Jurisdiction Without Sanctions? The Enforcement of ICJ Judgments in International Law

Abstract

While the ICJ (International Court of Justice) has a very relevant role in the peaceful settlement of State conflicts, its implementation of its judgments is one of the classic challenges of International Law. Judgments have binding force between the parties per Article 59 of theStatute of the Court and case-observance by the member-states under Article 94 of the United Nations Charter is of limited nature and requires the involvement of the Security Council. The problem being the ICJ lacks its own execution apparatus with regard to a state that it can push an adverse ruling on. The present article aims to explore the conjugate dimension of the enforceability of ICJ judgments in light of the legal force. It separates bindingness, compliance and enforcement and claims that absence of the automatic sanctions does not deprive ICJ's decisions of their normative, legally binding force. Instead, the feeble point is in the uncoordinated, politically dependent methods open post judgment. Special attention is paid to Article 94, the Security Council, state compliance, countermeasures and recent ICJ practice relating to the allegations of armed conflict and genocide. The article proposes that what enforcement must do today is go beyond a strictly bilateral approach, and integrate more robust institutional follow-up, monitoring, diplomatic pressure and, where "legally possible", third state involvement. There is no need to make the ICJ more of a domestic-style coercive Court, but merely a much more credible linkage between judicial decision and actual implementation.

Keywords: International Court of Justice; ICJ judgments; enforcement; state compliance; Article 94; Security Council; international adjudication; sanctions; state responsibility; international law.

https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.22117290