announced by the Prime Minister's Office Media Wing (Government of Pakistan, 2024a). A clarification was then issued on 24 June. It was said in it that this was intensified implementation of Revised NAP, and not a new large-scale military operation. Political, diplomatic, legal, and informational measures were being combined with continuing kinetic action (Government of Pakistan, 2024b).

### 6.5 The 2024-2025 security environment

A security context also exists. Policy sophistication is prevented by it from being presented as demonstrated impact. It is reported in the Global Terrorism Index 2026 that there were 1,098 attacks in Pakistan in 2024 and 1,045 in 2025. Deaths in 2025 were raised by nearly 6% to 1,139, and Pakistan was ranked first at a score of 8.574 (Institute for Economics & Peace, 2026, p. 20). Different definitions are used by the local monitors. 699 terrorist attacks and 1,034 terrorism-related deaths in 2025 are recorded by the Pak Institute for Peace Studies. 1,272 incidents and 3,417 fatalities are reported by the Center for Research and Security Studies, across the broader category of terrorist attacks and counter-terrorism operations (Center for Research and Security Studies, 2025; Pak Institute for Peace Studies, 2026). These totals cannot be swapped for one another. Sustained pressure and concentration in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa and Balochistan are what they converge on. The 2025 evidence is outside the study period, and it is the first full calendar year after NPVE was approved. The counterfactual is not identified by it. It cannot be attributed to the success or failure of a policy approved at the end of 2024.

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<sup>2</sup> Dedicated provincial CVE-centre statutes were enacted in the two remaining provinces after the study period, by Sindh in April 2025 and by Punjab in June 2025. Neither falls inside 2014-2024 and neither is coded here. Their timing reinforces the finding reported in the text, because dedicated statutory prevention machinery is shown by it to have been completed across all four provinces only after the national policy had been approved. Punjab's position inside the period rests on the coordination machinery created in 2014, and not on a dedicated centre.

## 7. Discussion

### 7.1 Recurrent re-specification and incomplete vertical translation

It is not the case that psychosocial prevention was discovered by Pakistan after a 2014 starting point that was only coercive. National narrative, youth engagement, deradicalization, rehabilitation, reconstruction, dialogue, educational integration, rights, institutional assignments, and timelines were already contained in NISP 2014. Institutional layering is nevertheless not established by the sequence. Evidence would be needed that earlier rules or commitments were kept operative while new ones were attached to them. Seminary integration was given a twelve-month horizon in NISP 2014. It was then restated in NAP 2014, in NISP 2018, and in Revised NAP 2021 (Ministry of Interior, 2014, pp. 13-17). A recurring priority is shown by that. Cumulative delivery is not proved by it. Provincial statutory bodies may also have carried on across federal policy changes, although a national instrument is named by none of the three provincial Acts.

What is best supported is a characterization of recurrent federal re-specification. Provincial institutionalization that is not uniform accompanies it, and public evidence of vertical translation that is incomplete. Common priorities exist, and provincial or shared delivery is assigned by 51 NPVE actions. A uniform chain through provincial authority, adaptation, appropriation, implementation, and reporting is nevertheless not shown by the public record. This claim can be disconfirmed. Persistence would be supported by provincial strategies, by linked budgets, and by outcome reports in which implementation is shown to be continuous. Re-specification without accumulation would be supported by national commitments repeated without provincial authorization or delivery.

### 7.2 Mechanisms, indicators, and learning systems

What is made clear by the mechanism families is a widening. It runs from narrative and content control towards curricula, dialogue, community messengers, services, participation, livelihoods, intergroup exchange, agency, and differentiated reintegration. A constraint is also placed by them on interpretation. Critical resistance to violent messaging is not proved by curriculum revision. Perceived injustice need not be altered by livelihood support. Either meaningful participation or merely symbolic inclusion might be produced by a youth forum. What is supplied by policy text is an intervention logic, and not an identified causal mechanism. Risk and protective factors are multiple and interacting. Measurable intermediate outcomes and plausible tests must therefore be generated by programme theory (Carthy et al., 2020; Wolfowicz et al., 2021).

Delivery is made more auditable by NISP 2018 and NPVE 2024. Their main evaluation challenge is the distance between administrative output and social outcome, which is confirmed by the distributions in Table 3. In a stronger results chain the outputs would be kept. Baselines, targets, sources, reporting intervals, and data custodians would be added to them. So would intermediate constructs such as trust, fairness, participation, or disengagement. Designs by which contribution or attribution can be assessed are needed for final outcomes.

### 7.3 Financing and safeguards across levels

The claim that preventive costing went backwards after NISP 2014 is not supported by the corpus. Security and institutional capacity are what is principally supported by the Rs 32 billion estimate, and the largest share had already been identified as provincial. A mixture of assigned and unresolved entries is contained in NISP 2018, and post-approval demands in NPVE. These are different fiscal objects, and not

national purses that can be compared. What must be tested is a chain. It runs through responsible level, financing route, implementing instrument, appropriation, reporting, and results.

Rights commitments made at framework level need action-specific procedures in a similar way. Lawful purpose, necessity, proportionality, data minimization, retention limits, and review are needed for digital monitoring. Non-stigmatizing participation and complaint routes are needed for education. Confidentiality, informed participation, case review, and do-no-harm procedures are needed for work with vulnerable participants and for reintegration.

#### 8. Policy implications

Monitoring must be specific to genre and to level. National priorities and intergovernmental responsibility should be tracked by NAP reporting. Federal action, provincial strategy, and shared coordination should be distinguished by NISP reporting. National oversight should be connected by NPVE reporting to province-specific programmes and outcomes. A public results architecture is needed by NPVE's 58 actions. A small set of comparable outcome measures is needed, and a named provincial data custodian wherever delivery is devolved. An authority and financing map is also needed. The responsible level, the legal instrument, the appropriation or transfer route, the additional resource need, the safeguard, and the evidence threshold to be met before scaling up would be identified by it. Restatement could then be distinguished from adaptation, from non-adoption, and from sustained delivery.

#### 9. Limitations

Five limitations apply. First, national instruments are what the principal corpus contains, and the provincial audit was deliberately narrower. Public constitutional and statutory evidence of vertical translation is tested by it. Every provincial strategy, budget, or implementation record is not inventoried. Provincial performance cannot be ranked, and the absence of a dedicated statute cannot be treated as the absence of provincial practice.

Second, formal action units are internally different. Several ideas can be contained in a NAP point, while an implementation row might be narrow. That difference is reduced by genre matching and by the prohibition on raw cross-genre counts. The difference is not eliminated. Third, the coding was done by one analyst. Auditability is supported by transparent definitions, a complete action-unit population, page-level anchors, and explicit negative-case categories. Independent inter-coder reliability is not provided. The assignment table and its derived outputs are reproduced by the build script, and the interpretive decisions are not independently re-created by it. A stratified sample should therefore be coded independently by a second trained coder, before any future quantitative extension.

Fourth, OCR was needed for NPVE 2024. Dispositive passages were checked visually, but transcription and search risk are increased by the image-only format. Fifth, the implementation-context evidence is selective and non-causal. Programme delivery is not measured by approval timing, board meetings, campaign announcements, or terrorism trends. The effect of any policy instrument is not identified by them.

#### 10. Conclusion

Pakistan's 2014-2024 sequence is not a completed movement from coercion to prevention. Preventive and deterrent measures were already combined in NISP 2014. They were then compressed by NAP, differentiated by NISP 2018, formalized as a kinetic and non-kinetic division by Revised NAP, and

consolidated by NPVE. What is shown by the indicator and delivery counts is stronger administrative specification and extensive provincial dependence. Implementation and impact are not shown by them.

The central finding has three parts. National re-specification was recurrent. Provincial institutionalization was not uniform. Public evidence of vertical translation is incomplete. Provincial statutes appeared at different times, and the national instruments were expressly incorporated by none of them. No comparable dedicated Sindh statute was identified inside the period. The Rs 32 billion in NISP 2014 was principally concerned with security and institutional capacity, and provincial budget routes that came later are constitutionally plausible but still publicly incomplete. What is needed next is an observable chain. It runs from national priority through provincial authority, appropriation, implementation, safeguards, intermediate outcomes, and reporting. National coordination would be enabled by an architecture of that kind. Provincial competence would not be erased by it, and persistence, non-adoption, and performance would all be made empirically distinguishable.

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