Political Economy of Local Governance in KP: Power, Patronage, and Public Accountability

Abstract

This study evaluates critically the political economy of local governance in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (KP), in Pakistan through the lens of the interactions of power relations, patronage system, and accountability. Although legislative solutions like 18th and 25th Constitutional Amendments have sought to devolve power and to reinstate peripheral regions, in terms of local democratic governance, in view of ingrained informal authority, the practice is still limited by clientelist power politics. Based on theoretical insights and field evidence in the districts of Peshawar, Swat, Bannu, and the merged tribal areas, the paper demonstrates how the mediation of access to state resources is still practiced by the traditional elites (i.e., Maliks and Khans), political parties, and bureaucratic actors. The study points at the continued rent seeking activities, arbitrary allocation of funds, and laxity of supervising agencies that undermine the confidence of citizens and service delivery performance. Moreover, the marginalized communities especially the women and religious minorities are still not conspicuous at the local level when it comes to decision-making. The article provides a political economy perspective on the nature of proposed reform, arguing that it is important to go further than institutional design to structural incentives, elite capture and socio-political context in which governance practices are conducted in practice. It ends in a series of policy recommendations aimed at improving civic education, improving the means of accountability, and protecting local institutions against political intrusion.

Keywords: Political Economy, Local Governance, Power, Patronage, Public Accountability