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## JUDICIAL INTERVENTION, PARTY AUTONOMY, AND EFFICIENCY: A COMPARATIVE DOCTRINAL STUDY OF THE UK ARBITRATION ACTS 1996 AND 2025

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### ABSTRACT

*This paper engages in a comparative approach of the Arbitration Act of 1996 of the United Kingdom and the recently enacted Arbitration Act 2025 and explores the contribution which these legislations have made in terms of the refinement of the arbitration law and practice. The 1996 Act, arguably a landmark in modern-day arbitration law, codified some of the most fundamental principles of arbitration, i.e., party autonomy, restraint on judicial intervention and fairness of the procedure which made London a leading arbitral seat. However, the development of international arbitration and development of new challenges, such as efficiency issues, confidentiality and the proliferation of the use of digital platforms has over the last 3 decades required reform. The Arbitration Act 2025 moves forward in such a way that it does not displace the existing framework, instead of adding provisions on summary disposal, emergency arbitrators, clarified principles on confidentiality and a more articulated scope of judicial review. These reforms are in line with international best practices and it maintains the stability that the UK is known to be predictable internationally. The analysis conclude that the 2025 Act will provide London with even stronger competitive advantage in terms of procedural control, responsive court supervision and of adherence to the values that have always guided the English arbitration law.*

**Keywords:** Arbitration Act 1996; Arbitration Act 2025; international arbitration; party autonomy; judicial intervention; procedural efficiency; confidentiality; arbitral reform; London as arbitral seat; comparative arbitration law.

### Introduction

Arbitration in the United Kingdom was always regarded as the preferred way of resolving commercial disputes mainly because of its flexibility, its ability to remain confidential and the

ease in enforcing any agreement. Arbitration Act 1996 (UK) was said to have been a modern and comprehensive code that brought a unification of English law on arbitration in one law. It was intended to diminish the intervention of the judiciary, reinforce party freedom and develop an optimal system of dispute solution that will meet international standards. The 1996 Act has remained unchanged in substance since its enactment almost thirty years ago and has been used as one of the cornerstones of the establishment of London as a major arbitral seat.

However, by the early 2020s, it was reported that some of the measures in the 1996 Act had become obsolete and had led to inefficiencies, ambiguities and procedural complexities. The Law Commission of England and Wales acted in reaction to this by conducting a review of the Act resulting in the passing of the Arbitration Act 2025 (UK). The new Act, which was enacted on 24 February 2025 and took effect on 1 August 2025, brought important but focused changes designed to future-proof UK arbitration law to the next generation of disputes (Participation, n.d.-b).

This paper undertakes a comparative doctrinal analysis of the 1996 and 2025 Acts, focusing on three interrelated themes: (i) judicial intervention, (ii) party autonomy, and (iii) efficiency. These themes not only define the core philosophy of arbitration law but also mark the most consequential areas of reform in the 2025 Act. Through this lens, the paper evaluates whether the 2025 reforms successfully recalibrate the delicate balance between judicial oversight and arbitral independence, while ensuring that arbitration remains both efficient and internationally competitive.

The methodology employed is doctrinal, involving a close reading of statutory provisions, parliamentary debates, and Law Commission reports, as well as comparative, situating the reforms against international arbitral practices such as the UNCITRAL Model Law, the Singapore International Arbitration Act, and the Hong Kong Arbitration Ordinance.

The paper is structured as follows: Section 2 sets out the theoretical framework, clarifying the concepts of judicial intervention, party autonomy, and efficiency in arbitration. Section 3 examines judicial intervention under the 1996 and 2025 Acts, with a focus on reforms to jurisdictional challenges. Section 4 evaluates reforms affecting party autonomy, including choice of law rules and arbitrator duties. Section 5 analyses the efficiency-enhancing mechanisms of the 2025 Act, such as summary disposal and emergency arbitrators. Section 6 situates the reforms within a comparative international context. Section 7 concludes with an assessment of whether the 2025 Act strikes the appropriate balance for contemporary and future arbitration practice.

### **Theoretical Framework: Judicial Intervention, Party Autonomy, and Efficiency**

The law of arbitration is structured upon a delicate equilibrium between three foundational principles: judicial intervention, party autonomy, and efficiency. These principles have historically defined the contours of arbitral practice in the United Kingdom and beyond, shaping both statutory reforms and judicial interpretation. To understand the transition from the Arbitration Act 1996 to the Arbitration Act 2025, it is essential to clarify the meaning and scope of each principle.

**Judicial Intervention**

Judicial intervention refers to the extent to which state courts may support, supervise, or interfere with arbitral proceedings. Arbitration derives its legitimacy from the consent of the parties, but it cannot be entirely detached from the state judicial system, particularly in matters of enforcement and procedural safeguards. The 1996 Act expressed this philosophy in its “general principles” (s.1(c)), which declared that “the court should not intervene except as provided by this Part” (Participation, n.d.-a). Yet, over time, provisions such as s.67 (challenges to jurisdiction) and s.69 (appeals on a point of law, where permitted) raised questions about whether judicial review was more intrusive than intended (Rab, 2022). Judicial intervention thus encapsulates the central tension in arbitration law: how to ensure fairness and legality without undermining the autonomy of the arbitral process.

**Party Autonomy**

Party autonomy is widely regarded as the cornerstone of arbitration. It denotes the right of the parties to determine the procedure, substantive law, seat, and even the tribunal itself (Hasan, 2024). The 1996 Act enshrined this principle by providing that parties are free to agree on how disputes should be resolved, subject only to limited mandatory rules (s.4). Nonetheless, ambiguity persisted—particularly regarding the law governing the arbitration agreement itself, which was left to judicial interpretation until clarified in 2025 (Aladaseen, 2025). In comparative terms, the primacy of party autonomy in the UK reflects international norms, most notably the UNCITRAL Model Law (Art. 19), which recognizes the freedom of parties to shape arbitral procedure (Abimanyu & Sinaga, 2025).

**Efficiency**

Efficiency refers to the ability of arbitration to deliver timely, cost-effective, and final dispute resolution. It is often cited as one of arbitration’s greatest advantages over litigation. The 1996 Act sought to foster efficiency by granting tribunals wide case management powers (ss.33–34). Yet critics observed that inefficiencies persisted, partly due to procedural ambiguity and partly because the Act lacked explicit recognition of tools such as summary disposal or emergency arbitrators (Rogers, 2023). The 2025 Act addressed these concerns directly, codifying mechanisms designed to accelerate proceedings while safeguarding due process. In modern arbitral theory, efficiency is closely tied to the enforceability of awards under the New York Convention 1958, since delays and procedural missteps can undermine enforceability across jurisdictions (Chauhan, 2024).

As a conclusion, these three principles, judicial intervention, party autonomy, and efficiency, provide the conceptual framework through which the 1996 and 2025 Acts will be comparatively analyzed in the following sections. They also serve as benchmarks for evaluating whether the UK continues to maintain its status as a leading arbitration hub in an increasingly competitive global landscape.

### Judicial Intervention under the Arbitration Acts 1996 and 2025

The balance between judicial support and judicial restraint lies at the heart of arbitration law. The Arbitration Act 1996 sought to codify a principle of minimal intervention, while still ensuring that the courts acted as guardians of procedural fairness and legality. Yet in practice, certain provisions allowed for extensive judicial scrutiny, generating criticism from practitioners and prompting reform. The Arbitration Act 2025 preserves the philosophy of limited intervention but introduces targeted reforms to curb unnecessary court involvement, particularly in challenges to arbitral jurisdiction.

#### Judicial Philosophy in the 1996 Act

The 1996 Act famously enshrined, in section 1(c), the principle that “the court should not intervene except as provided by this Part” (Pathak, n.d.). Despite this, the Act left wide scope for judicial review in several areas:

- **Section 32:** allowed parties to apply to the court for rulings on jurisdiction, even before a tribunal had ruled.
- **Section 45:** permitted court rulings on preliminary points of law, subject to party consent.
- **Section 67:** enabled parties to challenge an award on jurisdictional grounds through a *full rehearing*, not merely a review of the tribunal’s decision (Hosking, n.d.).
- **Section 69:** provided for appeals on a point of law (albeit with restricted availability).

Although intended as safeguards, these provisions were frequently invoked in high-stakes disputes, sometimes undermining arbitration’s promise of finality. Critics argued that s.67 *in particular* allowed parties to re-litigate jurisdictional matters, increasing costs and delaying enforcement (Brower, 2023).

#### The 2025 Act and Section 67 Reform

The most significant reform in the 2025 Act relates to jurisdictional challenges under s.67. The new provision restricts challenges to a more limited form of review, rather than a full rehearing (Hoffmann et al., 2025). The court is now obliged to give deference to the tribunal’s findings of fact, focusing instead on legal and procedural errors. This shift aligns the UK more closely with international standards such as the UNCITRAL Model Law, where tribunals’ jurisdictional decisions are given presumptive weight (Abimanyu & Sinaga, 2025).

Moreover, the 2025 Act streamlines applications under ss.32 and 45, discouraging premature judicial involvement unless the matter is of genuine practical necessity (Participation, n.d.-b). By doing so, it reinforces the tribunal’s primary competence in determining its own jurisdiction (*Kompetenz-Kompetenz*), while preserving courts as a final safeguard.

#### Appeals on a Point of Law

The 1996 Act’s controversial s.69, allowing appeals on a point of law, remains formally in place, but the 2025 Act introduces clarifications to limit frivolous use. Courts now require parties to demonstrate substantial injustice arising from an error of law before granting leave (Bundela & Sangwan, 2025). This modification responds to long-standing criticisms that s.69 undermined arbitral finality, while retaining its role as a uniquely English safeguard of legal coherence.

### Comparative Evaluation

The reforms introduced in the 2025 Act represent a recalibration rather than a wholesale transformation. While the 1996 Act created space for judicial scrutiny, the 2025 Act narrows that space by:

- limiting rehearings of jurisdictional challenges;
- tightening leave requirements for appeals on law;
- discouraging premature recourse to the courts.

The effect is to reinforce the principle of minimal intervention while maintaining judicial oversight in exceptional cases. In comparative perspective, this brings English arbitration law closer to the international mainstream, without abandoning its distinctiveness.

### Party Autonomy under the Arbitration Acts 1996 and 2025

Party autonomy has long been described as the *grundnorm* of English arbitration law. The 1996 Act hard-wired this premise, allowing parties wide latitude over procedure, seat, substantive law, and tribunal constitution, subject only to limited mandatory rules (Participation, n.d.-a). The 2025 Act preserves this architecture but resolves doctrinal uncertainty around the law governing the arbitration agreement, strengthens disclosure duties and immunity of arbitrators, and clarifies the interface between party design choices and court support. Collectively, these reforms re-affirm autonomy while reducing the scope for opportunistic litigation.

### Choice of Law of the Arbitration Agreement: From Judicial Patchwork to Statutory Clarity

Under the 1996 Act, the law governing the arbitration agreement (distinct from the matrix contract) was left to common-law conflicts analysis. Appellate courts crafted a multi-stage test that, by turns, emphasized express/implicit choice and close connections to the seat. In *Enka v. Chubb*, the UK Supreme Court preferred the law chosen for the main contract (absent contrary indication), with the law of the seat operating as a fallback (*RBA2021006*, n.d.). This approach, refined but unsettled by *Kabab-Ji v. Kout Food and Sulamérica*, generated forum risk and drafting traps.

The 2025 Act introduces a clear default rule: the law of the seat governs the arbitration agreement unless the parties expressly agree otherwise. This bright-line presumption privileges predictability and coheres with international practice in leading Model Law jurisdictions. It also respects *separability* (s.7, 1996 Act) without forcing parties into complex implied-choice debates. In practical terms, parties now know that selecting London as the seat will, absent explicit stipulation, also select English law for the arbitration clause. The reform reduces satellite litigation and aligns the UK with a pro-enforcement philosophy.

### Separability and Kompetenz-Kompetenz: Autonomy's Structural Guarantees

The 1996 Act codified separability (s.7) and recognized the tribunal's power to rule on its own jurisdiction (s.30), enabling parties to design arbitral processes confident that jurisdictional objections would be dealt with in-forum. The 2025 Act retains these pillars and, by narrowing rehearings under s.67 (see Section 3), gives functional bite to *Kompetenz-Kompetenz*: parties exercise autonomy up front, and courts defer unless clear error or unfairness is shown. The

upshot is a shift from de novo relitigation to review, which strengthens the parties' initial procedural bargain.

### **Arbitrator Disclosure, Independence, and Integrity Obligations**

While the 1996 Act imposed general duties of fairness and impartiality (ss.1, 24, 33), the 2025 Act refines disclosure obligations, drawing on case law such as *Halliburton v. Chubb* (which underscored context-sensitive disclosure in multiple appointments) (Lincoln, 2021). The new statutory language clarifies an ongoing duty to disclose circumstances that might reasonably give rise to justifiable doubts about impartiality, calibrated to the custom of the relevant arbitral community. For parties, this reduces information asymmetries at the appointment stage and during the reference, improving the quality of consent throughout proceedings.

### **Arbitrator Immunity and Cost Exposure**

The 1996 Act already protected arbitrators from liability for acts done in good faith (s.29), yet cost-exposure and injunctive tactics could chill decision-making. The 2025 Act fortifies arbitrator immunity, curbing claims and ancillary applications aimed at pressuring tribunals, save for narrow bad-faith or fraud exceptions (Warwas, 2017). For parties, stronger immunity stabilizes the tribunal's decisional independence, encouraging robust case management consistent with the parties' agreed procedural framework.

### **Party-Designed Procedure and Court Support**

Both Acts preserve wide procedural freedom (subject to mandatory safeguards). The 2025 Act complements this by recognizing summary disposal (see Section 5) and streamlining court assistance (e.g., tighter gateways for premature court rulings on jurisdiction or law). The doctrinal effect is to translate party-crafted efficiency tools into enforceable practice, reducing the mismatch between bespoke procedural clauses and judicial oversight. Parties' choices about timetables, evidence, and interim measures receive firmer statutory backing, improving the reliability of English-seated clauses in cross-border deals.

### **Comparative Assessment**

Doctrinally, the 2025 Act advances autonomy on three fronts: (i) conflicts certainty for the arbitration agreement; (ii) effective self-governance via restrained post-award review; and (iii) integrity-enhancing obligations that sustain informed consent (disclosure) while shielding decision-makers (immunity). In comparative perspective, these moves harmonize England & Wales with Model Law best practice while preserving hallmark features, commercial pragmatism and sophisticated court support, that made the 1996 Act a global benchmark.

### **Efficiency and Procedural Innovation**

The Arbitration Act 1996 (AA 1996) was a product of its time, primarily aimed at consolidating fragmented arbitration statutes rather than radically innovating procedural tools. As a result, efficiency measures were largely left to party agreement or tribunal discretion. For instance, the 1996 Act contained no express power for summary disposal of weak claims; instead, tribunals had to rely on implied discretion under section 33 to conduct proceedings fairly and expeditiously (van Haersolte-van Hof, 1997). Similarly, the Act did not recognize emergency arbitrators, leaving parties dependent on interim relief from national courts (Varesis, 2022).

By contrast, the Arbitration Act 2025 (AA 2025) expressly addresses efficiency concerns, reflecting global developments in arbitral practice. It introduces statutory authority for tribunals to dismiss unmeritorious claims or defenses through “summary disposal,” a reform intended to prevent abusive delay tactics and reduce costs (Ali, 2025). While this brings English law in line with institutions such as the LCIA, ICC, and SIAC, critics warn that excessive reliance on summary procedures risks undermining the due process rights of parties, particularly in high-stakes disputes (G. Born, 2021).

The 2025 Act also introduces formal recognition of emergency arbitrators, granting them statutory legitimacy to issue urgent interim measures prior to the constitution of the full tribunal. This closes a gap in the 1996 framework and harmonizes English law with leading arbitral jurisdictions, enhancing London’s competitiveness as a global seat of arbitration (Law, 1995). In addition, the repeal of sections 85–88, which had preserved outdated rules for domestic arbitration, simplifies the statute and reflects the practical reality that modern arbitration is inherently international in character (Lew & Mistelis, 2003).

Taken together, these reforms aim to balance procedural innovation with fairness. While efficiency gains are evident, they must be weighed against due process concerns. The statutory codification of summary disposal, in particular, requires careful judicial oversight to prevent claims of procedural inequality, underscoring the enduring tension between efficiency and justice in arbitral reform (Binisaroj & Kolo, 2024).

### **Comparative International Context**

The Arbitration Act 2025 should be read against the benchmark of the UNCITRAL Model Law on International Commercial Arbitration (1985, as amended in 2006), which many jurisdictions have adopted wholly or in part to promote harmonization and predictability in arbitral procedure. While the 1996 Act drew inspiration from the Model Law, it deliberately preserved a distinct English approach; the 2025 Act moves the needle closer to international orthodoxy by recognizing tools such as summary disposal and emergency arbitrators, thereby reducing divergence from widely accepted standards (Law, 2008).

Comparisons with Singapore and Hong Kong are particularly instructive. Singapore’s International Arbitration Act (Model Law–based) has long been praised for effective court support and modern interim-measures practice; Hong Kong’s Arbitration Ordinance similarly embeds Model Law principles while facilitating swift, enforceable interim relief (Hanotiau, 2014). The UK’s statutory recognition of emergency arbitrators and streamlined case-management under the 2025 Act mirrors these developments, seeking efficiency gains without compromising procedural integrity (G. B. Born, 2020).

From a market perspective, these reforms help sustain London’s competitiveness among leading seats (e.g., Singapore, Paris, Hong Kong). By codifying efficiency-oriented mechanisms in primary legislation, as opposed to leaving them solely to institutional rules, the UK signals regulatory clarity and user-facing certainty, a strategy consistent with comparative best practice and scholarship on international arbitral harmonization (Moreira, 2024).

**Conclusion**

The comparative analysis of the Arbitration Acts of 1996 and 2025 highlights both continuity and evolution in the United Kingdom's arbitration framework. The 1996 Act was groundbreaking in consolidating the law, introducing clarity and accessibility, and ensuring that arbitration in England and Wales was underpinned by the principles of party autonomy, limited judicial intervention, and procedural fairness. It successfully aligned the UK's arbitration practice with global standards at the time and cemented London's position as a premier arbitral seat.

But as the practice of international arbitration grew in the last thirty years, new issues have arisen to create a need of reform. The Arbitration Act 2025 is a reaction to those needs and addresses them with thorough-yet-strategic changes. One of its most striking accomplishments is the codification of previously unsettled principles, including express provision on summary disposal and emergency arbitrators, which boosts efficiency on the one hand and reflects the practice in Singapore and Hong Kong on the other hand. It is also noteworthy that the 2025 Act also responds to user demands because of its focus on issues such as confidentiality, tribunal powers, and streamlining procedures that matter most in arbitrations.

The reforms also reset the scales of judicial intervention. On the one hand, the 1996 Act put a strong limitation on the unjustified court involvement in the arbitral proceedings; on the other hand, judicial control was necessary in order to maintain the due process and to compel the arbitral awards. The 2025 Act keeps this philosophy intact but adds more to it by, first, clarifying the extent to which judicial review can remove the matter and secondly, restricting the challenges of the matter which are just aimed at stalling proceedings. In so doing, it validates the aspect that the work of courts is facilitative instead of supervisory, making it more predictable both in international and domestic levels of use.

Simultaneously, the comparative analysis shows that the 2025 Act is not an attempt to implement a radical change to the framework of 1996. Rather, it symbolizes an improvement of what had already been a successful formula. This evolutionary solution guarantees that the arbitral system will not fall apart and be replaced by another, as it will create continuity and stability in the arbitral system, which is critical in assuring international investors and arbitral practitioners that their faith is not misplaced. Radical change could have threatened to destabilize a system that is generally held in high esteem; instead, the Act shows restraint on the part of the legislation with measures being both accommodative and moderate.

There are more horizons on the horizon that will confront the law of arbitration. The digitalization of the proceedings, the greater use of virtual hearings, the adoption of the artificial intelligence into case management, the greater use of third-party funding all raise new questions concerning the arbitral legislation. The second step towards modernizing the law is that, although the 2025 Act still has some room on its journey towards modernity, it does not make the law ossified and unable to react to future changes.

Ultimately, this paper finds that the Arbitration Act 2025 further ensures London remains at the helm of the world of arbitration with the reinforcement of the three pillars that have



secured its prominence: judicial restraint, party autonomy, and procedural efficiency. Simplifying the latest rather than changing the 1996 Act proves that the new regulation has succeeded in adapting to changing international norms and has cut across its own advantages. In such a manner, the 2025 Act is not only going to secure the competitiveness of London but also preconditions the response to the emerging challenges of an ever-evolving dispute resolution environment.

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