REVISITING THE JUS AD BELLUM: A CRITICAL ANALYSIS OF THE RIGHT OF SELF-DEFENSE AND THE PROHIBITION ON THE USE OF FORCE UNDER INTERNATIONAL LAW

Abstract

International relations involving the use of force are governed by the legal theory known as jus ad bellum. Focusing on the provisions of essay 51 and the relationship between Article 2(4) and Article 51, this essay provides a sociopolitical and contemporary criticism of the UN Charter. Still, the enumerated aggressive action is forbidden and here the word "force" turns out to be amenable to an exception: self-defense in the event that the aggression is armed.  This article analyzes shifts in the judicial and institutional nature of the ICJ, state behavior, sovereignty disputes and cooperation frameworks. International relations involving the use of force are governed by the legal theory known as jus ad bellum. Focusing on the provisions of essay 51 and the relationship between Article 2(4) and Article 51, this essay provides a sociopolitical and contemporary criticism of the UN Charter.  Analyzing the given topic from a critical perspective of the rights, the author indicates that, although the right to self-preservation continues to be an essential element of the multiple contemporary legal systems, it requires adjustments based on the modern threats/violence nature and the warfare transformations. The assessment expands upon previous work by the United Nations Security Council on the subject of the right to self-defense and the present state of international law as it pertains to the prohibition of force.

Keywords: Jus ad Bellum, Self-defense, Use of Force, International Law, UN Charter.