Escalation, Deterrence, And Regional Order: An International Relations Analysis of The U.S.–Israel–Iran Conflict

Abstract

This paper looks at the strategic crises between the United States, Israel and Iran using the concept of international relations within the context of international relations theory, the dynamics of escalation, deflection and transformation of regional order in the Middle East. It holds that the U.S.-Israel-Iran conflict is a triangular security dilemma whereby security seeking by each of the involved actors increases the instability in the region as it goes about strengthening deterrence based restraint. Underlying the work are realism, offensive realism and the deterrence theory, which illustrate that instability has become embedded in strategic mistrust, politics of alliance and military posturing and has failed to lead to full scale interstate war. The paper also analyzes the security architecture implication of this conflict to Middle Eastern architecture and evaluates the policy implication of this conflict on Pakistan. It arrives at the conclusion that the regional order is still threatened of being shaken by strategic rivalry unless institutionalized crisis management and rejuvenated diplomatic involvement is enforced.