Artificial Intelligence, Nuclear Deterrence, and Strategic Stability in South Asia: A Security Dilemma Perspective

Abstract

Artificial Intelligence (AI) is increasingly transforming the concept of nuclear deterrence in one of the most volatile strategic equations in the world the India-Pakistan nuclear dyad. The article explores the changing South Asian perceptions of vulnerability and resolve through the power of Artificial Intelligence (AI) based intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR) systems, autonomous weapons systems, machine assisted command and control systems and cyber-AI convergence. Based on Robert Jervis' security dilemma theory, the article concludes that AI is not just putting new weapons into the arsenal, but at the same time deepening the structural insecurity of the region's high concentration of actors, locations, and doctrine, which are separated only by a narrow margin. When one State invests in the development of the "early warning" or "counterforce" targeting using artificial intelligence, it is interpreted as an offensive and threatening act by the other State, which creates a vicious circle of mistrust, diminishing the time for decision-making and increasing the chance of unintentional or accidental escalation. The analysis synthesizes the international academic research on the topic of AI and nuclear risk with the unique characteristics of South Asian deterrence short missile ranges, sub-conventional warfare, and doctrinal opacity. Finally, policy recommendations on 'confidence building measures restraint in AI-nuclear entanglement' and 'bilateral and trilateral risk-reduction' dialogue between India, Pakistan and China are given.

Keywords: Artificial Intelligence, Nuclear Deterrence, Strategic Stability, Security Dilemma, South Asia, India-Pakistan Relations, Autonomous Weapons, Command and Control