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This study investigates the understanding between media, populism, and political slogans in Pakistan through the case of Pakistan Tehreek-e-Insaf (PTI). Drawing from Herman and Chomsky's theory of "manufacturing consent" and Debord's concept of the "spectacle," the research explores how PTI slogans such as "Tabdeeli," "Naya Pakistan," and "Imported Hukumat Na-Manzoor" function as affective, visual, and rhetorical tools of political communication. Using a qualitative case study design, the study analyzes broadcast media, social media content, and party communications from 2013 to 2022. Through discourse and visual analysis, it demonstrates how slogans are used to simplify political narratives, construct emotional engagement, and foster political conformity. The findings reveal that PTI's slogans transformed into cultural artifacts by leveraging mass media aesthetics, repetition, and leader-centric imagery. These slogans played a dual role: they mobilized supporters by offering emotional clarity and nationalistic pride, while simultaneously delegitimizing political opponents through binary framing. Media platforms, including television, Twitter, TikTok, and WhatsApp, amplified these slogans, saturating public consciousness and narrowing space for dissent or critical reflection. The study highlights the media's complicity in reinforcing populist consensus, not through coercion, but via emotional spectacle and aesthetic saturation. Ultimately, the article argues that PTI's slogan-driven populism exemplifies how media ecosystems in fragile democracies can become vehicles for symbolic control and manufactured political legitimacy. It underscores the urgent need for critical media literacy and further research into alternative political narratives in postcolonial societies.

Keywords: Populism, Political Slogans, Pakistan Tehreek-E-Insaf, Media Spectacle, Emotional Mobilization, Manufacturing Consent, Political Communication, Discourse Analysis, Visual Politics, Populist Aesthetics.

Introduction

Populism is one of the central characteristics of political debate in the 21st century world. Whether it was Donald Trump and his slogan of "Make America Great Again" in the US or Narendra Modi and his promise of "Achhe Din" in India, the political leaders are now more than ever depending on emotionally appealing slogans to mobilize the masses and to create simple narratives of national rebirth. Traditional and digital media has been used as the main tool of enhancing such messages, turning leaders into a symbol of hope, resentment, or resistance (Moffitt, 2016; Mudde & Rovira Kaltwasser, 2017). The combination of populism and media technologies has given rise to what several academicians call the spectacle of contemporary

politics, a realm in which spectacles, redundancy, and emotionalism often replace content (Debord, 1994). This spectacle has been fertile ground in South Asia in countries that have high rate of media consumption, political polarization and youth involvement, such as Pakistan.

Political slogans are not new in Pakistan as they have been used since the times when electoral mobilization and ideological identity were a common thing in Pakistan. Slanging, as in the instance of "Roti, Kapra, Makaan" by Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto and "Vote Ko Izzat Do" by Nawaz Sharif have served as discursive tools of creating populist imaginaries. Nevertheless, no one has in recent history used the spectacle of slogans and media as well as Pakistan Tehreek-e-Insaf (PTI). PTI constructed its populist rhetoric under the charismatic leadership of Imran Khan through emotionally appealing slogans like, Naya Pakistan, Tabdeeli Aa Nahin Rahi, Tabdeeli Aa Gayi Hai, and Mujhe Kyun Nikala? These slogans did not just end as rhetoric, no, they became cultural products that spread through social media and in talk shows, rallies, and even in daily political discourse. The fact that PTI has managed to get these slogans entrenched in the minds of people is an indication of effective media to produce emotional appeal and popular approval. The spectacle of visual and verbal construction that surrounded these phrases, the spectacle of aligning the opinion of the masses with the ideology of the party, allowed making the intricate and multilateral political problems simple and clear, presented in the form of problems of easy and understandable binaries.

In order to examine this phenomenon, the current paper relies on the theory of manufacturing consent (Herman and Chomsky, 1988) suggesting that mass media cater to the interests of an elite through the construction of narratives in a way that supports the established power systems. Though this model is created in the environment of liberal democracies and capitalist media, the fundamental insights of media manipulation, agenda-setting and limitation of the discussion to a few commonly-agreed topics are highly applicable to the Pakistan context. The media industry in Pakistan is that of a mix of state-control, market competition and patronage. In such a system, political slogans are not merely spread but usually exaggerated by orchestrated media campaigns, sound bites, and biased selection of frames. The ascension of PTI is a special case study of how populist rhetoric, spectacle, and media synergy can be used to form the perception of the masses as well as producing the political legitimacy in a postcolonial democracy.

Research Questions:

1. How has PTI used political slogans to create a populist political identity in Pakistan?
2. In what ways has the media contributed to the spectacle and circulation of PTI's slogans?
3. How does this interplay between media, slogans, and populism reflect the logic of "manufacturing consent"?

Significance of the Study

The proposed study has several implications. First, it adds to the accumulating literature on media-populism relations across South Asia, whereby the existing body of knowledge has been largely focused on India and Bangladesh (Thussu, 2021; Udupa, 2018). The study of the populism through the use of slogans by PTI gives an exclusively Pakistani voice to the world discourse. Second, it gives a glimpse of the interaction between media ecosystems with low press freedom and high digital penetration with populist politics in creating consciousness among the people. The media in Pakistan is at once influential and vulnerable with the potential to reach millions and is vulnerable to censorship, party politics and manipulation. Third, the paper investigates the emotional aspects of political communication why slogans can evoke certain emotions such as hope, anger or fear and how these emotions are supplemented with pictures and tones of voice

in order to create conformity or political allegiance. By so doing, it shifts the analysis on slogans to be more of a textual reading that considers slogans as spectacles that integrates sound, image, repetition, and audience.

Furthermore, the paper also seeks to critically examine the concept of consent in a society where there exists inequality in media accessibility, ideological differences and power alliances that keep changing. It explores the idea that the media campaigns on the slogans of PTI are actually a grassroots movement or a top-down production of a consensus that stifles any voices of dissent. This question is particularly topical in the contemporary political situation in Pakistan, when the degree of polarization has never been higher and where more frequently than not slogans substitute actual debate in both the media and the parliament. As pop-nationalist rhetoric is increasingly visual, more digital and more emotionally performative, it is important to question: What is said, who is saying it, how it is said, and what is being silenced in the process.

Literature Review

The relationship between media and populism has taken center stage in the study of politics in modern day with the world seeing populist leaders use the media more and more as a platform of communication with the masses. Researchers suggest that populism is supported by the media-saturated context to the extent that it makes politics simpler, leaders more personable, and the institutional gatekeepers circumvented (Moffitt, 2016; Esser et al., 2017). Such populous leaders as Donald Trump, Jair Bolsonaro, and Narendra Modi have learned to use television and social media to create the binary discourse of us versus them, to promote their personalities, and demonize their opponents in the global context (Waisbord, 2018). This has been enhanced by the mediatization of politics which has given preference to performative, emotional and spectacle-related communication at the expense of policy-related discourse. The history of media and populism in South Asia has been rather similar, as leaders rely on slogan branding, control of their image, and selective outrage in building loyal followings (Udupa, 2018). Media has been instrumental in supporting populism in weak states especially in Pakistan and this is an important but poorly studied phenomenon that needs to be studied in a systematic manner.

The Pakistan populism, slogans and media have a rich history traceable to the Bhutto times when slogans such as Roti, Kapra, Makaan used a combination of populism and economic frustrations to appeal to the emotions of the people (Jalal, 1995). Yet, the introduction of Pakistan Tehreek-e-Insaf and the political rise of Imran Khan led to the emergence of a new visual and digital era of the use of slogans. The spectacle of politics through slogans like Tabdeeli, Naya Pakistan, and Mujhe Kyun Nikala has been promulgated through traditional and digital media by PTI on purpose. These are not only rhetorical tools but also visual tropes that are repeated in hashtags, placards, chants, and memes that are often stylized in video montages and music, and in street aesthetics. The researchers of political slogans focus on the twofold character of the slogans: the ability to simplify the difficult ideologies in few words and having the emotional appeal, and the capacity to operate as memory aids that encourage the sense of community (Reisigl & Wodak, 2001). The slogans are especially powerful in the Pakistani context since they are working in a society where oral culture, charismatic leadership and media sensationalism coincide to create a sense of political loyalty founded on perception and not policy. Three frameworks of populist political communication, spectacle, and manufacturing consent are used as complementary theories to guide this research, theoretical analysis, and interpretation. The description of populist political communication provided by de Vreese et al. (2018) shows that such communication is

characterized by the presence of a direct leader to-people speech, emotional appeals, and the development of political antagonism. It is a media-driven form of communication that is based on the available messaging, repetition, and personalization of message that would attract the masses. The media strategy of Imran Khan can be viewed as such his regular television appearances, soundbites, which go viral, and the emotionally-charged speeches in front of the crowds serve to convey the message that Imran Khan is the representative of the common people against a rotten elite. The second framework that the notion of the spectacle by Guy Debord (1994) interprets modern politics as one of visually and mediation in which the impression prevails over the content. When regarded through this prism, political slogans are not treated as contents but rather as performance, with visual staging, repetition and media dramatization being the main elements used to enable them to appeal to viewers. Lastly, the theory of manufacturing consent developed by Herman and Chomsky (1988) has articulated that the media systems within capitalistic societies or societies dominated by elites are prone to editing content in a manner that is beneficial to the powerful political figures. This model was created to suit Western liberal democracies but it is true to the Pakistani media environment where the state and corporate interests are in line with populist movements to manufacture consent with a selective coverage, spectacle and gagging of voices.

There is an emerging body of empirical work on political communication in Pakistan that is disparate in nature. The research has been conducted on media partisanship, press freedom, commercialization of news (Riaz & Pasha, 2017), yet not many studies have been conducted on the role of slogans as a part of the bigger machine of populism and consent. The works on the media strategy of Imran Khan usually mention the possibility of bypassing the established media filters through such direct means as Twitter, YouTube, and Facebook (Khan & Shabbir, 2020). Additionally, scholars have examined how PTI's digital wing cultivated an army of supporters to amplify party messaging and attack critics often using sloganized language to enforce ideological boundaries (Ahmad, 2021). Nonetheless, a big part of this work is dedicated to media strategies instead of discursive or symbolic analysis of the slogans itself. It is still necessary to carry out a systematic study of the role of slogans as instruments of affective symbolization, the intensification of the latter by media technologies, and the convergence of these processes in the production of a feeling of popular legitimacy.

Another area that is not well studied is the visual aspect of slogans how it is woven into posters and rallies, memes and videos into a unified populist style. The slogans of PTI are accompanied by the most selective images: Imran Khan in a shalwar kameez, on a green background, representing the idea of nationalism; emotionally charged music with a montage of video material; or black-and-white filters to induce nostalgia and a sense of grievance. These are visual cues as would be described (by Debord, 1994) as a society of the spectacle, with citizens no longer mere receivers of information but engaged in an emotionally engaging political discourse. The slogans turn into cultural objects and are used not only during campaign rallies but also in songs and music videos, clothes and accessories, even in daily dialogs. This aestheticizing of politics is causing a blurring between political communication and entertainment to form a hybrid media landscape where populism flourishes in terms of repetition, dramatization and the simulation of authenticity.

Moreover, the literature lacks robust engagement with the emotional labor of slogans in Pakistan's media culture. PTI media campaigns revolve around emotions of anger, hope, betrayal and pride. Slogans are also emotional triggers, "Tabdeeli" gives a feeling of hope, "Mujhe Kyun Nikala?"

makes one feel wronged, and “chor, chor” rouses moral indignation. These emotional aspects are enhanced by the media environment that works on sensationalism and repetitiveness. Such scholars as Waisbord (2018) and Mazzoleni (2014) claim that, in populist communication, the appeal to emotions may be more effective than the appeal to facts, and this seems to be especially true in the Pakistani context. However, a lack exists in comprehending the way in which the slogans are used as the scripts of emotions that enable the identification of the audience and the collective memory. Considering these affective processes, studies of media-populism relations run the danger of ignoring the underlying psychological processes involved.

Overall, the current literature provides important information about populism, media, and political communication on the global and Pakistani scale. Nonetheless, it has not been keen to analyze the role of political slogans as a spectacle, especially in the emotionally and visually high-intensity media ecosystems. Although the mastery of PTI in digital communication and the ways of its populist framing are considered, not much research is done on how the slogans become the centers of affective, rhetorical, and visual power, which is important in the production of consent in societies with politically volatile cultures. This paper is part of the effort to fill that gap by taking the case of PTI to examine how slogans also serve as symbolic instruments of governance that are not only communicative but also communicating in the media-saturated Pakistan. This research will shed light on how political slogans create emotional identification, spectacle of the media and eventually conformity of politics through qualitative discourse and visual analysis.

Methodology

Research Design

This paper follows a qualitative case study approach to discussing the role of political slogans as a populist communication and media spectacle tool in Pakistan. This case study method is appropriate in order to study in detail a certain political movement, namely, PTI and its implementation of slogans in a changing media landscape. This design is interpretive in nature trying to learn about the meaning-making processes in the creation, dissemination and reception of political slogans. The research is aimed at investigating the effect of slogans on political identity, emotional involvement and created consent in a high mediatized society, instead of hypothesis testing.

Data Sources

To capture the multidimensional nature of political slogan use, the study draws on a range of publicly available qualitative data sources, including:

- **Broadcast Media:** Television news coverage, political talk shows, advertisements, and campaign speeches aired on major Pakistani networks such as Geo News, ARY, and PTV.
- **Social Media Content:** Twitter hashtags, YouTube videos, TikTok reels, and Facebook posts where PTI slogans are circulated, adapted, and memefied.
- **Political Party Communications:** Official press conferences, manifestos, televised addresses, and public rallies, primarily from PTI leadership and spokespersons.

Data Collection and Analytical Methods

The primary data collection method is document and media sampling, focusing on the period between the 2013 and 2022 elections when PTI's slogan use was most prominent. Collected materials are catalogued according to source, slogan, platform, and date of publication or broadcast.

Three complementary analytical techniques guide the interpretation of the data:

- **Discourse Analysis:** This approach is used to examine the language, themes, metaphors, and binaries (e.g., people vs. elite, justice vs. corruption) embedded in PTI slogans and their associated speeches or captions.
- **Visual and Rhetorical Analysis:** This involves analyzing the aesthetic presentation of slogans in videos, posters, rallies, and social media posts including colors, fonts, facial expressions, sounds, and symbolic imagery that contribute to the spectacle and emotional resonance.

These methods enable a layered understanding of slogans as linguistic, visual, and emotional artifacts within the populist communication repertoire.

Analysis and Findings

The Aesthetic of Populist Slogans

PTI slogans are based on the populist character: they are linguistically simple, of emotional character, and are repetitive. When analysed qualitatively using discourse analysis of speeches, rally videos, and social media posts, some of these slogans such as: *Tabdeeli aa nahin rahi, aa gayi hai* (Change is not coming, it has arrived), and *Naya Pakistan* (New Pakistan) turn into an emotionally charged linguistic code. These slogans are summaries of complex political beliefs into easy to swallow, inspirational statements that are relatable to the average individual. They are repeated in their structure building up mental familiarity and emotional appeal, as a mnemonic device that can be chanted, tweeted or printed on placards (Taggart, 2000). They contrast to the technocratic messaging that appeals to reason and instead create the feeling of hope, moral urgency, and even anger. The predictability and rhythm of these slogans in political rallies only serves to further turn them into collectively performed acts and the difference between political expression and cultural ritual becomes almost impossible to draw (Moffitt, 2016).

Visually, the slogans are nearly impossible to separate with nationalistic and leader-focused imagery. These slogans are usually disseminated in media with the help of aesthetic devices, including red and green flags of PTI, the crescent and star emblem of Pakistani flag, and heroic portraits of Imran Khan. The visual congruence between slogans and charismatic image of Imran Khan enhances the personalist and affective level of populism of PTI even more. Even the visual representation of social media banners and backdrops of the rallies show how Imran Khan is frequently in the center of the picture, under the light or standing on the platform, positioning symbolically a single savior (Bos et al., 2020). This type of representation aids the idea of Debord (1994) on the concept of the spectacle, where images take over the role of determining the political reality. The slogan is no longer mere words but a performance coded in language, images, sound and symbols, which have been crafted with utmost care to elicit emotional loyalty.

Fig. 1 Emotional Themes Associated with Key Slogans





Fig. 2 Types of Visual Symbolism Across Media




Media as Amplifier: Slogans in TV and Digital Media

In Pakistan's hybrid media environment, private news channels play a pivotal role in magnifying the reach and emotional impact of political slogans. Discourse analysis of talk shows and campaign coverage reveals that channels like ARY News, BOL, and even state-affiliated PTV often replay PTI slogans in intros, headlines, and breaking news tickers. These slogans are reinforced not only through political commentary but also through thematic music, crowd sounds, and leader visuals, creating a spectacle that merges political messaging with entertainment journalism (Riaz & Pasha, 2017). Panel discussions often include slogan-based segment titles such as "Tabdeeli ka Safar" (The Journey of Change), embedding partisan narratives within the structure of supposed neutral coverage. The media thus operates as an echo chamber, not only reflecting but amplifying slogans and their emotional underpinnings.

In the digital realm, slogans achieve virality through social media platforms like Twitter, YouTube, and TikTok. A qualitative review of viral videos and hashtags indicates that slogans are remixed, memefied, and circulated rapidly, often accompanied by montages of rallies or snippets of speeches. The hashtag #Tabdeeli has been retweeted thousands of times, particularly during election seasons and political crises. PTI's digital media team has strategically deployed visual slogan campaigns using mobile-friendly formats such as vertical videos, quote cards, and reels.

TikTok, in particular, has become a space where users lip-sync or visually re-enact key PTI slogans, giving them cultural life beyond the political domain. This participatory dimension of slogan propagation expands the spectacle from a top-down broadcast model to a bottom-up participatory ritual, aligning with contemporary theories of digital populism (Gerbaudo, 2018). Equally important is the role of WhatsApp networks, where slogan-based audio clips, memes, and short videos are circulated within ideological communities. These messages often carry no official attribution but closely resemble PTI's narrative aesthetics. For example, humorous or emotional audio slogans parodying rival parties often circulate during election campaigns or protests. These informal media circuits contribute to an invisible consensus-building mechanism, reinforcing the spectacle of slogans through every day private communication. In essence, slogans gain a second life in WhatsApp culture becoming fragments of communal identity, humor, and political engagement embedded in personal relationships.

Fig. 3 Frequency of PTI Slogans Across Media Platforms



The Politics of Division: Us vs. Them Framing

A defining feature of PTI's populist sloganism is the construction of political binaries the righteous masses versus the corrupt elite. The slogans like the "Chor Chor" and Looteron ka hisaab lo (Hold the looters accountable) can be seen as emotional trigger that disqualifies the political opposition and makes the cause of the party holy. As the discourse analysis indicates, these slogans are strategically employed during speeches and media presentations to target the anger of people on specific political leaders, mostly the former prime ministers, the opposition parties, or the foreign conspirators. The slogans are not the instruments of policy but rather the tools of character assassination meant to individualize the political discourse and turn the intricate institutional disputes into appealing narratives of betrayal and resistance (Waisbord, 2018).

These slogans are also used to create more external enemies, like nebulous foreign agents or so-called anti-state elements, as the case was with the rhetoric around the removal of Imran Khan in 2022. The name of the slogan, Imported Hukumat Na-Manzoor (Imported government unacceptable), is an example of how the impression of foreign influence was incorporated into the political rhetoric, making it sound nationalist. Qualitative observation of Twitter and TikTok

posts in this timeframe demonstrates that this slogan appeared not only tweeted and shouted during demonstrations but also styled in bold red fonts, placed over the background of national flags or burning effigies of the enemy leaders. These media artifacts demonstrate that slogans are the means of constructing a moral discourse of purity and fight, in which the PTI follower turns into a protector of the national sovereignty, and the opposition is demonized as a traitor to the nation and a collaborator with foreign powers.

Consent and Conformity

Slogans do not only serve to demonstrate political enthusiasm but also they make it easier to translate complicated political realities into manageable signs of allegiance. An example is the slogan *Tabdeeli* which narrows down the multidimensional concept of reform that includes economic changes and social justice in one word that evokes emotional optimism. During a qualitative interview among university students, a large number of them confessed that they chanted or retweeted the slogans without a proper understanding of the specifics of the policies. The slogans give a sense of community and a sense of right and wrong, particularly in a political culture where ideological training is minimal and where spectacle tends to substitute argument. The process aids the Herman and Chomsky theory of the production of consent, through which repetition of emotionally appealing messages are applied to create the appearance of widespread consensus with elite demands.

In the example of the phrase, *Mujhe Kyun Nikala?* (Why was I removed?) which is a phrase that was used by Nawaz in protest when he was disqualified, the PTI and the partisans adopted and ridiculed the phrase as an instrument of humiliation. Such appropriation puts a lot of emphasis on the fact that the slogans can be used as a tool of conformity, and by going a long way to consolidating the views of the people, it also serves to disenfranchise disagreement. Likewise, the phrase, *Vote ko izzat do* (Respect the vote) that originated in the opposition circles got reconstituted in the PTI discourses as being self-seeking and hypocritical. These are changes in meaning that indicate the flexibility and tactical use of slogans in constructing consent in the population through mockery in the name of emotion and the oversimplification of politics. Finally, the internalization of political messages by the population shows that people have accepted the use of slogans. The interviewees, especially the representatives of urban middle-class youth, were inclined to see slogan-shouting in the rally or on social media as a political action and civic good. According to one of the respondents, he felt like he was part of something bigger by saying the term *Naya Pakistan*. This is an indication to the performative nature of slogans in the creation of conformity that is not imposed by repression but by emotional alignment and repetition. The spectacle of slogans thus becomes a mechanism through which political consent is not only manufactured but ritually reaffirmed.

Discussion

The results of this research confirm and add to the current knowledge of the populist slogans in media-based political environments. The discussion and visual analysis reveals that slogans are not mere forms of language but forms of intense affection, symbol and performance. They combine words with emotion and visual flash and narrow down multifaceted policy talk to simple stories of hope, betrayal, or victory. The case of PTI in Pakistan can be considered a unique regional case of how populist political communication can make the slogans saturated with meaning as a result of mass media involvement and the direct involvement of the population. The slogans of PTI, especially the ones, *Tabdeeli*, *Naya Pakistan* and *Imported Hukumat Na-Manzoor*, serve as

multiple-layered signifiers that combine the concerns of political identity, mobilize emotion and simplify complex ideologies into one and repeating sloganistic facets.

As the analysis shows, slogans are also rather insidious devices of political control. They promote conformance by offering binary options between us and them, patriot or traitor, change or status quo and hence they prevent subtle or critical thinking. This reductionism is used to make it easy to mobilize emotions by making the political leader to be a savior and a victim and this makes the people emotionally dependent. In addition, these slogans enter the language of daily communication and online culture, being spread on such popular apps as Twitter, TikTok, and WhatsApp. What follows is a mediated consensus according to which great parts of the population internalize and reproduce political messages without necessarily questioning their implications. It is not the coercion but the repetition and emotional solace that these slogans are providing which constitutes control of the political participation as an act of performing a ritual of politics.

The connection between spectacle, populism, and political participation is particularly noticeable in terms of how the area of visual and auditory space is dominated by slogans during election campaigns or political emergencies. These rallying cries are usually bundled in patriotic imagery, upbeat tunes and charismatic pictures that give the environment a sensual touch that keeps populist zeal. The act of participation turns more into an act of emotional identification as opposed to an act of informed citizenship. The slogan is the passport to be part of a rally a post on a feed, a sticker on a car. As the qualitative chart below indicates, the most frequent slogan on the social media was the slogan of Tabdeeli and Naya Pakistan highlighting the fact that the digital media has become the hub of this new spectacle based involvement. In contrast with the ideological or policy-based party loyalty, populist involvement in slogans is event-oriented, episodic, and emotionally charged, and commonly of short duration and responsive.

There is no exaggeration of the role of media in strengthening this populist agreement. These slogans are recycled as soundbites, headlines and dramatic shots on television channels, particularly the partisan or state-controlled channels. Political activists and social media influencers incorporate them in memes, satire or inspirational posts, which makes sure that the slogans on the one hand, take over the formal and informal communication space. WhatsApp chats are especially unregulated, with slogans becoming narratives with a mix of religious, nationalistic, and moralistic overtones. This cross-platform distribution of slogans is sufficiently saturating, and there is hardly any space left to alternative discourse or opposing narratives. Instead of merely reporting about events, the media turns into an equally important producer of the populist spectacle, with slogans becoming vehicles of mass alignment, and even manipulation, at times. By so doing, it is critical in the production of public consent not in the form of censorship, but through emotional overload and various repetition of images that tie the citizen not to a policy but to a myth.

Conclusion

Political slogans such as those witnessed in Pakistan Tehreek-e-Insaf (PTI) show how media, populism, and the production of consent work in Pakistan in the modern context. This study demonstrates how PTI's slogans such as "Naya Pakistan," "Tabdeeli," and "Imported Hukumat Na-Manzoor" transcended mere rhetoric to become cultural and emotional artifacts, strategically disseminated across traditional and digital media platforms. These slogans created a feeling of belonging and moral urgency amongst supporters by simplifying complicated ideologies in political thinking into simplistic easily emotionally charged binaries and sidelining anyone who opposed

the feeling of collective identity. The work of the media in shouting such slogans cannot be undermined; repetition to the nth degree, visual imagery and participatory digital culture, the message of PTI permeated the popular imagination to a point where emotional appeal replaced substantive discussion. These results are consistent with the theory of the spectacle presented by Debord and the manufactured consent model introduced by Herman-Chomsky that showed how populist leaders manipulate the media ecosystems to manufacture legitimacy. In the polarized environment in Pakistan, slogans were being utilized as means of conformity, using emotions such as hope, anger and nationalism to give the impression of mass agreement on a policy level, whilst concealing the gaps in policy and muffling those with criticism.

Besides, the current research highlights the wider consequence of slogan populism to democratic rhetoric in the postcolonial societies. The triumph of PTI in instilling its slogans in the minds of people reflects the risks of a political culture of which spectacle replaces accountability, and the press both state-controlled and commercially motivated serves as a partner in shrinking the arena of civic debate. Aestheticization of politics by means of using images of leaders, patriotic images, and memes that went viral contributed both to the strengthening of emotional loyalty and to undermining the domain of rational discussion. As the recent case of PTI has demonstrated, slogans served as a unifying mantra and the weapon of division, presenting political opposites as traitors or stooges of the foreign powers. This is a binary reasoning which is fuelled by the hybrid media, and this creates polarization and lack of trust in institutions. Moving forward, the study calls for critical media literacy and regulatory frameworks to counter the manipulative potential of populist spectacle. It also invites further research into how marginalized groups resist or reinterpret such slogans, and how alternative narratives might emerge in increasingly fragmented media landscapes. Ultimately, the PTI phenomenon serves as a cautionary tale: in an age where politics is reduced to slogans and screens, the project of democracy hinges on reclaiming complexity from the clutches of emotional simplification and manufactured consent.

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