Self-image, memory, and sense of personal identity

Abstract

Is it necessary for an individual to possess conscious awareness of their actions when observing, desiring, or contemplating something? Can thought be regarded as self-intimating, borrowing the terminology of Gilbert Ryle? Until recently, philosophers held the prevailing belief that this assertion was incontrovertible. According to Descartes, it is self-evident that the mind, in its capacity as a thinking entity, cannot possess any thoughts of which it is not consciously aware. This notion, often attributed to Descartes, is expressed in his Fourth Replies (CSM II 171). Descartes is commonly attributed with the origination of the phrase. According to Locke, it is inherently impossible for an individual to have a perception without simultaneously being aware of their own act of perceiving. According to the assertions made in Essay 2.XXVII.9, it is understood that our perception occurs through several sensory modalities such as hearing, smelling, tasting, feeling, meditating, and volition. Furthermore, the statement made in Essay 1.II.5 posits that the notion of imprinting something on the mind without the mind's conscious awareness appears to be scarcely comprehensible. Moreover, Hume posits in Treatise 1.IV.2 that "consciousness is the means by which we acquire knowledge of all mental actions and sensations." The notion that self-awareness of one's own ideas is a prerequisite for consciousness has been widely accepted among philosophers who adhere to the self-intimation thesis. However, it is worth noting that this belief is often assumed without substantial empirical evidence to substantiate its validity. Notably, Dinnaga, an Indian Buddhist philosopher from the period of 480 to 540 A.D., and his critic Dharmakrti, both staunchly advocate for the concept of self-intimation. Dinnaga also supports the notion of self-intimation. In India, there exists a contrasting perspective to that of the Western world, wherein the notion that individuals possess inherent awareness of their own mental states is considered heretical. Consequently, individuals were compelled to provide substantiating proof to support their claims. The argument presented by the individual is closely linked to the Buddhist perspective on this fundamental issue, since it explores the intricate connection between memory and the notion of personal continuity. Dinn-aga's conclusion is based on particular empirical evidence on the characteristics of memory, and his line of reasoning is intricately connected to the philosophical framework of Buddhism in addressing this fundamental quandary.